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JABSTRACT
Structuralist models of development still persist in the 1990s, and many developing 
countries continue to target macroeconomic stability through aggressive monetary controls 
based on structuralist assumptions. Simultaneously, prudential criteria, principally capital 
controls take effect through the commercial banking system. It is the central hypothesis of 
this thesis that monetary controls impact adversely on commercial bank performance and on 
banks’ market share, and that the simultaneous implementation of monetary and prudential 
regulation can undermine the objectives of monetary stability and the growth of the banking 
system. This study argues that those monetary measures most frequently applied to protect 
the balance of payments; primary and secondary reserve requirements, credit controls, and 
interest rate controls, force cost adjustments and non-optimal portfolio realignments which 
stymie commercial bank performance. These arguments are illustrated from the cases of 
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago for the period 1973-1992.
The study discusses the rationale for regulation, analyses commercial bank 
performance in the Caribbean and formulates a model which includes regulatory variables for 
testing the impact of monetary and prudential regulation on bank performance. The model 
also defines the determinants of bank performance and provides the basis for deriving 
regulation and performance indices with global application.
Results disclose that most regulatory variables are negatively associated with 
commercial bank performance and tentative causality is established running from regulation 
to bank performance. Where cost-axiomatic interest rate-setting is practised the adverse 
impact on bank performance is alleviated, but unevenness of monetary and prudential 
regulations adversely influence the performance of commercial banks, contributing to loss of 
market share relative to non-banks. Regulation assists in achieving macroeconomic 
objectives, but greater Iiberalistion appears desirable for the development of commercial 
banking. However, new monetary theories are needed to identify alternative vehicles, other 
than commercial banks, if macroeconomic objectives are to be achieved in increasingly 
liberalised environments.
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Contemporary thinking on liberalisation of the financial system generally makes the 
point that liberalisation offers greater advantages for financial development. This position is 
usually based on the view that prices should be determined by market forces and that monetary 
regulation stymies the performance of the banking system. In the Caribbean context, this view 
has gained considerable ground but has not been supported by any substantive research.
The literature on commercial bank performance normally examines performance in 
terms of effectiveness and efficiency but seldom takes fully into account the impact of monetary 
and prudential regulation. Studies on the impact of monetary regulation on commercial banks 
tend to analyse particular forms of monetary regulation, such as reserve requirements, credit 
controls or interest rate controls, but rarely their combined impact on bank liquidity, solvency, 
profitability or market share.
More recently, studies on prudential regulation have analysed the impact of capital 
adequacy on bank performance but have tended to omit the simultaneous impact of other forms 
of monetary regulation, largely because concerns of capital adequacy and other forms of 
prudential regulation have only recently been ascribed increased importance. As a result, joint 
examination of monetary and prudential regulation was not viewed as a priority, even during 
periods when direct monetary controls were in place in Europe and North America.
In developing countries, and particularly in die highly regulated case of the Caribbean, 
where monetary controls continued to be employed up to the early 1990s, the macroeconomic 
response to monetary regulation tended to be a more critical concern. Caribbean studies 
therefore focused on the effectiveness of monetary regulation in bringing about expected 
macroeconomic outcomes, and researchers largely omitted analysis of the impact of monetary 
regulation on commercial banks. This study of the joint impact of monetary and prudential 
regulation in the Caribbean is intended to fill this gap in the literature. It is based on the view 
that the financial sector in general, and the banking system in particular, are important vehicles
Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
for achieving accelerated growth and development and that banks should not only be seen as 
conduits for monetary control and that high levels of regulation are not long term solutions to 
macroeconomic management. The four main hypotheses are, firstly, that monetary regulation 
impacts adversely on the performance of banks, secondly, that monetary regulation when 
imposed conjointly with prudential regulation sometimes conflicts with the prudential objectives 
of regulators; thirdly, that regulators sometimes engage in cost-axiomatic or accommodative 
pricing, and fourthly, that even where cost axiomatic pricing is practised, that regulation still 
reduces the flexibility of commercial banks and depresses their market share relative to non­
banks. This occurs even where banks continue to make profits.
In addition to the four main hypotheses cited above, other issues will be addressed. 
These include, firstly, the view that equity holders bear the cost of reserve requirements; 
secondly, the view that regulated credit ceilings do not affect profitability (due to the 
profitability of default); and thirdly that reserve requirements tend to be associated with 
increased bank risk. Fourthly, the study will also examine whether the views of commercial 
banks that reserve requirements and interest rate controls are the most important factors which 
limit bank performance are borne out by the analysis. Fifthly, the study is expected to reveal 
that a model of bank performance in the Caribbean cannot have good predictive capability 
unless regulatory variables are explicitly included.
Several other assertions are discussed which do not lend themselves easily to empirical 
testing. These include the view that "a priori" indications suggest that entry barriers decline 
when oligopolistic behaviour among banks is reduced. This finds support in the observations 
of Spiller and Favaro (1984) and in the Caribbean, Howard (1976). The Caribbean case of few 
explicit barriers to entry also reflects the observation of Pastr£ (1981) that while some countries 
will allow access to the market, monetary and other controls may prevent any meaningful level 
of expansion within the market (a view shared by Farrell (1990) about Trinidad and Tobago).1
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1 Pastre cites the case of France where there were ceilings on overall increases in credit and suggests that 
new entrants to the market are condemned to an insignificant market share, even though there are no barriers 
to entry.
Relatively high returns on assets, and the rapid rise of non-banks and their under 
regulation, also give credence to the observation that low failure rates and discriminatory 
pricing policies are a result of lack of competition, and that the converse, high failure rates, 
result from intense competition [Phillips (1964)]. The Trinidad and Tobago situation of the 
1980s further raises the related view that bank crises are frequently caused by over-entry to the 
industry attracted by boom profits, which result from governmental controls which leave 
producers in the industry earning super-normal profits [Barclay (1978)].2
This introduction identifies the major issues to be raised in the analysis, defines 
regulation, and describes the regulatory cycle as well as the interrelationships between various 
forms of regulation. It also defines structural, monetary and prudential regulation and proceeds 
to establish the purposes for which monetary and prudential regulation are employed. A brief 
summary is presented of the theoretical context in which regulation takes place. Similarly, it 
provides definitions of bank performance and a brief overview of the performance of 
commercial banks in the Caribbean during the period reviewed.
1.2 Regulation
Regulation, defined as "the public administrative policing of a private activity with 
respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest" [Mitnick (1980 p.7)], suggests a public good 
approach to regulation based on non-rivalry and non-excludability characteristics as described 
by Gowland (1992)3. The notion that the process of regulating interferes with free market 
choice is conveyed in the further definition that regulation is a "process consisting of the 
intentional restriction of a subject’s choice of activity, by an entity not directly party to or 
involved in that activity" [Mitnick (1992, p.9]. The purpose of regulation is generally the 
prevention of systemic failure [Bank of England (1992, p.322, Vittas (1992)].4 5 The public
24
2 In 1981, in Trinidad and Tobago, 20 non-banks sought to establish operations in Trinidad and Tobago 
(Farrell (1990), compared with eight non-banks then in operation.
3 A good is a non-rival if consumption by A does not reduce the amount available for consumption by B, 
and is non-excludable if the good by being supplied to one person is automatically supplied to others. A well 
functioning financial system is such a public good.
4 A market is contestable if a new firm can both enter and leave the industry without cost.
interest view of regulation has however, been challenged by Posner and Stigler (1974) and 
others of the Chicago School who argue that this definition does not necessarily describe action 
taken in the public interest but rather action perceived by regulators to be in the public interest. 
They describe a theory which shows regulation to be undesirable, arguing that regulation can 
often operate in the interests of producers and that producers can manipulate (capture) the 
regulatory process so as to create unnecessary regulations in their own self interests. Pelzman 
(1976) further attempts to describe regulatory theory in terms of an equation and derivatives 
which in equilibrium equate the marginal costs of regulation to the marginal benefits; a 
position articulated earlier by Pigou (1920) and developed later by Coase (1985).
There are several other approaches to the study of regulation. An analysis of regulation as 
intermediation between constituents is found in Fiorina and Noll (1978) and models of 
bureaucratic behaviour in Downs (1957) and Tullock (1975) and as public choice theory and 
regulatory behaviour in Romer and Rosenthal (1985). Modern techniques of analysis of 
regulation are well documented in Spulber (1989) and Kahn (1989). Empirically, however, the 
measurement of benefits and costs of regulation are not easily quantifiable and testable. A 
position less frequently adopted, is that regulators sometimes accommodate the regulated 
industry by taking costs into account so that profitability of the industry is not diminished. Such 
prices, when they are market clearing are referred to as anonymously equitably prices 
[Faulhaber and Levinson (1981)] or when they are a result of bargaining, are similar to 
Aumann -Shapley prices [Aumann and Shapley (1974)]. They are not unlike theories of 
monopoly which emphasise the impact on profits and on risks of entry. Such theories of 
monopoly and regulation tend however to involve the utility and communications industries, 
but can be made applicable to the banking system.
Commercial bank regulations are of three types: structural, monetary (or macro- 
monetary) and prudential. Structural regulation refers to boundaries placed on the activities 
of commercial banks, determining the activities in which they may become involved and those
25
increasingly financial regulation has also become concerned with providing consumer protection and 
ensuring high standards of business conduct, but these aspects bank regulation are not will not be included in 
the study.
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Table 1.1
Summary of Structural, Monetary and Prudential Regulation
Structural
Regulation
Prudential
Regulation
Monetary
Regulation
1. Setting of 1. Capital requirements. 1. Interest rate
boundaries to the 2 . Limits on customer controls.
business of banking. concentration. 2 . Credit controls
2 . Debarrment from 3. Risk-based portfolio 3. Cash reserve
engagement in assessment. requirements.
commercial 4. Secondary reserve
activities. requirements.
Figure 1.1
1.2 The Interrelationship between Structural, Monetary and Prudential Regulation 
(The Structural- Monetary -  Prudential Regulatory cycle)
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p r o f i t a b i I i  ty  
solvency 
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from which they are debarred. Monetary regulation6, sometimes termed macro-monetary 
regulation, refers to the process of setting monetary policy directives designed to bring about 
predetermined macroeconomic outcomes. In the Caribbean this covers a wide range of 
monetary policy tools but focuses principally on regulation of interest rates, credit controls and 
primary and secondary reserve requirements. Prudential regulation emphasises the control of 
systemic risk through, principally balance sheet constraints such as capital adequacy and 
permissible bank concentration ratios;7 it establishes guidelines for banks which are intended 
to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system.
Table 1.1 summarises the main regulatory tools applied to the banking system in the 
Caribbean and Figure 1.1 describes the cycle of interrelationships involving the three types of 
regulation: structural, monetary and prudential. Structural regulation sets the general 
parameters for the banking system [Revell (1980)]; it defines restrictions on activities of certain 
types of institutions and sets the context in which both prudential and monetary regulation 
operate. Monetary regulation impacts on the deposit-taking and lending activities of 
commercial banks through adjustments in price, volume, portfolio changes and in risk-taking 
(line CD in Figure 1.1). These influences flow through to aggregate expenditures and output 
and determine macroeconomic outcomes (line DE) but also impact on bank profitability, 
liquidity, solvency and market share (line DF).
The resulting outcomes in turn influence future decisions about the need to apply 
further monetary measures (line EC). Simultaneously, prudential regulations, principally 
capital adequacy provisions, influence the availability of credit and hence prices and volumes 
(line BD). The outcome of these and other portfolio decisions, further impact on profitability, 
solvency and market share and guide the decisions of authorities about future adjustments in
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6 Some writers refer to "macro-monetary" regulation and others to "monetary regulation". The terms 
essentially refer to the same process of using monetary tools to achieve macroeconomic outcomes. The term 
monetary regulation will be used in this paper,
7 The term "concentration" ratio used in the context of a commercial bank’s asset distribution, refers to the 
share of the bank’s assets (or liabilities) held in a particular sector or by a particular individual or company. 
It differs from the industry concentration ratio normally used as an indicator of oligopoly in the corporate 
literature.
prudential regulation (FB). Over the longer term, macroeconomic outcomes and commercial 
bank performance influence decisions about the appropriate structure of the banking system and 
the role of banks in that system, (i.e about the need for structural regulation). However, such 
structural changes tend to be rather infrequent.
This classification differs somewhat from that of Vittas (1992), who places financial 
regulation into six categories: macro-economic, allocative, structural, prudential, organisational 
and protective. The classification used here combines macroeconomic and allocative into a 
single category called "monetary"; and structural and organisational regulation in another 
termed "structural". Similarly, prudential and protective regulation are combined in the single 
category called "prudential regulation". The classification is not therefore essentially at odds 
with that used by Vittas but is a compressed form of his six-tier classification.
Structural regulation aims to prevent excessive market power, to limit the potential for 
conflict of interest and to discourage financial institutions from assuming excessive risks by 
expanding into areas that are remote from their main focus of operations and expertise [Vittas
(1992)]. This supports the generally held position that the rationale for regulation is the need 
to prevent market failure but adds the further objective of avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
Revell (1980) is of the view that it is structural regulation rather than prudential regulation that 
is largely responsible for inhibiting competition, and suggests that structural regulation requires 
some trade-off between competition and financial stability. Barriers to entry or exit, or lack 
of them fall largely within the category " structural regulation" and bear on what banks (and 
non-banks) are permitted or debarred from doing but also include the effect of the general 
business environment on the banking industry.
Not unlike financial regulation in the US, which was first imposed in response to the 
stock market collapse of 1929, monetary regulation in the Caribbean8 is principally a monetary 
response to macroeconomic forces. Where the objective of regulators is to achieve
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8 While the Caribbean comprises a number of other countries, the study is restricted to the English speaking 
countries of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago because of data availability. Central banks were in 
place in these countries for the entire period of the study.
macroeconomic stability, principally protection of the balance of payments, profitability, 
solvency and market share are seldom explicitly taken into account in the presence of the 
overwhelming need for achievement of monetary goals. This is reflected in the observation 
by Blackman (1982) that if the nations’s reserve position is "desperate" the only relevant 
objective is (foreign exchange) liquidity. It is echoed by Gowland (1990 p.39) who observes 
that monetary authorities have always had to trade-off structural objectives against those of 
macro-monetary policy. While, the Caribbean has never had to choose between the extremes 
of systemic failure of financial institutions and macro-monetary stabilisation, it is suggested that 
in the process of securing balance on the external account, the development of the financial 
system was often ignored.
In the Caribbean of the 1970s and 1980s regulation of the banking system was heavily 
influenced by the theories of regional economists of the 1960s who rejected monetarist 
prescriptions based on the notion that the transmission of influences to expenditure and output 
was a direct result of changes in the money supply9 [Beckford (1972, Thomas (1974) Best 
(1968]. Policy makers embraced the structuralist views of Rual Prebisch (1959), Myrdal 
(1951) and Hirschman (1958) and later of Lance Taylor (1983) who emphasised the need for 
authorities to take charge of the direction of their economies and to change their structures. 
They identified inappropriate structure as an explanation of slow rates of economic development 
in the Caribbean, and suggested that government action was required in order to achieve 
economic goals since market prices did not prompt the appropriate responses but merely altered 
prices and widened the disparity in earnings between economic groups.
The structuralist doctrine which formed the basis for macro-monetary policy in the 
Caribbean was not unlike the credit availability doctrine of the sixties. It placed the emphasis 
on activity in the market for government securities and the private sector loan market as 
opposed to the money and bond market of Keynesian proponents [Keynes (1936)]. The 
effective thrust is to induce liquidity pressure and encourage a tight bank lending policy which
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9 In the Caribbean money supply was treated as an exogenous variable and foreign exchange availability 
was seen as critical to economic viability.
will together lead to an absolute decrease in the supply of loanable funds to the private sector. 
The doctrine differs from the neoclassical view of the interest rate as the price of loanable 
funds in that it assumes sticky interest rates on private sector loans and a locked-in effect of 
government securities, that is, an imperfect market for government bonds.
These arguments were given concrete form in the monetary policies in the Caribbean 
over the past two decades and though the process was taken further in some Caribbean 
countries than in others, the similarities are undisputable. Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago all used credit as an important tool for achieving economic development. In Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago this included taking banks under public control. In all three countries 
it included encouraging institutions to lend to selected sectors and keeping interest rates low, 
usually below the rate of inflation. While primary the primary reserve requirement was the 
conventional fractional reserve system used in metropolitan countries and was a universally 
accepted monetary policy tool, it was the use of secondary reserve requirements or liquid assets 
ratios (principally required holdings of treasury bills or government bonds) which were most 
heavily relied upon in the Caribbean. This process was not peculiar to the Caribbean, but was 
applied in Europe and North America in the 1950s and 1960s, and in Latin America in the 
sixties and seventies. Vittas (1992) observed that although these policies met some of the 
Governments’ objectives they failed to create robust financial systems. Similar views have 
been expressed by Brown (1990) about the Jamaica case. Neither writer specifies how the lack 
of robustness is reflected in commercial bank performance or more particularly how it 
translates into the impact on profitability, solvency, liquidity or market share.
While monetary policies in the Caribbean may have been consistent with the objectives 
of authorities during most of the period under study, they were facilitated by the relatively low 
level of internationalisation of markets and low levels of globalisation of corporate structures. 
However, as markets became more international and corporate structures more global, the 
effectiveness of these measures declined and the process of liberalisation became inevitable.
The justification for prudential regulation of the Caribbean banking system has less 
clear theoretical origins and greater practical justification. Prudential regulation, initiated by
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monetary authorities to protect the banking system, emphasises capital adequacy in order to 
prevent banks from operating on low levels of capital, and hence more cheaply, while leaving 
customers less protected. However it is rarely integrated into macro-monetary regulation, 
though like macro-monetary regulation, it impacts on the profitability and liquidity of banks 
and on market share. Prudential regulation is rooted in the view that the collapse of a single 
commercial bank can seriously damage the viability of the entire banking system10 - an 
outcome referred to in recent literature as "infection". It emphasises not only capital adequacy, 
but the dangers of concentration of both deposits and credit, both by product and by customer, 
and encompasses concerns about portfolio risk. It reflects in principle the views of the Basle 
Committee on Bank Supervision developed many years later in the 1980s and 1990s, and in 
the Caribbean, is based on guidelines similar to those followed by banks in Europe, the U.K. 
and North America.11
Central banks therefore have objectives of macroeconomic stability, allocative 
efficiency and financial sector stability, much of which is achieved through the banking system. 
As a result the problem reduces to one of joint determination of appropriate macroeconomic 
objectives as well as the safety and efficiency of the financial system, so that an important 
ingredient that shapes the functioning and efficiency of financial institutions is the stance of 
macro-financial policy [Vittas (1992)]12. Vittas recognises the conflicting influences of macro- 
fmancial policies on financial institutions, noting that failure to maintain macroeconomic 
stability has adverse effects on the operations of financial institutions and that the pursuit of 
macroeconomic and financial stability may conflict with the process of financial innovation. 
The relative outcome is influenced by the type of regulatory controls employed by monetary
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10 The financial crisis in the U.S. in the 1980s in the form of the Savings and Loan debacle which served 
to underline the importance of prudential regulation and both bank and non-bank failures in the past decade has 
demonstrated that failure of financial institutions can have as serious macroeconomic implications for economic 
growth as inappropriate monetary policies.
1 Not all the criteria developed by the Basle Committee on Bank Supervision were applied in the Caribbean 
during the period covered by this study. The application of the full range of prudential criteria is a more recent 
phenomenon. For most of the period covered by this study the principal prudential criteria used were capital 
adequacy and to a lesser extent the requirement to observe certain concentration ratios.
12 Vittas uses the term "macro-financial in the same way as the term "macro-monetary" or "monetary".
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1.3 Measures of Bank Performance
The indicators employed to analyse the impact of these monetary and prudential 
regulations on bank performance are modifications of the conventional performance indicators. 
Traditionally, bank profitability is considered the most important measure of bank performance. 
The study therefore places relatively greater emphasis on this measure. Revell’s (1980) 
landmark study on bank performance applies a number of profitability measures, principally 
interest margins, gross earnings margin, net earnings margin and profits before tax. These are 
similar to measures of bank performance employed by audit firms and Securities Exchanges 
in the Caribbean which tend to focus on net interest income, net profits, and loan losses; for 
example Price Waterhouse (1992). Performance scores which employ the technique of 
discriminant analysis, Altman (1984) and Taffler (1984) and the Bank of England (1982) tend 
to consider ratios which include liquid assets ratios, retained earnings, before tax earnings, 
some equity measure and in the case of trading companies, a sales ratio. These ratios tend to 
be survival ratios which focus on the short term. In the banking industry the Basle Committee 
of Bank Supervisors takes a longer view of survival of the industry and focuses on earnings, 
capital adequacy, management, liquidity and solvency.
This study does not place emphasis on the micro analysis of the components of bank 
profitability emphasised in the Revell study and in other accounting and audit based analyses, 
nor does it emphasise the full range of indicators applied by bank supervisors using their 
CAMEL rating, 13 since many of these ratings require some subjective micro analysis. 
Instead it stresses the measurable outcomes which impact the longer term viability of the 
institution, such as liquidity, solvency, profitability, risk, and a measure not used by bank 
supervisors - market share.
authorities.
13 This is reflected in a "CAMEL" rating which emphasises capital, asset quality, management, earnings 
and liquidity. It was considerably tightened in July 1988 when the Basle Accord was proposed by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices and endorsed by central bank governors of the 
group of 10 (G-10) countries. It introduced risk-based capital standards which were to be phased in over a 4- 
year period ending in 1992.
The main profitability measure employed is before tax return on assets, though other 
profitability measures are used selectively throughout the analysis. Liquidity is defined by 
reference to banks’ holdings of cash and government securities in excess of required amounts. 
Insolvency is defined to exist where assets are less than liabilities; in simplified form the ratio 
of capital and reserves to total assets is taken as the measure of solvency. Market share is 
measured with reference to the share of assets of commercial banks in the combined assets of 
banks and non-banks. Bank risk (an outcome) as opposed to banks’ attitude to risk-taking (a 
process) is measured by the variability of bank profitability, and is considered a subset of the 
bank profitability measure. It is based on the view that the high-risk lenders’ profit over the 
planning horizon may be described as simply the difference between total interest collections 
and the sum of the cost of capital and defaulted principal. The lender chooses to maximise 
expected profits such that:
n
E (II) = £  Yi qi xi -I-ZK-EPL
i -1
Where:
Yj =  expected return of interest per dollar of interest due in loan category i 
qj =  cash advanced in loan category i 
r.q; =  demand function loans in category i;
I =  interest standardised for lengths of maturity 
Z =  constant unit cost of capital 
K =  total capital 
EPL= expected portfolio losses.
To the extent that major profits or major losses are made, bank profitability is either 
increased or decreased, so that the variability in bank profitability (0%), where a2 is the 
measure of variance, becomes a measure of bank risk.
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1.4 Cost-axiomatic and Accommodative Pricing
Indications are that while some regulations may have restricted bank profitability, at 
least one regulatory measure - interest rate controls - may not have constrained bank 
profitability as is often assumed, but may have rather helped to offset or minimise the negative 
impact on bank profitability resulting from other monetary controls. The impact of interest rate 
regulation on bank profitability in the Caribbean may therefore conflict with the generally held 
view of banks under financial repression. This outcome is likely to have been the result of 
accommodative or cost-axiomatic price setting.
Cost-axiomatic pricing or autonomously equitable pricing is defined to exist where 
costs such as transactions costs, relative rates of return, default costs, insurance costs, insurance 
costs, labour costs, the cost of deposit attraction and marginal reserve costs are taken into 
account in the setting of regulations in order to provide banks with a return on investment 
which is market clearing. Where such pricing takes some of these costs into account but does 
not result in a market clearing rate it is termed "accommodative". Levels of regulation can
therefore be seen on a spectrum from rigid >  to accommodative >  to cost-axiomatic.
This thesis asserts that authorities in the Caribbean engaged in cost-axiomatic, or at the least 
accommodative pricing, but that this was inadequate to prevent the loss of market share by 
banks and from time, the decline in bank profitability.
1.5 Summary of Bank Performance
An overview of bank performance in the Caribbean discloses that bank profitability 
appears to increase during periods of less intense regulation and to improve during periods of 
increasing liberalisation. This occurred in Jamaica in the post-1985 period, a period described 
by Brown (1991) as one which marked the shift by Jamaica to an increasingly liberalised 
system. Similarly, in Trinidad and Tobago bank profits increased up to 1980 and declined 
during the period 1980-1986, a period described by Farrell (1990) as one of stabilisation and 
adjustment. In Barbados the period 1981-1985, a period of declining bank profitability, also 
coincided with a period of tight monetary control, which included principally higher reserve 
requirements.
34
One of the major outcomes of the performance of commercial banks in the Caribbean 
has been the loss of market share to non-banks. While the rise of non-banks has been a global 
trend over the past 20 years, this growth was assisted by the absence of regulation of non-banks 
in the Caribbean for most of the peiod. Regulation of banks in the Caribbean may have 
influenced the exit of banks and the absence of regulation of non-banks appears to have 
influenced entry of the latter. The accepted explanation of the exiting of banks was that this 
was a response to localisation and nationalisation rather than regulation. In Barbados where 
banks have tended to be rather more regulated than Trinidad and Tobago, those banks which 
withdrew were new banks and were all branches with small portfolios, 14 underscoring the 
concern for small and new banks in a regulated environment.15 While profitability may have 
been at the root of their withdrawal to the extent that regulation impacts on profitability, the 
causes may have been inter-related.16 The impact of regulation on small banks and on local 
banks will therefore be given special attention. Such an examination also permits analysis of 
the existence of economies of scale in the Caribbean context.
A review of the literature follows in Chapter 2. It is divided into two sections; the first 
reviews the literature on monetary policy in developing countries and establishes the rationale 
for the use of monetary controls; the second reviews the literature on the impact of monetary 
and prudential controls on bank performance. Chapter 3 describes the structure of the financial 
system in the Caribbean, particularly the composition of commercial banks’ portfolios and 
shows how authorities imposed direct monetary controls on commercial banks in order to 
protect the balance of payments. It then presents the resulting outcomes for bank performance 
in terms of profitability, liquidity, market share, risk and solvency. Chapter 4 presents the 
views of commercial banks about the impact of regulation on bank performance. This evidence 
is provided from responses to questionnaires sent to commercial banks. A model and
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14 The banks which withdrew were First National Bank of Chicago, Citi Bank, and Chase Manhattan bank.
15 The causes of exit of most foreign banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were related to policies 
of localisation and nationalisation.
16 In 1993 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce became the first major bank in Barbados to cede any 
portion of its ownership (49 %) to regional equity holders.
methodology for testing the impact of regulation on bank performance are developed in Chapter
5. It employs ordinary least squares regression analysis, and cointegration, and develops error 
correction models. It employs the maximum likelihood procedure [Johansen and Juselius
(1990)3 to analyse the relationship between bank regulation and individual measures of bank 
performance and in other selected circumstances. A composite measure of performance is then 
developed employing the technique of discriminant analysis, to produce a composite measure 
of bank performance and of bank regulation. These scores are then tested for causality, 
employing Granger causality tests [Granger (1980, 1988)]. The results of the empirical 
analysis are discussed in Chapter 6. The study concludes with a summary and a commentary 
on the insights gained into the impact of regulation on commercial banks in the Caribbean. 
This includes a discussion of the implications for die development of the financial system and 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy in increasingly liberalised systems of the Caribbean as 
well as in other developing countries, and discusses the inevitability of such liberalisation in 
the context of increasingly open capital markets and corporate globalisation.
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2.a REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE - Monetary Regulation in Developing Countries
with Special Reference to the Caribbean 
2.a.l Introduction
The first section of this chapter reviews the literature on the theory supporting 
monetary regulation in developing countries, and in the Caribbean in particular, and traces the 
development of monetary theory through the appealing Keynesian argument of expansionary 
monetary policy to the neo-structuralist position of the imperfection of markets, a position 
which facilitates an enlarged role for government, and which implicitly supports direct 
monetary controls. It shows how the views of the McKinnon and Shaw school which argued 
that price and interest rate distortions retarded economic growth were countered by the views 
of Cavallo (1977), Wijnbergen (1983) and Taylor (1983) that rather, high interest rates retarded 
economic growth. It points to the twin argument for control of credit which found official 
support in the monetary theory of the balance of payments and shows how arguments about 
the inefficiencies of direct controls [Kane (1977), Fry (1988)] were countered by arguments of 
their effectiveness [Brown (1991)]. The second section concentrates on the narrower focus of 
the study, that is, the impact of these regulations on bank performance.
2.a.2 Monetary Regulation in Developing Countries
Monetary policies in most developing countries had their root in Keynesian economic 
theory which argued that inadequate investment could be corrected by changing the relative 
returns on money and capital [Keynes (1936)] and that expansionary monetary policy could be 
achieved by lowering interest rates while satisfying liquidity preference. This Keynesian 
solution had strong appeal to developing countries. Subsequent models of money and economic 
growth which included expansionary macroeconomic postures argued that since households 
allocated wealth between money and capital assets, one means of accelerating economic growth 
was to increase the return on capital by raising the ratio of capital to labour. It was argued that 
this could be achieved by reducing deposit rates and by accelerating growth of the money 
stock. These monetarist views were also appealing to developing countries.
Chapter 2
38
Savings and Investment under Interest Rate Ceilings 
The McKinnon and Shaw View
Figure 2.1
Savings and Investment
However, in contrast to neo-classical monetary growth theory, theories of financial 
liberalistion of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) strongly dominated the thinking of the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) during the 1970s and 1980s. McKinnon (1973) argues 
that real money balances are complements to, rather than substitutes for, tangible investment. 
His model of "outside money", loans to government which are not available to finance private 
sector development, emphasises the role of deposits in encouraging self-financed investment. 
He advocates that high real interest rates are necessary as a means of stimulating capital 
accumulation. Similarly, the debt intermediation view advanced by Shaw (1973) argues that 
bank loans are channelled primarily into capital accumulation. It emphasizes expanding the 
potential of financial intermediaries, who it is argued, are able to offer attractive rates and so 
reduce costs of intermediation between savers and lenders. The central argument of both 
McKinnon and Shaw is that distortions of financial prices, including interest rates and foreign- 
exchange rates, reduce the real rate of growth and the real size of the financial system relative 
to non-financial sector and that high interest rates promote investment and economic growth.
These views are summarised in Figure 2.1. They suggest that financial repression 
represented by administratively fixed nominal interest rates (F) holds the real rate (r) below the 
equilibrium level such that actual investment is limited to (I0), and the amount of saving 
forthcoming at the real interest rate r0, since, they argue, at these low interest rates, savings 
will not be adequate to finance investments. If interest rates were not subject to a ceiling, 
equilibrium would be at E with interest rates at r2. However, at the ceiling F, banks will make 
large profits (r3 - r0) which are likely to be used for non-price competition and conspicuous 
spending. They argue that relaxing (raising) the interest rate ceiling from (F) to (F') increases 
savings and investment and rations out the low yielding investments in the area r0, b0, bl5 i\. 
Thus the average efficiency of savings rises, income rises to Syl and the inefficiencies of 
rationing which result from a low interest rate regime, are reduced.
The policy prescription for the financially repressed economy in the McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) model is therefore to raise institutional interest rates or to reduce the rate of 
inflation. Shaw maintains that expanded financial intermediation between savers and investors 
resulting from financial liberalisation (high real institutional interest rates) and financial
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development increases incentives to save. Measures such as exchange controls, interest rate 
ceilings, high reserve requirements, suppression of capital markets and selective credit controls 
were regarded as signs of financial repression.
These views were countered by the neo-structuralists [Taylor, (1983), Cavallo (1977) 
and Van Wijnbergen (1983)] who identify the problem as one of low levels of economic growth 
and inappropriate structures, arguing that low elasticities of demand and supply in developing 
countries required large price changes which were socially inefficient. They argue that raising 
interest rates increases inflation in the short run through a cost-push effect and lowers the rate 
of economic growth by reducing the supply of credit (in real terms) available to finance 
investment. Most of these models were based on Tobin’s (1969) portfolio allocation 
framework.
Taylor (1983) observes that the financial liberalisation theory is more unlikely to reduce 
growth since an increase in the desire to save reduces aggregate demand and makes economic 
contraction more likely; particularly deposit flows to the banking system from controlled 
markets. He concludes that, in practice, financial liberalisation is likely to reduce the rate of 
economic growth by reducing the total real supply of credit available to business firms. Van 
Wijnbergen goes much further; he stresses the importance of incorporating the curb or 
unorganised money markets in monetary models of developing countries. He bases part of his 
model on the Wicksellian credit availability effect17, an argument first used by Cavallo (1977) 
and supported by Diaz-Alejandro (1985).
2.a.3 Theoretical Justification for Interest Rate Controls
The views of Van Wijnbergen (1983) on the desirability of a low interest rate regime 
coincide to a great extent with the thinking of Caribbean policy makers. It emphasizes the link 
between the financial sector and the supply side of the economy via the financing of working 
capital, and shows how higher real rates may actually push inflation up in the short run rather
40
17 Wicksell argued that through the supply side, price increases generate an internal drain on credit 
availability which leads to an increase in interest rates or to a decrease in the supply of loans.
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than slow it down and so reduce real output. He describes a model in which credit is needed 
to finance labour costs, and where labour and other costs depend on the real wage (w), output 
(y) and the cost of credit (i-p). Applying the Cobb Douglas production function with share 
parameter cc
This determines output so that profits pY - LCp will be maximised, which leads to the 
aggregate supply function
That is, output will decline if either the real wage or the real rate goes up. The real wage (w) 
is fixed exogenously reflecting the assumption of a Lewis-type surplus labour economy. 
[Lewis, (1974)] where fixed capital formation depends on Y and K and a given real wage. In 
the contractionary case the real rate (i-p) will rise and output (plus profits from the real wage) 
will decline, that is rea! growth will decline.
The initial spurt in inflation caused by the higher real rate will lead to a loss in 
competitiveness, the effects on the steady state growth rate on output per unit of capital are 
unambiguously negative as medium run profits fall and the real rate rises as demonstrated by 
the IS/LM curves in Figure 2.2.
LC =  wYa K'M) (1 +  i-p) where 
a =  l/(l-o') >  1 and LC =  labour cost in real terms
(2 .8)
(2.9)
=  aYa l K ‘(a*1) w (1+i-p)
=  ay a'1 w (1 +  i-p), where y =  Y/K (2 .10)
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Figure
Interest Rates and Output - The Van Wijnbergen Case
Figure
Interest Rates and Output - The Conventional Response
Van Wijnbergen (1983) therefore showed that shifts into time deposits will lead to reserve 
accumulation by banks and will be contractionary. He argues that when the banking system 
is constrained by direct limits on total lending then the increase in time deposits is always 
contractionary. If the banking system is operating under a system of direct credit limits an 
increase in the lending rate will induce banks to hold less free reserves and to assume more 
loans thus increasing the volume of credit outstanding.
Not only was it argued that higher deposit rates lead to less rather than more financial 
deepening and lower growth in the medium run but also that the need for the supply side of 
the economy to access low cost working capital for the financial sector was important. Some 
writers compromised on a fixed deposit rate, but a flexible loan rate [Benavie and Froyen 
(1982] and describe a model in which deposit rates are fixed and set exogenously below the 
market clearing rate. In this fixed deposit rate setting, the interest rate on loans is a function 
of the required reserve ratio on deposits, the discount rate, loans, central bank lending and 
some stochastic error term. They argue that in the fixed rate case, the increase in loan demand 
mitigates the upward pressure on the loan rate. Where the loan rate is flexible the new 
equilibrium is achieved with a higher loan rate and a higher level of deposits, but this flexibility 
creates uncertainty as to the effects of these instruments and the behaviour of the monetary 
aggregates. A more recent study, [Dutt (1991)] in examining the implications of liberalisation 
in a closed economy characterised by excess capacity, also agrees that it is highly likely that 
on balance, aggregate demand will fall in response to high interest rates and that output will 
decline and real investment will be reduced.
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Figure 2.4
Low risk and High Risk Loan Markets
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Support for this position is found in Beckerman (1988) who argues that market clearing 
interest rates may be non-positive and that a policy to increase nominal interest rates above the 
rate of inflation may be damaging and distorting; since investment demand may be very low 
because of depressed expectations or high uncertainty. He argues that savings may occur at 
negative real interest rates and wealth holders may prefer real assets, a position supported in 
the Barbados case by Worrell and Prescod (1983). This hypothesis is also supported by Buffie 
(1984) who argues that if curb loans constitute a large share of total loanable funds and are 
relatively good substitutes with demand deposits, the total supply of credit in the economy can 
contract in response to an increase in interest rates, since more funds are allocated to banks 
which are subject to reserve requirements in contrast to the curb market which is not.
Caribbean economists therefore argued that the effects of interest rate liberalisation in 
"financially repressed" economies were not compelling and that nominal interest rates at levels 
intended to effect positive real rates could be burdensome to business activity [Farrell, Najjar 
and Marcelle (1986)]. Local authorities viewed the ability to access low cost working capital 
as more important and saw the financial sector as supplying this need. It was their view that 
via the financial sector and the supply side, higher real interest rates will reduce output if the 
effect on aggregate supply is stronger than the deflationary impact on aggregate demand, and 
that high real rates may actually push inflation up in the short run rather than slow it down18, 
views similar to those of [Cavallo 1977)].
It is an empirical question whether the negative Cavallo effects of a higher real rate on 
output really dominate the positive effects of a higher savings rate in the short run, and that 
higher deposit rates will lead to less rather than more financial deepening (a lower r) and lower 
growth in the medium term. Empirical studies in the Caribbean are divided on whether the 
growth maximising rate is a low rate of interest. Worrell and Prescod (1983) found no
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18 Interest rate policies in the Caribbean supported the views of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) which 
suggest that higher time deposits rates will lead to increased savings, but differed from that branch of their 
thinking which suggests that higher time deposit rates will lead to higher economic growth.
The implication of regulation for bank performance is not that clear cut. The conventional literature supports 
the view that regulation impacts adversely on bank profitability.
causality, but others have found some correlation between deposit rates and economic growth 
but note that interest rate policy seemed more concerned with maintaining external balance 
rather than promoting economic growth (Craigwell 1990). (See also Appendix 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3).
Results of many empirical studies on the impact of liberalisation policies on growth in 
developing countries provide increasingly less support for the repressionist arguments against 
low interest rate regimes. Gupta’s (1987) research in 22 Asian and Latin American countries 
led him to conclude that there is little support for the repressionists hypothesis that the positive 
substitution effect of real interest rates on savings dominate the negative income effect. The 
results of Giovanni (1983) in a study of eight Asian countries also cast doubt on the view that 
interest elasticity of savings is significantly positive in developing countries. Similarly, Cho 
and Khatkhate (1991) in a study of five Asian countries indicate that there does not seem to be 
any significant difference in saving and investment following new financial regimes in these 
now liberalised countries. Studies on Sub-Sahara Africa [Nissanke (1990)] have also shown 
that financial liberalisation and interest rate deregulation have had little effect on improving the 
size and allocation of savings. A similar study [Warman and Thirlwall (1994)] for the case of 
Mexico, found that while financial savings rise with higher interest rates there is no evidence 
that high real rates led to higher total savings investment and economic growth.
The justification for monetary controls was based not on their efficiency but on their 
effectiveness and arguments about inefficiency were not disputed [Brown (1991)]. Kane (1978) 
argues that interest rate regulation is an inefficient means of credit rationing and that credit 
flows through so many channels that it is virtually impossible to design an effective credit 
rationing system, observing that after controls are set, markets adapt, and controls are 
redesigned for yet another round.
The inefficiency argument as it applies to interest rate controls tends to be particularly 
cogent in its application to risk-taking by commercial banks. In two independent markets shown 
in Figure 2.4, a loan rate ceiling produces a supply curve of SB0 for low risk loans and SA0 for 
high risk loans. The supply of low risk loans is q0 where the supply of risky loans is zero. Both
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supply curves shift as a result of the abolition of the loan rate ceiling. The supply of low risk 
loans is reduced at each rate of interest because of substitution into higher risk loans. A 
reduction in the supply of high risk loans results since abolition of loan ceilings produces a 
higher rate for less risky lending. In equilibrium the actual quantities of both low risk and high 
risk loans are increased from q0 to qt for the former and from zero to q2 for the latter (Figure
2.4).
However, policy makers in the Caribbean in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Thomas 
(1974), Beckford (1972) and Best (1968) accepted these deficiencies but argued for their 
macroeconomic effectiveness, observing that there was an under-development bias in the 
Caribbean which led to forgone linkages and spread effects. They stressed the transformation 
role of banks and industry and felt that this called for planned implementation of a structure 
of domestic output consistent with domestic demand.
These views were also influential in determining monetary policy in other countries, 
for example in the 1970s and up to the early 1980s, in Latin America and West Africa where 
interestingly, macro-monetary policy differed very little from the Caribbean.
2.a.4 Theoretical Justification for Credit Controls
While the financial liberalisation view focused principally on interest rate controls, 
other control mechanisms featuring in the arguments were credit controls and reserve 
requirements. Central banks in developing countries also focused on influencing the level of 
credit expansion, particularly where exchange rates are fixed. However, with a fixed exchange 
rate, monetary aggregates are difficult to control over an extended period. These demand 
management policies however often failed because of pressures to expand money and credit to 
finance government, and the latter often overrode other objectives of monetary policy [Page 
(1993)].
Consequently, writers like Fry (1988) advocate abolishing ceilings on institutional 
interest rates or raising them to levels nearer their competitive free-market equilibrium levels
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so as to reduce the price level by increasing money demand, arguing that deposit and loan rate 
ceilings tend to worsen the distribution of income. Fry observes that most of the economic rent 
goes to large borrowers rather than small savers/lenders when deposit and loan rates are held 
below their market equilibrium levels and that capital intensive production methods encouraged 
by low interest rates reduce the demand for labour, and wages of unskilled labour fall.
He advocates the allocation of credit on the basis of planning priorities even while 
observing that selective credit controls are likely to be accompanied by high reserve 
requirements designed to reduce commercial banks’ own funds available for discretionary, non­
priority lending. He cites six general inconsistencies relating to selective credit policies. 
Firstly, they encourage lower yielding investments through interest rate subsidies vis-a-vis 
higher yielding investments that are not subsidised; they typically involve a downward sloping 
term structure of interest rates; they lead to inversion of deposit and loan rates of interests; they 
reduce the demand for labour by distorting factor prices; they discourage saving and so reduce 
the aggregate supply of investible funds; and they provide the wrong signals to private sector 
institutional lenders. His arguments however tend to underplay the importance of such controls 
for a sustainable balance of payments and for economic stabilisation.
Fry (1988), cautiously implies some role for well administered selective credit controls. 
He observes that for credit controls to work financial markets must be kept segmented and that 
otherwise financial channels would develop for re-routing subsidised credit to uses with the 
highest private returns. Yet, a wide definition of financial repression would imply that 
segmented markets are repressive, and Fry (1988) at the same time, opposes financial 
repression, observing that typically, financial repression is the unintended consequence of low, 
fixed, nominal interest rates combined with high and rising inflation. His position on 
segmented markets therefore seems an uneasy compromise.
Page (1993) makes a case for the development of the financial sector in its own right 
as a vehicle for promoting financial intermediation and not merely because a well functioning 
banking system is an important vehicle for giving effect to monetary regulation. She argues 
that though many developing countries have generally allocated credit to priority sectors and
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rationed others, in the context of stabilisation these systems institutionalise government’s 
unwillingness to sterilise the impact of flows across the exchanges on the domestic money 
supply.
Others argue that information failure in loan markets may lead to credit rationing 
because the quality of a bank’s loans will be adversely affected if banks try to charge higher 
interest rates - because of the possibility of default. Thus, increases in interest rates will raise 
the overall riskiness of their portfolios [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Zephirin (1990)]. They 
argue that a profit maximising bank will practice credit rationing and that in the presence of 
an excess demand for credit banks will be reluctant to raise interest rates in any market. It 
therefore appears that although credit rationing is potentially financially repressive, it is also 
a problem in liberalised markets. Evidence from developed countries as well, supports the 
view that liberalisation often leads to more credit for consumption rather than for industry. 
Evidence from France [(Melitz (1990)] suggests that liberalisation has led to a greater 
dependence of firms on internally generated finance, also Englund (1990), and Cho (1988) for 
Korea and Japan respectively, and Muelbauer and Murphy (1990) who show similar results for 
the U.K. case.
Support for credit controls can be found even in developed countries. Early work by 
Cohen (1968) and Silber (1975) support the view that credit policies were effective in altering 
expenditure patterns in the U.S. Their position was later supported by Glick and Plaut (1987) 
who argued that monetary policy becomes potent only when agents are rationed by credit 
ceilings. They disputed the view that credit rationing is inefficient. This position is put less 
strongly by Farrell (1990) who, in referring to selective credit controls, in Trinidad and 
Tobago, observed that the maintenance of a tight credit policy was important in the 
achievement of the balance of payment objective in Trinidad and Tobago in the 1980s.
The monetary theory of the balance of payments which emphasises control of domestic 
credit expansion also offers a theoretical construct for the control of foreign exchange reserves 
through control of credit. In its most extreme form this approach states that central banks in 
open economies with fixed exchange rates have no ability to affect the nominal money stock
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and that the critical factor is domestic credit expansion. Leon (1988) in empirical work on the 
application of the monetary theory of the balance of payments found that these "a priori" 
expectations were not rejected for the case of Jamaica. Similar evidence of fairly strong 
reserve flow mechanisms and strong patterns between foreign reserves and domestic assets were 
obtained by Looney (1991) for the case of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
The model employed by monetary authorities to justify credit controls, drew much of 
its support either explicitly or implicitly, from the Polak (1957) model which argued that 
deficits in the balance of payments could persist only if accommodated by increases in credit. 
The model provides a theoretical framework for selecting those target variables which control 
credit and hence the balance of payments. The Polak model contrasts with much of the early 
literature on the transmission mechanism through commercial banks which saw money as the 
key factor in controlling economic change. This monetary approach to the balance of 
payments, also supported by the IMF at the time, derives a consolidated balance sheet of a 
simplified banking system to show that:
Reserves +  Domestic Credit =  Money Supply
or R + D =  H (2.1)
Where H represented high powered money, R =  reserves and D =  domestic credit.
Since a deficit on the balance of payments implied a loss of reserves, it follows that 
there must be a counterpart to a deficit in the form of credit creation (sterilisation) or 
dishoarding (i.e a fall in H). Since dishoarding is a temporary or disequilibrium phenomenon, 
a payments deficit could only persist if it is accompanied by credit creation, i.e. any additional 
credit will ultimately leak abroad. The model assumes exogenous exports and domestic credit 
is a policy variable and therefore is also exogenous. It assumes that demand is homogenous 
of degree one in prices and assumes a stable long run demand for money function. By 
emphasising credit, it also emphasises the importance of commercial banks in the adjustment 
process and helps to provide a justification for credit controls as a stabilisation tool.
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The assumption of a constant velocity of money means that 
Yt =  Ht (2.2)
Imports (M) are assumed to be a fixed proportion (m) of the value of the previous 
period’s nominal income Yt_u so that
Mt =  mY,, (2.3)
Money supply and balance of payments identities are added to complete the model. In equation 
(2.1) and (2.2) the change in H is given as
AHt=ARt+ADt (2.4)
and
A R t=Xt~Mt (2.5)
Substituting (2.3) and (2.4) into (2.2 gives
Y A H t=Yt_1+a R c^  aD  t (2.6)
This gives the basic monetary theorem already deduced at (2.1). Since Yt = Y t.j in equilibrium 
(by definition), a payments deficit (AR <  0) can persist only when domestic credit creation 
(AD) is positive. If initially, at time t=0 , the economy is in equilibrium so (AD=0) and 
M = M 0 , then since this implies that Xt =  Xq =  M0, then
AYt=ADt+ARt=ADt+Xt-Mt=ADt- (Mt-M0) (2.7)
The model explains the emphasis placed on limiting domestic credit expansion and 
contributed to the ready acceptance by the IMF in the 1960s and 1970s of policies aimed at 
controlling credit.
Further theoretical underpinnings for the use of credit as a control variable are provided 
much later by Brunner and Meltzer (1988) who modified the Hicksian IS/LM paradigm to 
incorporate interaction with the credit market. Brunner and Meltzer reveal that impulses to 
output depend on the operation of the credit market, thus assigning an important role to credit 
in the determination of output.
Their analysis explains changes in monetary policy in developing countries, provides 
an enhanced framework for analyzing problems posed by regulation while bringing forcibly to
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attention the role of commercial banks in the transmission process and offers a further rationale 
for the use of credit as a control variable.
2.a.5. Theoretical Justification for Reserve Requirements
Reserve requirements, a third monetary control tool, was viewd by the McKinnon and 
Shaw school as a leakage in the intermediation process which prevented banks from efficiently 
intermediating beween savers and lenders. This negative effect does not exist in the same way 
in neo-structuralist models. Neo-structuralist models argue that the market determined nominal 
interest rate in the curb or non-institutional credit market adjusts to equate demand and supply 
of money and credit. Any negative effect of required reserves on financial intermediation in 
the neo-structuralist models comes entirely from the assumption that reserves are not available 
for investment finance either by the private or public sector.
The use of differential reserve requirements has been given some support by Page
(1993) who suggests that this monetary control device is relevant to developing countries since 
banks in these economies tend to be characterised by a high degree of liquidity. She observes 
that a reserve base system, by giving monetary authorities control of the supply of eligible 
assets, permits them to achieve monetary restraint by reducing supply and that when different 
parts of the financial system have different degrees of liquidity, different reserve ratios may be 
required. She notes that proponents of the reserve base system claim that the system causes 
fewer distortions than would the method of applying more direct controls to each bank. Most 
writers tend to accept the need for reserve requirements but question the level and the cost. 
Tobin (1984), for example, prefers to leave the reserve tax in place and advocates payment 
only on excess reserves.
A less conventional view of reserve requirements is the deposit-maximising view. It 
is based on the premise that reserve requirements form a safety net for deposits and therefore 
are deposit increasing. Courakis (1984) Mathieson (1980) and Kapur (1982) show that when 
the banking system faces loan demand that is not perfectly interest elastic, the imposition of a 
required reserve ratio actually raises the profit-maximising deposit rate and hence the volume 
of deposits. The relationship is not, however monotonic. Whereas reserve requirements are
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deposit-inducing up to some level, after some threshold the advantage of higher reserve 
requirements declines in its impact on deposit volumes (see Figure 2.5). Also, as the inflation 
rate rises, deposit maximisation requires that interest- earning loans be held in order to raise 
the nominal deposit rate of interest above zero. This would normally involve a reduction in 
the required reserve ratio (Figure 2.6). However in a scenario where reserve requirements are 
continuously increased, no positive effect on deposit volumes will be possible. The case of the 
rise of non-banks who are not required to hold reserve requirements tends to support this 
theory of diminishing impact of deposit-maximising reserve requirements.
A common argument invoked against the use of reserve requirements, the tool most 
frequently used by Caribbean policy makers, was perversely the very basis for its application. 
It is frequently argued in the literature that reserve requirements raise the marginal productivity 
of banks’ reserve position and reduce asset and monetary multipliers and that bank credit and 
money stock are also reduced with corresponding repercussions in the output market [Brunner 
and Meltzer (1988)]. It is this very argument which prompts policy makers to view reserve 
requirements as a useful tool to effect rapid economic contraction or expansion and encourages 
its use by central banks in both developed and developing countries. However, cash reserve 
requirements do not address the financing problem. Governments therefore relied more heavily 
on secondary reserve requirements. Secondary reserves or liquid assets ratios have little 
justification in the literature of developed countries, but are essentially a method of transferring 
resources from the private to the public sector on the grounds of avoidance of the adverse 
balance of payments impact of increases in private spending and are therefore generally viewed 
as a means of compulsory government financing.
Fundamentally, the problems of developing countries relate to either vulnerability to 
balance of payments shocks or their inability to cope with disequilibria and the adjustment cost 
involved [Bird (1982)]. Policy makers tended to see the financial system as principally a 
vehicle for monetary policy and macroeconomic stabilisation as taking precedence over the 
development of the financial sector. Though the objective of authorities is to reach that phase 
of financial sector development evidenced by the proliferation of different financial claims
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Figure 2 . 5
Deposit Volumes under Required Reserve Ratios
Figure 2 .6
Deposit Maximising Required Reserve Ratio 
at Different Inflation Rates
issued by different financial and non-financial institutions as per Gurley and Shaw (I960)19, 
such serious problems face developing countries, that the importance of developing the banking 
and financial sector tends to take second place in the concerns of analysts and policy-makers 
[Page (1993)]. Generally, however, after the disastrous results of financial liberalisation in the 
pre-1985 period in Latin America, World Bank Reports have been giving greater verbal 
recognition to macroeconomic stability as a prerequisite for financial development, following 
the 1989 Report which strongly advocated financial liberalisation. The fact that the theories 
have not produced the expected results20 has been strongly attacked in recent times [Dutt
(1991) and Fisher (1993)].
2.a.6. Conclusion
In summary, the view that responses to changes in prices and interest rates in 
developing countries differed from the outcomes predicted by orthodox theory dominated the 
thinking of Caribbean economists and policy makers. They considered that markets were 
imperfect, that interest rates on private sector loans were sticky downward and there was a 
locked in effect of government securities. Consequently, direct controls were relied upon, 
principally, reserve requirements, credit limits, interest rate controls. These positions had their 
theoretical foundations in the views of the neo-structuralists.
2.b. A Review of the Literature on the Impact of Regulation on Commercial Bank Performance 
2.b .l Introduction
We have so far discussed the rationale for monetary controls. This section examines 
the narrower focus of the study, the literature on the impact of various forms of bank regulation 
on bank performance. The section first discusses the literature on the theory of the firm in a 
regulated environment and the proceeds to examine the impact of scope and scale economies 
on the firm’s performance. Discussion follows of the literature on bank performance as it is
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19 Gurley and Shaw (1960) observe that in the first phase of financial development, outside money, 
commodity money or money backed entirely by Government debt is the norm while in the second stage, direct 
claims and inside money backed by private debt are introduced.
20 Some econometric studies on Latin America, for example, [Diaz- Alejandro (1985)], do not support the 
view that financial liberalisation has any substantial impact on the level of savings.
influenced by monetary and prudential regulation and the final section reviews empirical work 
on regulation and bank performance.
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2.b.2 Literature on the process of Regulation of the Firm
Theories of regulation which focus on the loss of consumer surplus resulting from 
regulation tend to emphasize the micro rather than the macro aspect of regulation. The loss 
of consumer surplus can be depicted using the Peltzman (1976) model which examines the 
process of price setting on regulation. He refers to a majority generating function (in this 
context a public good objective function). He lets S=S(p) represent consumer surplus and 11= 
7r(p) represent industry profits as a function of the market price (p). The political production 
function or public good objective function is, in this case, macroeconomic stability, and is 
given by M =  M(S,7r), where Mt =  SM/5S >  0 and M2=  5M/5ir >  0. Consumer surplus 
is greatest at the competitive price p°, 7r(p°) =  0, and smallest at the monopoly price 
(pm),7r'(pm) =  0. He derives a political production possibilities frontier (a macroeconomic 
stabilisation frontier in this case) where II takes the value between tt (p°) and 7r(pm).
curves (or macroeconomic stabilistion curves) resemble the curves MM in Figure 2.7. The 
regulated price solves
Assuming that (M) exhibits diminishing marginal rate of substitution, the majority
S=II<p, (H) - S i n ' 1 ( H ) )
2 . 8
maxpM (5(p ) , rc (p) ) ( 2 . 9 )
subject to p e [p°, pm]. Therefore the regulated price p satisfies
Mg{Stm  _ - s ' i p )
tx1 (p )
where S=S(p), n  =7r(p). This corresponds to point A in Figure 2.7.
( 2 . 1 0 )
Restrictions are also often seen in a benefit-cost framework as a transactions cost which 
must be covered and which can lead to higher interest rates or to lower profitability depending
on the elasticity of demand for credit facing the particular financial institution. In the Caribbean 
case, the benefit of regulation is attainment of balance of payments equilibrium and the cost, 
possibly lower levels of bank performance resulting from bank regulation.
If the risk of deterioration in the balance of payments which results from unregulated 
banking is seen as an external diseconomy and the objective of regulators is to trade-off the cost 
of the externality against the benefit of the service, subject to some reasonable return to banks, 
this appears to combine a) the views in the literature of Coase (1960) which place emphasis on 
transaction costs and b) the administrative approach to allocation of Aumann and Shapley 
(1974) who use a value allocation approach to calculate explicitly the regulated firm’s optimal 
pricing policy.
The Aumann-Shapley allocation is attained by discriminatory prices that are explicitly 
calculated from the cost function given specific weights. The resulting prices have an 
interesting economic interpretation. In any bargaining group, consumers marginal cost prices 
are given such that prices are a weighted average of the marginal cost price that the consumer 
would pay and hence prices allocate total costs. Since the outputs maximise welfare, the only 
demand compatible prices are therefore marginal cost prices. The Coase theory separates these 
marginal costs into marginal private costs and marginal external costs.
Marginal costs of production are the sum of marginal private costs (MPC) for the 
company (in this case bank), and marginal external costs MEC (used here to refer to 
macroeconomic instability). The marginal social benefit of production represents the marginal 
private benefits MPB to purchasers of the final output Q. By placing some of the burden of 
avoiding losses (in this case avoiding macroeconomic instability) on the company (bank) the 
company (bank) is required to internalise MEC as part of its marginal costs so that at market 
equilibrium
MPC (Q*) + MEC(Q*) = MPB(Q*) ( 2 . 1 1 )
Alternatively, if we trade - off the net benefit of the banks’ service activity with the cost to the
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economy we have at market equilibrium
Such models although intuitively clear, do not however easily lend themselves to empirical 
analysis because of the difficulties of measuring social and private costs. In addition special 
concerns of the banking firm’s response to monetary and prudential regulation are not easily 
accommodated in traditional industrial economic theory.
The Coase theorem and Aumann - Shapley prices are not unlike cost - axiomatic 
pricing of Bos and Tillman and approximate the process referred to in the literature as 
anonymously equitable prices [Faulhaber and Levinson (1981)]. For the case of the downward 
sloping demand curve and decreasing average costs, the market charges average cost price 
which is the uniquely anonymous equitable price. A price vector is said to be anonymously 
equitable given the cost function C(Q) and market demand D(p) if for all Q and D(p), p e 
T(Q). This is represented by price p* where p* Q' <  =  C(Q') for Q' <  =Q*.  This situation 
does not necessarily involve bargaining, and therefore seems to more closely approximate the 
Caribbean case. The anonymous equity of price p* is depicted in Figure 2.8.
This study is however, less concerned with the process of price-setting or regulation- 
setting and more with its impact on the performance of commercial banks, so that these aspects 
of the process of price-setting are only discussed in order to put in focus the analysis of the 
impact of regulation.
2.b.3 Literature on the Effect of Regulation on the Firm
A study of regulation of multi-firm markets by Meyer (1980) notes that whether firms 
act independently or collusively the impact of regulation is to increase the equilibrium price, 
to reduce the total output of firms as a group, and to induce increased average costs and 
increased risks. Meyer’s analysis focuses on rate-of-return regulation in competitive yet 
regulated settings, similar to the Caribbean banking system. He argues that there is a potential 
bias for greater capital usage in the non-collusive regulated firm compared with the regulated 
least cost production situation. These arguments have important implications for the banking 
firm, where capital adequacy and safety have become major concerns of policy makers.
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M E C ( Q * ) = M P B ( Q * )  -  M P C ( Q * ) (2.12)
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Figure 2.7
The Pelzman model of Consumer Surplus
T '( V v'-
Figure 2.8
Anonymous Equitable Pricing (p*)
Among the other branches of the literature which address aspects of corporate 
regulation and its impact on the banking firm, is the literature relating to size. One such view 
builds a case for differential regulations favouring small operations. It implies that the impact 
of uniform regulations affects small firms more so than large. The differential effect of 
regulation across plant size has been found to be important where there are economies of scale 
in regulatory compliance so that optimal regulatory policy may require imposing lighter 
regulatory burden on smaller than on larger plants [Pashigian (1968)]. In the U.S. this notion 
is captured in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 which minimised the disproportionate 
effect of regulatory requirements on small business. While this legislation does not apply 
explicitly to banks, the preferential treatment of thrifts in the U.S. and in many other countries 
is based on that premise. This aspect of regulation has its roots in studies of the production side 
of financial institutions which suggests economies of size and scope in cost structures 
particularly in operations under a certain size.
Economies of scale are not explicitly taken into account, though the literature does 
show that these affect profitability, and that there tends to be less regulation of smaller units 
than of large. A detailed study of multipurpose banking in developed countries by Khatkhate 
and Klaus-Walter (1980) claims that economies of scale and scope in rural areas particularly 
enhance performance and profitability.21 22 Such economies, however, seem to vary with 
the size of the firm. They show that large scale economies are a decreasing function of the level 
of output. To that extent these studies confirm the usefulness of examining the differential 
impact of regulation on banks according to size.
Studies of the traditional concept of scope economies investigate the question of 
whether a fixed output bundle at a given point could be more cheaply produced by dividing
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21 Research performed in the U .S . Youn Kim (1986) found economies o f both scale and scope in the growth 
o f credit unions.
22 In Barbados tax incentives offered to depositors who invest in credit unions are an example o f that type 
o f preferential treatment. Further parallels can be found in the U .S. in the long history o f  Regulation Q which 
was intended to protect small deposit-taking institutions from being pushed by competition from large banks into 
paying high interest rates to attract funds.
these outputs among two or more firms which specialise in some of these products. Scope 
economies are said to exist in the simple case of the two-product firm if:
C (y,0) + C(0,y2) -C(y„y2) >0 (2.13)
where C(yl5 y2) is the cost of joint production and where C(y,0) + C(0,y2) 
represents the costs of producing the same output levels at separate specialising firms. (Input 
prices are suppressed for convenience).
Scope economies are determined at a specific point usually at an actual data point in 
a mean value calculated for actual data point [Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1992)]. They 
argue that the procedure does not address the important question of whether joint production 
versus specialised production is optimal for the firm. However, whether economies arise from 
scope or scale, they are reflected in the impact on bank profitability, variance of profits and 
market share.23 If the cost of regulation is not covered and prices are subsidy free, and there 
remains for some output a set of prices that exceed their production costs, this provides an 
incentive to rival firms to provide those outputs at competitive prices, and may have some 
effect on the market share of the firm. This may partly explain the rise of non-banks in the 
Caribbean, but other scope economies may also exist which are unrelated to regulation [Berger, 
Hancock and Humphrey (1992)].
Studies on the benefits and costs of monetary and prudential regulation have not been 
conducted for the Caribbean. The more extensive studies on commercial bank behaviour in the 
Caribbean are by Bourne (1977) and Ramkissoon (1982). The Bourne (1977) study examines 
portfolio allocation of commercial banks’ assets in Jamaica using three variants of a model of 
commercial bank behaviour. Ramkissoon (1982) examines commercial bank portfolio behaviour 
in Trinidad and Tobago with special emphasis on adjustment times. These studies are all 
premised on the need for a developmental role for commercial banks and do not examine the 
repressive aspects of regulation. Research by Zepherin (1990) addresses the question of
61
23 Arguments similar to those o f size and scope are cast in terms o f materiality; suggesting that since small 
operations are not material then they should not be regulated. This was the approach taken to cooperatives in 
Barbados until they grew to a sufficiently significant size where their failure could affect the system. In the case 
o f banks, regulations apply to all banks irrespective o f size.
asymmetric information and financial liberalisation in the Caribbean. While some of these 
writers have tended to support the view that monetary controls are important in a Caribbean 
setting, the impact of these regulations on commercial banks has only recently been given 
attention [Williams (1989), Brown (1991) and Rolle (1992)].
2.b.4 Theories o f Financial Regulation and the Banking Firm
Theory assumes that the objective function of commercial banks is to maximise 
profits.24 Safety and soundness are often presumed to be the responsibility of the monetary 
authority. Consequently, literature on the banking firm does not always explicitly accommodate 
analysis of the impact of monetary and prudential regulation. For example, all equilibrium 
models do not explicitly include the capital constraint as a factor in prudential regulation. 
Leverage models [Taggart and Greenbaum (1978)] which do focus on capital adequacy and 
include a capital constraint, do not however adopt the portfolio approach, so that areas such 
as sectoral credit control are not jointly accommodated. Some writers who use the portfolio 
approach assume a given leverage. Koehn and Santomero (1980) include some element of 
leverage in their analysis, so permitting the inclusion of some elements of regulation such as 
capital adequacy. Indeed, there does not yet exist any comprehensive theory of the banking 
firm which describes the behaviour of banks under any set of assumptions which can fully 
accommodate changes in expected outcomes given variations in the internal and external 
environment [Reveil (1980)].
Portfolio theory deals with the pricing of assets and explicitly recognises the 
relationship between risk and return. Litner (1965) and Sharpe (1964) have shown that the 
equilibrium market value of a firm can be expressed as
V = ( S l > ]  - ( 3 p o J r f  ( 2 . 1 4 )
where p is the correlation between the firms return and the return on a portfolio of all
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24 The approach to the bank as a profit maximiser starts with a model o f a wealth maximising firm in 
financial markets with uncertain return. Other approaches emphasising agency and utility maximization have 
added to the literature but take second place to the view o f the commercial bank as a profit maximiser or 
objective function maximiser. A summary o f this literature is offered by Santomero (1989).
securities on the market, rf denotes 1 plus the riskless rate of return, jS is part of the market 
price of risk and E [tt] and crff are the expected value and standard deviation of profit.
This approach assumes the firm to have unlimited riskless ability to borrow and leverage. In 
the case of the banking firm this is not the case, since regulation underscores the risk-return 
nature of both assets and liabilities. Hence it is appropriate to describe a firm attempting to 
maximise profits subject to regulatory standards of bank soundness. Such approaches have 
been used by Mingo and Wolkowitz (1977), Meyer (1980) and Huggins and Morgan (1993).
They set the balance sheet identity
A + A'+ C = D + K  ( 2 . 1 5 )
where A = loans, A' = government securities, C = required cash reserves, D = deposits and 
K = capital. They define bank profits as
pA + rA' -gK -h D  (2.16)
Reserves are assumed to be non-interest bearing and the constraints are interest costs, credit 
controls and capital adequacy; p is the loan rate where p = p(a,A) where (a) is the credit 
worthiness of the loan customer and pa<0 and pA<0. The rate of return on government 
securities (r) is exogenously given and is presumed to be less than the return on loans, 
g = g(K) where g is the cost of capital and gK > 0; and h = h(D) where h is the cost of 
deposits and hD > 0.
The soundness constraint is
t  =aA + a'Af +  cC  + hK-cD  ( 2 . 1 7 )
(Lower case letters represent the weights associated with balance sheet entries and are all 
positive.) An increase in loans is therefore at the expense of a decline in cash and securities 
and additional bank capital (K) implies greater soundness. Greater deposits (for a given capital) 
imply less soundness. Thus the bank which maximises profits subject to a soundness constraint 
must consider the effect of all balance sheet items on soundness as well as profits.
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The model is solved via the method of Lagrange multipliers. First order partial derivatives are 
taken with respect to each of the exogenous variables, Loans (A), loan quality (a) capital (K) 
and deposits (D) and the Lagrange multiplier (X). (See Appendix 2.4).
In examining how equilibrium values change in response to a change in regulatory posture (dr), 
total derivatives of the first order equations are taken with respect to dr and the results are 
presented below. The complete derivations can be seen in Appendix 2.4. A change in r has 
several effects. The first (dA/dr) is expressed in terms of the model’s parameters and 
equilibrium values of endogenous variables and the rest is expressed in terms of dA/dr. First, 
the long run absolute size of the portfolio declines. That is,
The bank can adjust to imposed increases in soundness by improving loan quality, as well as 
decreasing loans (in favour of securities). That is
dA
dr (a'-a) +
(2.18)
d a
d x
+ P ^  + 2fa d A
( a ' - a )  P aa
(2.19)
which is positive under the same conditions that ensure dA/dr<0. 
The effect on bank capital of an increase in soundness is given by:
d K
a ,+ k  a P a a + 2 P a  d A
( a ' - a ) I d x ( 2 . 2 0 )
d x [Kpkk + 2 g k]
which is positive under the same conditions that ensure dA/dr<0.
Finally, dD/dr is negative under the same conditions that ensured the signs of the other 
derivatives:
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dD _ (a' -  c ) v  
dx DhDD + 2 hD ( a ' - a )
Also, the sign dAVdr is ambiguous; that is, government securities could rise or fall in response 
to an increase in soundness. On the other hand, A' can be expected to rise as loans (A) are 
drawn down. However, the total size of the bank’s balance sheet may decline (i.e. if jdD/dr| 
dK/dr) leading to a decline in all asset types including securities.
Among other models of the banking firm which assist in explaining adjustments to 
monetary measures, is that of Klein (1971). He presented a model of the banking firm which 
separates asset and liability management and determination by emphasising that the share of 
each asset in a portfolio was independent of the size and structure of deposit liabilities and thus 
of deposit market features. This aspect of the independence of asset structure partially 
accommodates the regulated environment where the volume of particular assets are determined 
by exogenous controls and is not a direct function of the stock of deposit liabilities. He assumes 
that the bank is a price-taker in government securities and a price-setter in the loans and deposit 
markets. His model is based on the assumption of maximisation of a rate of return on equity 
where W = equity invested and borrowed funds through the issue of deposits = B, and
Where F = total funds, EF = expected rate of return on total funds, R; = rate of interest on 
types of deposits, Xj= proportion of total funds allocated to the jth asset type, Ej= expected 
rate of return on that asset type and represents a specified proportion of total funds (F). 
Funds secured from equity and issuance of deposits are allocated among n classes of assets.
F=W+HBi ( 2 . 2 1 )
s i n c e  F -  W +F a i ( 2 . 2 2 )
and Bi = 0^  and EjXj = 1
E* =1f XjEj "  EttiRi ( 2 . 2 3 )
where W = equity originally invested.
and
6 6
E  = ------- +—  = ------ 1—1--------
w l -E o ^  1 -E a i
Er 'LXj Er 2 a 1RB ( 2 . 2 4 )
Liquidity management was an important part of Klein’s model. He formulated an expression 
for the expected loss from the banks’ cash management policy:
where (b) represented the lowest deposit loss or gain and (c) the largest possible interest 
disbursement. He separated the rates of return on securities into private (XJ and public (Xg); 
and the return on deposits into demand (cqRj) and time (c^RJ; arriving at an expression for 
determining return on equity EL = expected return on loans. Default risks are exogenous to 
the banks so that
applicability. The expected return on government securities is a random variable with density
function 0 (g) where g is the holding period of return and Eg the expected rate of return. The
full equation was given by:
1 r l Yr-n)  21E = [  ±  [X h (XL) c > j -  a ±R± -  0C2R2 ( 2 . 2 1 )
w ( l - a 1 - a 2) L L [2 ( c - b )  ] 1 1  2 2
The model helps to explain the process which determines the prices which banks charge 
for their services, but does not accommodate an environment where interest rates are prescribed 
and limits are placed on credit. It does not include resource costs and insolvency costs or 
provide a framework for the study of regulatory impact, nor does his assumption of the bank 
as a monopolistic price-setter accommodate examination of banks in a regulated setting.
(2.25)
EL=h(XL) w h ere h ' (XL) <0 (2.26)
His model has been heavily used in the literature because of its simplicity and easy
Expanded models include the capital decision (with and without deposit insurance). In 
his model Dermine (1986) shows that expected insolvency costs, where no deposit insurance 
exists, is borne by depositors and where deposit insurance exists, it is borne by borrowers. The
optimal loan rate is a function of the probability of bankruptcy and depends on the deposit rate 
so that indirectly insolvency costs are still borne by depositors.
Using the generalised form of utility maximisation, Pyle (1971) incorporates risk 
aversion, but disregards liquidity, solvency and resource cost considerations. In addition, yields 
are assumed to be exogenously determined and depend on yield differentials as the basis for 
the banks decision. The assumption of exogenous, though stochastic, net yields for all different 
assets and liabilities does not accommodate the case where returns are regulated.
An integrated approach to the banking firm which facilitates the study of regulation is 
found in Baltensperger’s (1980) work. His study combines the real and financial effects of 
banking behaviour and allows an endogenous determination of the overall operation of the 
banking firm and is described in the literature as a real resource model [Bourke (1988)]. 
Though his own work was presented in terms of a banking firm which was subject to no 
particular constraint or regulation, his insights into modelling of optimal asset choice, 
determinants of the distribution of deposit changes and the deposit capital decision, bring to the 
analysis of bank behaviour an appreciation of how liability management could be integrated 
with the asset management. Baltensperger’s analysis (1980) by explicitly incorporating costs 
and the capital decision facilitated the examination of commercial banks’ adjustment to both 
monetary and prudential regulation.
He formulates a model which assumes that banking firms act to maximise expected 
profits. Profits are determined by earnings on assets less cost of deposits, less resource costs, 
less liquidity costs , less the opportunity cost of equity capital.
This was expressed as :
E(H) = lE - tD -C (D ,E )  -L -S -p W  ( 2 . 2 8 )
where C = resource costs of producing and maintaining deposit and credit accounts
L = liquidity costs, or expected cost due to reserve deficiency
S = expected cost of insolvency
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D = deposits
L= liquidity costs
p — the opportunity cost of equity funds
This model permits a study of the impact of regulation through an analysis of the cost 
of regulation because it accommodates costs which are reflected not only in the flow of inputs 
and outputs but also in the stock of assets and liabilities, and can be modified to accommodate 
the full gamut of regulatory measures which apply in the Caribbean. Since an examination of 
bank performance must look at the commercial bank in terms of costs and earnings, a 
Baltensperger type formulation is more appropriate for such purposes. Such general models are 
helpful in analysing the balance sheet impact of specific monetary regulations which follow in 
the next section.
2.b.5 Literature: Reserve Requirements and Bank Performance
Most of the literature on the response of the banking system to primary and secondary 
reserve requirements is quite unequivocal about the adverse implications for bank profitability 
resulting from imposing reserve requirements.
Most writers, like Baltensperger, argue that primary and secondary reserve requirements force 
banks into portfolio adjustments as they seek to maximise a profit function (it) represented 
usually as:
n= f :  r . A , - £  £  C(Ak) -E  C (DA ( 2 .1 7 )
i = 1 j = l  J J k=1 g=1 9
Where A = assets, D = Deposits, C = costs
and r} = rate of return on assets and Sj= rate of return paid on deposits.
The profit of the banking firm (II) is the return on assets, principally loans less the cost 
of deposits. Viewed in terms of optimum liquidity levels one can conclude that in maximising 
profits the optimum liquidity level is a function of the asset structure, the liability structure and
6 8
W = equity capital
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Regulation limits the range of banks’ choices; but within the limited scope afforded to 
banks, cost adjustments can be made by deriving a reserve management approach which adjusts 
cost functions through changes in returns on deposits and assets. If net withdrawals exceed 
reserves available, or if repayments are insufficient to meet withdrawals, the bank adjusts its 
flow of loans and deposits and their costs to restore its profit position. By implying an 
objective of restoring a profit position, this approach suggests that changes in profitability of 
banks are only temporary and tends to assume that banks will not accept lower profits in 
response to changes in costs consequent on changes in reserve requirements.
In the Caribbean case where both minimum deposit rates and maximum lending rates 
are set for much of the period under study, the bank becomes more of a price taker, so that 
the expected adjustment cost due to reserve deficiencies or the liquidity cost is likely to be:
L = f ° ° p ( X - R )  f ( X )  dX ( 2 . 3 0 )
J R
where
X denotes the outflow of deposits and thus reserves with density function f(X).
L= liquidity costs due to reserve deficiency
R= beginning of period reserves
p = cost per dollar of reserve deficiency
Holding an extra dollar of reserves implies a marginal opportunity cost of r > 0 but 
a marginal reduction in liquidity cost such that: where r= the loan rate
co
LR= - p f  f ( X ) dX < 0  ( 2 . 3 1 )
R
Optimisation requires minimisation of the sum of these two cost elements, i.e - 
equalisation of marginal cost and marginal "return" of holding additional reserves.
the volume of assets and deposits.
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p [ ”f(x)dX ( 2 .3 2 )
This means that the bank must choose the level of reserves such that f(x) dX = the probability 
of a reserve deficiency is just equal to the ratio of r/p. This condition defines the banks desired 
reserves as a function of the data of the model r, p and f(X), where rR = the opportunity cost 
of holding reserves.
If the legal requirement is that reserves at the end of the period (R-X) must be at least 
equal to a specified proportion k of the end of period deposits (D-X). A reserve deficiency 
occurs where:
R-X<k (D-X) ( 2 . 3 3 )
or
X  > ( R -k D ) / ( 1 - k )  =X ( 2 . 3 4 )
If a reserve deficiency occurs its size is
X ( l - k )  -  (R-kD) = (X-X) ( 1 -k )
(2 o 35)
The expected value of these costs thus is;
2 > f  P [ X ( l - k )  -  (R+kD) ] f  (X) d x
J Jt
( 2 . 3 6 )
with derivative
( 2 . 3 7 )
representing the marginal reduction in liquidity costs.
Thus optimality requires again that the marginal opportunity cost of holding reserves 
(r) if the bank is a price taker in the loan market) is equal to (p) multiplied by the probability 
of a reserve deficiency. This probability is given by the probability of X exceeding X, rather
than X exceeding R. The rate (/>) cannot be identified simply as the discount rate but the total 
of all costs including administration and information, so that (r) and (p) are functionally related 
to but not identical to die loan rate.
In the presence of adjustment costs, however, an adjustment to R is profitable only if 
the resulting gain ( reduction in rR+L i.e the opportunity cost of holding reserves plus liquidity 
costs) more than offsets the cost of the adjustment itself. In this case there exists a range 
around R which the bank will let its reserves fluctuate freely, without making adjustments. 
Furthermore, if adjustment costs also include a fixed element which is independent of the size 
of the adjustment, an adjustment is profitable only if the resulting gain covers all adjustment 
costs, including the fixed element.
For this to be the case, the total gain (i.e reduction in rR +L) resulting from bringing 
reserves up to the optimum levels, must be at least as large as the fixed adjustment cost plus 
the proportional cost term fixed element multiplied by the size of the adjustment. Thus, the 
range within which active adjustments are profitable is further increased.
Writers are however, uncertain about the relative impact of reserve requirements on 
depositors and bank borrowers. Black (1975) and Fama (1980), found that reserve requirements 
had an observable adverse impact on the market valuation of commercial banks. They saw 
reserve requirements as a direct tax on deposit returns which lowers the return on deposits by 
the fraction of deposits that must be held in reserves, so that deposits involve an opportunity 
cost, providing lower returns than non-deposit based assets with the same risk. Fama, in a 
later work (1985) develops a model which shows that such costs are borne by bank borrowers 
depending on the elasticity of demand for loans and deposits. The results taken together 
suggest that the incidence of the cost of reserve requirements can be shifted to depositors or 
to borrowers depending on the structure of the market.
Increases in reserve requirements therefore raises bank costs and artificially constrain 
the size of the banking firm. [Ramakhrisnan and Thakor (1984)j and [Boyd and Prescott
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(1986)] also argue that a set of marginal customers is lost to the banking sector because it is 
non-optimal for these firms to deal with banks, an argument that is consistent with the rise of 
non-banks in a regulated environment of the Caribbean, where open market operations are not 
fully developed and where most of the adjustment has to be in loans and deposits.
Further examination of the incidence of reserve requirements was undertaken by 
Osborne and Zaher (1992) who used classical event studies methods and conclude that reserve 
requirements are a tax on depositors, but that shareholders bear part of the tax. Romer (1985) 
splits the cost of reserve requirements between bank borrowers and banks themselves by 
showing how increased reserve requirements not only raise loan rates but reduce bank lending. 
Some writers question the need for reserve requirements altogether and others have suggested 
that to provide compensation to banks, reserve requirements should be retained but interest 
should be paid on reserves [Friedman (1984)].
More important to the focus of this study, they conclude that reserve requirements 
impact on the size of the banking industry, but are not specific about the kind of circumstances 
in which equity holders as opposed to depositors bear the cost. The arguments are also open 
to the possible inference that firm industry size can be reduced without profitability being 
affected. This argument suggests that banks may not permit changes in reserve requirements 
to impact on profitability, but may prefer to make the required accommodation in terms of bank 
size while maintaining or even sacrificing profitability levels. They suggest that a set of 
customers at the margin is lost to the banking system as a result of higher costs of services to 
customers as banks seek to recover income lost from higher reserve requirements. To the 
extent however, that banks in Barbados operate in an oligopolistic environment, and where non­
banks offer services which are not fully substitutable for commercial bank services, it is 
possible that additional costs may be borne by customers in an oligopolistic environment 
without loss to business.
Reserve requirements have been shown to have significant adverse implications for 
bank shareholder wealth. Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1990) show that this adverse impact 
is uniform across banks and that changes in reserve requirements have no significant effect on
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treasury securities. Their work also implies that reserve requirements contribute to reduced 
profitability of commercial banks and to the rise of non-banks.
Generally, most writers conclude that reserve requirements impact negatively on bank 
profitability and bank market share. However,a pure accounting interpretation would suggest 
that bank risks are improved since the additional assets held in cash or government securities 
requirements are risk-free.
2.b.6 Literature: Credit Controls and Bank Performance
Analysis of the effect of regulatory changes suggests that attention be centred on the 
impacts borne by customers, creditors and equity owners and requires a framework for 
integrating these multiple facets of the operations of financial institutions. Meyer (1980) asserts 
that the study of aggregate credit system expansion or contraction relevant to macroeconomic 
policy models should logically proceed from a macroeconomic model of financial regulatory 
impact. While studies have not provided us with a framework for analysis of the full 
regulatory impact of all bank regulations, studies of the impact of individual regulatory 
measures are instructive.
Distinguishing between the impact of credit limits on the solvency of healthy and 
unhealthy banks, White (1981) suggests that the impact of credit limits on solvency will depend 
on the existing net asset situation of each bank. He suggests that banks which are already 
experiencing solvency problems are however likely to suffer further deterioration in net assets 
through reduced profitability and that credit restrictions will reduce the solvency of all banks 
through the effect on profitability but are unlikely to have more than an interim impact on 
healthy banks during the period of adjustment to the controls.
He suggests that the adjustment of one portfolio item is influenced by all other portfolio 
adjustments at a particular time and that portfolio adjustments are constrained by changes in 
net worth. He suggests that the inability to accumulate income earning assets adversely affects 
net worth and hence solvency over the medium term and that if liabilities continue to grow 
banks must find new areas of investment or negative net worth can result.
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The effectiveness of credit ceilings is challenged by Ducca and Vanhoose (1990) who 
trace the transmission mechanism with special reference to the effect of loan contracts on 
monetary policy and conclude that changes in loan contract type towards committed loan 
arrangements influence how monetary policy disturbances alter intended results. They suggest 
that loan commitments can undermine the effectiveness of credit ceilings.
Ceilings on lending rates effectively place limits on the extent to which banks can 
charge customers higher rates in compensation for higher risks, so reducing the effectiveness 
of the loan rate. Indeed by reducing the effectiveness of the loan rate as a control device the 
credit rationing hypothesis by implication, assigns greater importance to credit controls, since 
equilibrium rationing predicts that the market will be in equilibrium in a state of excess demand 
and that loan supply will not depend positively on the loan rate.
This position differs slightly from that of Bester (1985) who argues that in an 
environment of credit controls banks will choose a rate of return to screen investors’ riskiness. 
He argues that collateral and interest rates are determined simultaneously and that banks adjust 
to limited supply by raising collateral requirements for high risk customers. This point is also 
made by Zepherin (1990) who however places the emphasis on the impact of information on 
rationing and concluded that asymmetric information of borrowers led to increases in 
reservation service prices and to credit rationing.
The non-market clearing views of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) tend to be non-committal 
on the effectiveness of credit and interest rate controls.25 They argue that once one moves 
beyond the IS/LM analysis of incorporating credit and introduces a general substitution process, 
loan rationing supplements interest rate rationing and other responses to relative price changes 
as part of the monetary transmission process. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks trade­
off profitability against the risk of default but they do not throw any light on rationing which
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The non-market clearing hypothesis states that excess demand is handled by credit rationing and that 
when supply increases, loans increase even with the same demand level. It predicts that the market will be in 
equilibrium in a state o f  excess demand and that loan supply will not depend positively on the loan rate. This 
view was given great prominence through the work o f Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
arises from regulation, nor do they indicate whether there is a different impact on profitability 
arising from regulation induced rationing compared with voluntary rationing. If banks do 
ration credit in an environment where credit limits are exogenous to the firm the inference is 
that the high-profit low-risk controlled sector would first be satisfied and that banks would 
withhold credit from the high risk, usually the productive sectors, which authorities wish to 
promote.
Fry (1988) is much more explicit on the question of allocation but less so on the 
question of the impact on profitability. He concludes that where credit ceilings exist credit 
is not advanced according to expected productivity but according to transactions costs and 
perceived risk of default, thus suggesting that commercial banks’ main concern in a credit 
controlled environment is not the viability of the project but the impact on costs and risk. (See 
also Williams (1989)). An indirect reference to the impact of credit controls on profitability 
is found in King (1986) who develops a model which implies that for a given level of core 
deposits, the marginal cost of issuing loans rises with the volume of loans made as the bank 
becomes less liquid. However liquidity increases the probability that the bank will have to 
borrow on the open market, which increases the marginal cost of funds. Since credit controls 
tend to increase bank liquidity thus reducing the marginal cost of funds the implication is that 
such controls could possibly improve the profitability of banks.
2.b.7 Literature: Interest Rate Regulation and Bank Performance
Conclusions about credit controls often need to be modified in the presence of interest 
rate controls. Early work on interest rate regulation [Mingo (1978)] found that deposit rate 
ceilings which limit banks’ ability to compete via payment of interest may be counter­
productive if the aim of deposit rate ceilings is to reduce risk. He argues that since banks rely 
on interest rate payment to attract funds, where this option is precluded, then interest rate 
controls can lead to increased risk. However, subsequent literature has tended to focus less on 
whether controls achieve their objective and more on who bears the cost of controls.
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The literature on interest rate controls in the U.S., tends also to focus on controls on
deposit rates rather than lending rates.26 Meyer (1986) argues that deposit interest rate 
ceilings, by limiting price competition confer a subsidy on bank equity holders and a cost to 
depositors. His comments were, however, made in the context of a ceiling on deposit rates but 
would need to be modified for the Caribbean case where there were floors on deposit rates and 
ceilings on lending rates. He finds that in a regulated environment risk adjusted returns are 
lower. This implies either that returns to equity are lower than they would otherwise be or that 
in a cost constrained portfolio, loan prices (as opposed to strict interest rates) may be lower or 
services fewer than would otherwise occur without restrictions. If equity owners do not bear 
the impact through lower yields or lower market prices of their stock, then higher revenues are 
needed to compensate for the higher portfolio risk in order to provide the same risk adjusted 
return.
In a model of uncertain rates of return, Pyle (1971) suggests that for a profit 
maximising firm the covariance between loans and deposits leads to intermediation by 
encouraging the risk averse profit maximiser to transform deposits into loans. That position 
is developed by Sealy (1977) who sees a scenario where rates are set by the intermediary rather 
than by the open market. He suggests that ceilings on lending rates prompt commercial banks 
to voluntarily set ceilings on their own deposit rates and concedes that the ability of the bank 
to subsidise banking activity such as check cashing, funds transfer and account variance costs 
may encourage deposit values. He found that the covariance reduces the uncertainty around 
expected profits and encourages intermediation.
An extreme position is, however, taken by Barro and Santomero (1972) who cite the 
case in which production and operating costs rise due to regulatory constraints. This argument 
is also made by Mitchell (1986) who examines the case where production and operating costs 
due to regulatory constraints were incapable of rewarding the depositor sufficiently. He applies 
a utility function defined over the mean and variance of portfolio return to examine how bank 
risk is affected by both deposit rates paid by the central bank on reserves and the required
76
26 In the Caribbean, however, both floors on interest rates and ceilings were set on deposit rates, unlike 
regulation Q in the U .S . which set a maximum rate on deposits only.
reserve ratio. He concluded that bank risk, however measured is affected partly by the interest 
rate on bank loans and separately by the reserve requirement.
Greater disaggregation of the costs involved in the adjustment of banks to monetary 
changes can be found in the contributions of Sealy and Lindley (1977) who also examined 
aspects such as implicit payments and embedded costs and identified other operational costs 
such as insurance costs, labour costs,and default costs. This is not an area which has been 
greatly examined as much of the literature tends to merge all costs into a single parameter 
representative of all operational costs or separates only liquidity and insolvency costs.
The model of a quasi-fixed production developed by Flannery (1989) comes close to 
the approach of the regulated environment and is closer to conventional views of shared costs. 
He assumes that the cost function relates to changes in deposit balances rather than on, or in 
addition to, the level itself. He assumed that customer specific costs are shared by the 
customer and the bank. The model demonstrates how deposit rate variation may be reduced 
relative to open market movements. He argues that such a production process can explain both 
the long run customer relation and the tendency for deposit rates sometimes to lag behind open 
market rates both on the up and the down side of the market. He suggests that such quasi­
fixed production technology explains the concept of core deposits.
The objective of stimulating the productive sectors through a low interest rate regime 
is generally not supported by later economists. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for example argue 
that monetary policies which seek to increase investment by lowering interest rates will not 
have the desired effect since there is no shortage of willing borrowers, and that policies that 
increase the availability of loanable funds will increase investment. Their view implies that 
profits may be maximised at lower interest rates and hence that ceilings on lending rates need 
not adversely affect bank profitability. However, if one assumes that rationing behaviour of 
commercial banks occurs whether or not there is central bank regulation, unless it occurs to 
a greater extent when there is regulation, then we can take rationing as given in all situations 
and proceed to analyze the effect of regulation by monetary authorities on bank profitability in 
a situation where voluntary credit rationing can be described as almost profit-neutral. Their
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analysis infers that regulated ceilings on lending rates do not necessarily adversely affect bank 
profitability since higher rates may be accompanied by higher risks and consequently higher 
losses with adverse implications for profitability.
To the extent that banks observe loan rate ceilings Fry (1988) agrees that non-price 
rationing will occur, but suggests that credit rationing caused by administratively imposed loan 
rate ceilings differs from credit rationing identified by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). However, 
he observes that loan rate ceilings discourage risk-taking on the part of financial institutions, 
since risk premia cannot be charged when ceilings bind profitability.
Both types of credit rationing, induced and voluntary, are analyzed by Cho (1986) who 
concludes that abolishing interest rate controls will be insufficient to maximise investment 
efficiency, since banks may hold lending rates below the rate at which funds could be lent in 
order to reduce the probability of default and that credit rationing will persist even in the 
presence of financial liberalisation.
The weight of the arguments on interest rate controls whether focusing on the incidence 
of controls or the effectiveness of controls tends to suggest that by limiting the opportunity set 
of banks such controls impact adversely on bank profitability and bank market share - but the 
implications for liquidity and solvency are often left undetermined.
2.b .8  Literature: Prudential Regulation and Bank Performance
The literature on prudential regulation focuses more on bank performance than does 
the literature on monetary regulation. Until very recently, writers were ambivalent about the 
form prudential regulation should take, particularly with regard to capital adequacy, risk and 
the probability of failure, e.g., Flannery (1989) and Kim and Santomero (1988). It is often 
argued, for example, Flannery (1989), that the combination of loan examination procedures and 
capital adequacy regulation lead insured banks to prefer relatively low risk individual loans, 
even while they pursue high portfolio risk in order to maximise their deposit insurance put 
option value. He argues that as a result of capital adequacy guidelines, banks will increasingly 
securitise loans that they cannot effectively finance from their own portfolios. Kim and
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Santomero (1988) agree that capital regulation via a simple capital asset ratio gives banks an 
incentive to increase their business risk by portfolio realignment and is an ineffective way to 
bound the insolvency of banks, but that the recent move to risk-related capital regulation in the 
U.S. and in many other countries which are part of the Basle agreement, is potentially more 
effective but is in danger of putting serious restrictions on bank activities and on product 
pricing. However, writers are unnanimous on the impact of capital adequacy on profitability, 
and to a lesser extent on market share, arguing that capital regulation bounds insolvency risk 
with adverse implications for return (see Figure 2.9).
Defining bank solvency as an event where the bank’s capital is completely eliminated, 
that is, the captal-asset ratio, E < -1, then if return on equity is normally distributed the 
probability of insolvency denoted by (p), can be specified for any (E,a ) where a, is the 
standard deviation of return per unit of capital and the mean of the capital asset ratio jug
p r o b l E s - 1] ( 2 . 3 8 )
a a
Thus
E - 1-<{> (p) . a ( 2 . 3 9 )
and
-4>(P)=—  ( 2 . 4 0 )a
where fi(.) is the inverse of the cumulative standard normal distribution function. The value
of 0 (.) is always negative since the probability of failure considers only the lower end of the
distribution. A larger absolute value of corresponds to a lower insolvency risk for a chosen 
portfolio.
The introduction of risk-based capital criteria (KR) forces greater adjustment on banks 
and lowers the scope for trading-off risk and return. Using the expression in equation (2.38), 
regulators want to make sure that banks operate in the region to the left of the line LR (see
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Figure 2.9). LR is the regulation preference line and G0 Gt G2 is the bank’s global efficient 
frontier. The necessary and sufficient condition for the success of the banks’ risk management 
through capital regulation is to eliminate the area between Gt G2 and Gl G3 for the opportunity 
set. Risk weights imposed by regulators achieve this. Rq G! R2 is now the efficient frontier 
conditional on capital ratio KR, and ER G3 is the upward bound on the expected return 
associated with the solvency constraint. In the absence of capital regulation the global frontier 
becomes feasible to the bank. With capital regulation the bank can no longer make the normal 
trade-off between risk and return.
In the Caribbean, capital adequacy criteria are not explicitly risk-based and formal 
systems of assigning risk levels to assets did not apply; authorities, in assessing the adequacy 
of capital of individual banks took risk into account, so that insolvency risks, though not bound 
by the global frontier, were nevertheless bound by a frontier conditional on a capital constraint, 
albiet not fillly risk-weighted.
Risk-based capital systems also have their disadvantages for the customer. Flannery 
(1989) examined the impact of capital adequacy criteria for insured banks in the U.S. under
the risk-based scheme and found that the combination of loan examination procedures and
capital adequacy regulations lead insured banks to prefer relatively low risk individual loans 
through the impact on permissible leverage (D/K), thus reducing the probability of failure but 
points out the consequences for profitability. He represented that:
E ( R s ) = R f + f R l [ R f ( D / K ) - & L ( D - H O / K ] f ( R L) .d R rL ( 2 .4 1 )
J —00
where:
K = an exogenously fixed amount of equity
W = end of period wealth and W/K= RB= return on capital and E(Re) expected 
return to shareholders 
Rl = 1 + the realised loan rate
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Rf = 1 + the risk free rate
D=deposits
D/K = financial leverage
R \ =  Rf /(D+K) is the lowest loan return for which depositors can be fully repaid and
f(R)= the density function for RL (which depends on the portfolio’s riskiness 6p).
Expressing deposit insurance as a put option written on the banks asset portfolio with 
an exercise price equal to end-of-period face value of outstanding deposits, he rewrites the 
above expression in terms of a put option with value (v). So that the attainable option value 
is:
E(Re ) =Rf +V(dp, Rf (D/K) ) ( 2 .4 2 )
Where: Rf(D/K) is the exercise price.
The put option is increasing in both the asset variance and the exercise price : i.e.
V ^ O
V2>0
where V! = asset variance and V2 the exercise price.
Accordingly, in the absence of restrictive regulations, expected bank profits will be 
maximised by selecting the greatest feasible level of asset risk (Qp) and financial leverage 
(D/K). However, regulators attempt to influence 0p and D/K in ways that reduce the 
attainable option value, forcing banks into holding low risk portfolios. This could therefore 
largely explain the observed tendency of insured banks to specialise in low risk assets. While 
this confirms the impact of capital adequacy and leverage regulations on insured banks, insured 
banks compete with unregulated lenders in making loans, so that regulations partly determine 
which loans bankers have a comparative advantage in financing. The increasing practice of 
loan sales and loan securitisation have been identified as attempts by banks to recover 
profitability resulting from the constraints on capital sufficiency associated with risk weighted 
capital.
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Figure 2 .9
Bounding Insolvency Risk by Capital Regulation
Most writers agree that adequate capital increases the soundness of financial institutions 
but suggest caution in the structuring of such requirements because of the impact on solvency. 
Heggestad (1979) notes that where financial regulators set rules for portfolios that it has the 
potential for reducing the probability of bank failure. These writers saw banks as choosing an 
asset portfolio to maximise expected utility of uncertain profits and that these choices were 
characterised by risk aversion. They defined failure as a situation where banks’ losses 
exceeded capital.
They noted that where regulators focus solely on a relatively high variance and ignore 
the pooling effect of a regulatory change they may be misled into regarding the desirability of 
high-risk high-return assets. They do not recommend that portfolio regulation restrict high- 
risk, high-return assets as this may increase the probability of bank failure. They argue that 
where regulations force banks to inefficient frontiers, regulators are likely to increase the 
probability that losses will exceed capital.
Later writings on the effect of capital adequacy criteria on commercial banks continue 
to be ambiguous with regard to risk but suggest a threshold at which the impact of increased 
capital requirements differs among banks. Koehn and Santomero (1980) showed that banks 
altered the composition of their asset portfolio with the imposition of higher capital 
requirements and according to the riskiness of the portfolio different results obtained. They 
showed that there existed some risk aversion coefficient below which any increase in capital 
will increase the probability of bankruptcy rather than decrease it.
Essentially therefore, safe banks became safer and risky institutions increased their risk 
position. Their writings have tended to support capital criteria based on asset quality as an 
improvement on uniform ratios. Representing insolvency risks by [E < -1], that is, where the 
bank’s equity capital is completely eliminated, they argue that when solvency standards are not 
based on asset quality banks reshuffle their portfolios toward riskier ones, thus increasing 
business risk in order to offset the impact of forced lower leverage, (lower financial risk) so 
that regulators fail to bound the insolvency risk. While such uniform capital ratios fail to 
bound bankruptcy risks, a risk related capital plan, by placing bank assets into risk categories
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and assigning a risk weight to each category bounds insolvency risks.
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Assuming banks have a generally risk averse utility function in end-of-period capital, 
capital adequacy criteria in the presence of leveraging capability meant that banks efficiency 
frontier falls downward and to the left for any given value of increase in capital [Koehn and 
Santomero (1980)]. Their results implied unambiguously that over the entire permissible 
efficient frontier the total value of the portfolio falls and the returns of each set declines.
Some writers claim that because of the problem of moral hazard, deposit insurance 
reduces the role of the Central Bank in ensuring monetary stability in the operation of the 
banking system since it is claimed that banks exercise less care in credit selection in the 
presence of deposit insurance. Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) show that this problem can be 
minimised through the use of capital adequacy criteria since such criteria protect the insurance 
fund. They interpret the cost of regulatory restrictions as an implicit insurance premium. 
Without such regulations (of which capital adequacy is a part), deposit insurance schemes 
would not be viable. This found support in arguments that adequate capital was that which 
made the insurance premium actuarially fair [Sharpe (1978) and (1991)].
Regulators of commercial banks rarely see themselves as setting prices when imposing 
prudential regulations. Bos and Tillman (1983), using a cost-axiomatic approach to pricing 
in regulated firms, questioned whether prices determined by regulation are always demand 
compatible. It is often assumed that financial institutions will adjust prices to changes in 
regulations and that the changes are demand compatible. They suggest that cost adjustments 
may not always be passed on in terms of price adjustments and that cost-axiomatic pricing is 
only market clearing where firms’ profits are explicitly taken into account.
The need for a model of capital regulation that takes both monetary and prudential 
measures into account is advocated by Mitchell (1986). This is particularly relevant to the 
Caribbean where there is a high level of dependence on monetary policy. Recent trends in the 
Caribbean to review the regulatory framework conform to the global trend in tightening 
prudential regulation and include some measure of regulation of non-banks. For the most part
these capital adequacy measures are not explicitly risk-based, although there is the intention to 
introduce explicitly risk-based capital adequacy measures in some Caribbean countries.
2.b.9 Empirical Studies: Monetary and Prudential Regulation
In the past decade there has been little monetary regulation in most developed countries, 
so that there is a dearth of current empirical literature on the impact of regulation on 
commercial banks. Work on the impact of regulation on banks in the U.S. has tended to 
examine the impact of regulation on bank risk, but very few studies have examined impact on 
bank profitability and shareholder wealth. The latter can be divided into empirical studies on 
efficiency, e.g Smirlock (1985), and studies which examine the impact of some particular 
economic or monetary development on bank profitability. Theories such as the relative 
efficiency hypothesis [Smirlock (1985)] use optimising conditions to equate marginal cost of 
output (MC) with marginal revenue from input (MR). The objective of Smirlock’s relative 
efficiency hypothesis is not to derive relative efficiency for the firm but to determine how the 
industry responds to each type of regulation. Later writers, Berger, Hancock and Humphrey 
(1992) derive efficiency estimates from the profit function and apply this methodology to data 
on U.S. banking. By using the profit function in place of the cost function they are able to 
examine output inefficiencies. These approaches differ somewhat from studies on regulatory 
impact. The only Caribbean study of which the writer is aware which examines bank 
profitability is a very recent work by Rolle (1992) which examined the impact of monetary 
policy on bank profitability in the Bahamas. That study adopted an efficiency approach and 
did not include prudential regulation.
Most econometric studies which examine the impact of a single aspect of regulation 
employ either "event studies" methods or regression analysis but tend to analyze the impact 
mostly on shareholder wealth. The work of Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1990) tests the 
impact of changes in reserve requirements on bank shareholder wealth. They use the prices 
of banks listed stocks in pooled cross sectional regression analysis using changes in reserve 
requirements as the dependent variable. A dummy variable is used which takes on the value 
of unity in the week of the regulation change and the value of zero at other times when there 
is a decrease. A second dummy variable takes on the value of unity when reserve requirements
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are increased and zero otherwise. The market index is used as a proxy for the return on the 
portfolio of all risky assets. His findings show that reserve requirements reduce bank 
shareholder wealth and shift resources from the regulated banking sector to the non-bank 
financial system.
Osborne and Zaher (1992) also examine the impact of reserve requirements on large 
banks’ stock returns. They employ classical event study methods which allow examination of 
relationships between the size of tax changes and the size of associated abnormal returns. They 
examine changes in tax on demand deposits and time deposits and impose rigorous controls for 
developments in banking or in monetary policy that could be expected to affect bank 
shareholders’ returns, thus ruling out contamination of the events as causing the observed 
abnormal returns.
First, following the approach used by Dann and James (1982) they test abnormal 
returns using the t-statistic to ensure that abnormal returns were not influenced by a change in 
risk structure. Separate regressions were run on the market model for the pre-event estimation 
period (pre-event day 85 through pre-event day 5) and the post event estimation period (days 
6 through 85) and for the pooled estimation period (pre-event plus post event periods). This 
was followed by a Chow test for equality of the betas for pre-event and post-event periods 
[Chow (I960)]. Their findings were consistent with the notion that reserve requirements are 
a tax on deposits. They indicate, however, that shareholders bear at least part of the tax, 
suggesting a view contrary to the hypothesis advanced by some authors that the tax on deposits 
falls exclusively on borrowers.
2 .b .l0  Empirical Studies: Interest Rates and Bank Performance
In early work on corporate finance Grove (1974) argued that conditions under which 
interest rate changes affect net worth of a financial institution occur if the weighted duration 
of assets is greater (smaller) than the weighted duration of liabilities. In these circumstances 
an increase in interest rates will decrease (increase) net worth. In recent writings [Akella and 
Greenbaum (1992)] have developed this idea in a study which examines its impact on stock 
returns. They show that in the U.S. when the duration of assets exceeds that of liabilities,
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repricing of assets in response to innovations is slower, and that since revenues adjust more 
slowly than costs, stock returns are affected. They impound the duration effects in the speeds 
of adjustment to revenues and costs and found that the difference in adjustment speeds proxies 
for the duration mismatch and influences the sensitivity of bank stock returns to interest rate 
innovations.
Their results suggest that bank stocks respond to short term interest rates. The duration 
of assets exceeds that of liabilities, supporting the hypothesis that the sensitivity of bank stocks 
is replaced by the relative speeds of adjustment of revenues and costs; so that the implication 
is that banks are not hedged against interest rate risk as reflected in the stock return sensitivity 
to unexpected changes in short term interest rates.
2 ,b .11 Empirical Studies: Deposit Rate Ceilings and Bank Performance
Other studies of the impact of monetary regulation on market values test the impact 
of deposit rate ceilings in France on the market value of banks’ stocks [Dermine and Hillion. 
(1992)]. Their objective was to assess the relationship between the market value and the asset 
and liability structure of banks. Tests are based on the assumption that ceilings on savings and 
term deposit interest rates produce regulatory rents. The study tests both the effect of corporate 
taxation and the effect of regulatory rents on stock market prices.
Their paper contrasts sharply with traditional "event" studies. These studies evaluate 
abnormal returns associated with a change in the economic environment and analyse bank- 
specific sources of wealth. The methodology used is compared to that proposed by Kane and 
Unal (1990) who regressed the market value of banks on the book value of equity. While they 
impose a constant cross-sectional valuation factor for the book value of equity in a given year, 
the accounting net worth is disaggregated in the Dermine-Hillion model into detailed assets and 
liabilities. A simple bank valuation model is developed to predict the relationship between asset 
and liability structure and market value. The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate and 
draw inferences from the coefficients {(l-t)p/b*, (l-t)b/b* and (l-t)d/b*} associated with the 
loans, bonds, and deposits respectively, where p,d and b are historical returns and p*,b* and 
d* are current market returns. Their findings suggest that assets and liabilities subject to
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taxation are priced at a lower value for part of the period, and that demand deposits provided 
rents.
2 .b .l2  Empirical Studies: Deregulation o f  Interest Rates and Bank Performance
The techniques used by Cornett and Tehranian (1990) to estimate stock market reaction 
to the Depository institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 also provide 
useful approaches to the examination of regulatory impact. The approach adopted was an event 
study methodology used to determine the expected effect of regulatory reform on future profits.
The study employed a simultaneous equations multivariate regression approach based 
on Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR). The system of equations 
explicitly conditions the return-generating process on the occurrence or the non-occurrence of 
an event. This is accompanied by appending zero/one dummy variable to market model 
equations. The variable is set to equal one if the event occurred and zero if it did not. The 
coefficients multiplying the event dummy variable measures the impact on stock returns. The 
extended market model is used to measure returns for securities, the abnormal returns 
associated with a regulatory event is the residual from the model. Results of the tests were able 
to identify which event affected stock prices abnormally, and whether positively or negatively.
The problem in measuring the regulatory change is that unrelated events occur which 
affect the targeted industry during the period of regulatory reform. Cornett and Tehranain note 
that "in particular the need for regulation as a solution to market failure is measured with 
comparison of costs imposed on society by market imperfections which exist in the absence of 
regulation" and that there is an indirect cost to society resulting from regulatory reform.
Other approaches to the study of regulatory impact include those of Binder (1985) who 
uses stock returns to measure tax effects of 20 regulatory changes which occurred since 1987 
and Schreft (1992) who suggests the use of market data to measure the effects of regulation. 
Schreft argues that market data are more powerful than other measures because asset price 
movements incorporate all relevant information as soon as it becomes available. While this 
conclusion is accepted, in the Caribbean where stock data are either not available (as in
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Barbados) or are available at only long discrete intervals or in very short series (as in Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago) this approach is not possible and profit data are used instead.
2 .b .l3  Empirical Studies: Deposit Rate Ceilings and Bank Profits
Tests on the impact on bank profitability as opposed to the impact on shareholder 
wealth have not been as frequently attempted and the impact of bank regulation on bank 
profitability is usually inferred from results using stock returns. The profit function has been 
used in banking to study scale economies, [Mullineaux (1978) and Hancock (1992), price 
elasticities of demand and substitution, Humphrey (1981) Hancock (1985) market power, Kim
(1985) Berger (1991), Timme and Yang (1991), and the relationship of profits to cost based 
efficiency estimates, Berger and Humphrey (1991), Berger (1991) and Timme and Yang
(1991)], but studies on the impact of regulation on bank profits are few.
Mingo (1978) was among the early economists to test the impact of regulation on 
earnings variance using return on assets as the measure of earnings. His objective was to test 
the effect of deposit rate ceilings in the U.S. on bank risk using linear least squares regression 
analysis. His data consisted of a combination of cross section and time series information for 
insured commercial banks in the U.S. his independent variables were;
- mean total assets for the bank over the period
- mean ratio over the period of equity to total assets
- the Herfindahl index27 (computed on total assets for banks in SMSA28)
- the banks market share
- per capita income in SMSA (average over the period)
- % growth in SMSA personal income
- average ratio of interest expense/total expense for the bank
The riskiness of the banks portfolio is reflected in the variance of stock prices or in the
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27The Herfindahl index or Herfindahl- Hirschman index (H- index) is the sum o f the squares o f  market 
shares o f the firms in the relevant market.
28 SM SA  denotes Standard Metropolitan Statistical area. Data refer to banks in the U .S . metropolitan area.
variance of profits. He chose the latter approach; an approach which is particularly useful 
where bank stocks are not listed on the stock exchanges. This is represented by:
v a r ~  = f ( TA, K/ TA, H, MS, Y/L, GR, I )  ( 2 .4 3 )
N I J
Where:
NI= net income
Var NI/NI= coefficient of variance of net income 
TA= total assets for the bank
K/TA= mean ratio over the period of equity to total assets.
Y/L = per capita income 
H= index of total deposits 
GR= growth in personal incomes
1 = average ratio of interest expense/total expense for the bank.
MS = money supply
The results of the regression provided support for the view that non-price means of 
competing for deposit funds can increase bank risk.
2 .b .l4  Empirical Studies: Determinants o f Bank Profitability
Bourke (1988) and (1989) observes that barriers to entry may enhance profitability but 
other regulatory interventions may depress it. His research however, focuses more on bank 
performance generally than on the impact of regulation on bank performance. He tests the 
internal and external determinants of profitability across ten countries. Different forms of 
profitability are tested but only the results for profitability defined as return on assets are 
displayed. He used linear least squares regression equations, where the independent variables 
used were; a dummy variable representing government ownership; three bank concentration 
ratios; the long term bond rate for each country; growth of the money supply; capital and 
reserves as a percentage of total assets; cash, bank deposits and investments; securities as a 
percentage of total assets; the percentage change in the CPI for each country; and staff 
expenses as a percentage of total assets.
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The results generally showed that capital ratios, liquidity ratios and interest rates are 
positively related to profitability. The results relating to liquidity ratios were less expected, as 
conventional wisdom is that liquidity holdings (particularly imposed by Government) represent 
an expense to banks. Higher levels of concentration were found to be associated with lower 
loan losses.
2 .b .l5  Conclusion
A review of the literature tends to suggest that regulation impacts on equity holders 
more so than on depositors and that it is often possible for production and operating costs due 
to regulatory constraints to fail to compensate depositors. The covariance between deposits and 
loans will voluntarily encourage banks to set their own ceilings, but where there are both 
ceilings and floors, banks become hostage to regulators. However, where regulators engage 
in cost- axiomatic pricing quasi-market prices are likely to obtain.
The review reveals that theories of the banking firm are divided into two groups, 
equilibrium models and leverage models. Models which include the capital constraint and which 
can accommodate analysis of the adjustment processes of commercial banks to various costs, 
such as, liquidity, solvency, and resource costs, facilitate analysis of bank performance which 
include prudential considerations. Empirical studies have tended to focus on who bears the cost 
and have mostly concluded that equity holders bear the full cost of regulation, though some 
argue for split costs or suggest that depositors bear the cost. The literature on the impact of 
capital adequacy on risk suggests that where capital provisions are not risk-based that banks 
will increase risk to cover return from additional capital outlays. In such cases, capital does 
not bound insolvency risk, but where capital adequacy is risk-based the contrary position 
occurs, banks will finance only low risk portfolios.
Several of these hypotheses will be tested in the course of the empirical investigation; 
among them, the observation that reserve requirements artificially constrain the size of the 
banking firm [Ramakhrisnan and Thakor (1984], and that part of the tax imposed by reserve 
requirements is borne by shareholders [Romer (1985)] and Osborne and Zaher (1992)]. The 
impact of reserve requirements on profits will be substituted in the analysis for the impact
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on shareholder wealth [Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1990)], and Arkella and Greenbaum
(1992)]. More importantly, the general point made by Bourke (1988) that regulatory 
interventions may depress profitability will be examined.
The observation that credit limits impact the solvency of banks adversely through their 
their impact on profitability will be among the hypotheses to be tested as well as the Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) view that banks trade-off profitability against the risk of default, that is, that 
a negative relationship exists between risk and bank profitability. The observation of King
(1986) that credit controls increase the liquidity of banks will be tested. Mingo’s (1978) 
observation that interest rate controls tend to increase risk due to reliance on non-price 
rationing will also be tested as will Mitchell’s (1986) observation that interest rate controls 
influence bank risk. The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argument that regulated ceilings on lending 
rates do not necessarily affect bank profitability since higher rates may be accompanied by 
higher risks and therefore higher losses, with adverse implications for profitability will be 
examined with a view to observing whether a negative relationship exists between risk and 
interest rate regulation. Fry’s (1988) observation that loan rate ceilings discourage risk-taking 
since risk premiums cannot be charged will be among the hypotheses tested.
In the course of the study, several observations related to bank performance and not 
necessarily to regulation will have the opportunity to be analysed. These include the Galbraith- 
Caves hypothesis that higher concentration leads to lower risks and Benston’s (1972) 
observation that large banks are not necessarily more profitable than small banks. Many of 
these hypotheses will be tested in the empirical section while others which do not require 
econometric testing will be analysed in the course of reviewing the structure and performance 
of the banking system in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
The Structure and Performance o f the Banking System in the Caribbean
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the structure and performance of the banking system in the 
Caribbean and elaborates on the regulation of non-banks in so far as it relates to the 
performance of banks. It indicates the range and sequence of monetary measures and, 
demonstrates how the tools of monetary policy were given effect through commercial banks. 
It explains how monetary controls on commercial banks facilitated the growth of non-banks and 
suggests that the lack of adequate prudential regulation of non-banks led to their collapse. The 
second part of the chapter analyses the cost of financial intermediation and traces the trend in 
intermediation ratios in the Caribbean, particularly during periods of intense regulation. The 
final section of the chapter discusses the actual performance of commercial banks specifically 
in terms of bank profitability, risk, liquidity, solvency and market share.
The Caribbean economies of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are 
principally British in origin.29 They are small economies, the largest being Jamaica with a 
population of 2.37 million and the smallest Barbados with a population of .27 million.30 Per 
capita incomes were relatively high in Barbados (US$6686) and Trinidad and Tobago 
(US$4068) for most of the period of the study but were much lower in Jamaica (US$738) and 
declined further during the decade of the eighties (data are for the year 1991, see Table 3.1). 
Commercial banks were initially established to facilitate trade with the metropole.
29 These islands became politically independent in the 1960s; Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 1962 and 
Barbados in 1966.
30 In Barbados the main export was sugar; in Jamaica, bauxite and in Trinidad and Tobago, oil.
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Table 3.1
Summary o f Economic Statistics on 
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
Data at December 
1991
Barbados Jamaica Trinidad &  
Tobago
GDP($miIlion)local
currency
3393 44128 21766
population .26 mill 2.37 mill 1.25 mill
Foreign Exchange 
Reserves (US$million)
87.5 106.1 338.6
Foreign exchange 
reserves. Equivalent 
months o f  imports
1.2 months 0.8 months 1.7 months
BOP (overall bal)local 
cur
-39.9 -115.5 -2765
Bop C/A  local 
cur
-79.8 1113.3 -631.5
per capita GDP  
(US$)
6686 738 4068
Exchange Rate (per 
U S$)
2.00 21.49 4.125
Source: International Financial Statistics IMF February 1993 and Annual Reports of Regional 
Central Banks
3.1.1 Structure of the Banking System
Legislation governing commercial banks was enacted in 1961 in Jamaica31, in 1964 
in Trinidad and Tobago and in 1963 in Barbados. It was mostly structural in its setting of 
parameters for commercial banks and prudential in its emphasis on capital requirements and 
customer concentration ratios but did not include powers of monetary regulation.32 It 
identified licensing requirements, detailed the activities in which banks could or could not
31 The first commercial bank was established in Trinidad and Tobago in 1806, in Jam aica in 1836, and in 
Barbados, in 1838. They were administered under the British Caribbean Currency Board system - the note 
issuing authority.
32 Criteria for monetary regulation formed part o f the Central Bank Acts in the three jurisdictions.
become involved and set minimum capital requirements. Other areas which were later to 
assume importance in the prudential regulation of banks were omitted from the original 
Banking Acts.33 Regulations governing the financial system tended to be put in place after 
financial institutions had already been established.
Banking legislation was based on the U.K. model. Despite the British orientation of 
the Caribbean banking legislation, commercial banking in some islands (in Barbados for 
example) was, and still is, dominated by Canadian banks, but the presence of American banks 
tended to be short-lived.34 There was no equivalent in the Caribbean of the McFadden Act 
of the U.S. which prohibited branching across state lines. Indeed banks with head offices in 
the U.S. and Canada were able to set up branch offices simultaneously in Barbados, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Jamaica.
Historical and cultural characteristics also influenced the structure of the banking 
system even where there was no explicit regulation. In the Caribbean, regulation of 
commercial banks is grounded in the view that commercial banks have an important fiduciary 
responsibility (greater than other financial institutions), should be closely regulated and 
supervised and should be debarred from direct involvement in commercial undertakings35. 
In this structural framework banks are differentiated from non-banks by their monopoly on the 
ability to offer chequing facilities and by their ability to accept demand deposits from the 
public. Their fiduciary responsibilities are emphasised in the requirement to hold minimum 
amounts of capital which are considerably higher than levels prescribed for non-banks. Specific 
regulations tend to be used for specific purposes but most regulations have effects that cut 
across different purposes. For example credit ceilings are mainly applied for macroeconomic
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33 Areas omitted from the early Banking Acts included, for example, bad debt provisioning and limitations 
on risk-taking.
34 Canadian banks still exist in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. For part o f  the period there 
were three American banks in Barbados two in Jamaica, and two in Trinidad and Tobago, but by 1992 there 
were no American banks in any o f these countries.
35
This differs from the structure o f other financial systems such as Germany and Japan where 
commercial banks have traditionally been directly involved in corporate ventures.
purposes, but by preventing uncontrolled and imprudent expansion of credit, also serve to fulfil 
a prudential objective. [Vittas (1992)].
As in most developing countries, monetary distinctions have tended to be preserved for 
longer periods in the Caribbean than in North America and Europe. Commercial banks, 
however, remain the dominant means of transmission of monetary policy and the structure of 
the financial system is based on the view that banks are the most important institutions in the 
financial system. Universal banking and the functional view of regulation have not 
characterised these markets. Although there is increasing recognition of the need to view non­
banks as an increasingly important part of the monetary and financial environment, this latter 
development has so far been extended to include only a slightly greater degree of regulation 
of non-banks.
The predominance of Canadian banks (they distinguish between banking and investment 
broking and dealing activity) tended to influence the culture of commercial banking in the 
Caribbean. This is inferred from the case of Jamaica where most Canadian banks withdrew 
at an early stage, and where there was relatively more active and aggressive development of 
traditionally non-banking activity.
3.1 .2  Areas o f Structural Regulation in tihe Caribbean
Table 3.2 lists the areas of structural regulation in the Caribbean which form the 
background against which other forms of bank regulation - monetary and prudential- are 
implemented.
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Table 3.2
Types of Structural Regulation in the Caribbean
Banks(BK) and non-banks(NB) BK NB
Country B J T B J T
-Licensing o f commercial banks * * * *
-Prohibition from engaging in commercial activity * *
-Debarrment from offering chequing accounts * * ❖
-No restriction on branching * * * * * *
-No restriction on investment broking or dealing * * * * H= *
B K  - banks
NB - non-banks
B- applicable to Barbados.
J- applicable to Jamaica.
T- applicable to Trinidad and Tobago.
*  =  in effect.
3.1 .3  Growth o f the Banking System
Until the mid-1960s most commercial banks in the region were foreign. Localisation 
occurred first in Jamaica and almost immediately afterward in Trinidad and Tobago, following 
a wave of structuralist economic thought of the 1960s and 1970s. Some economists, among 
them Beckford (1972), explicitly recommended the nationalisation of commercial banks, and 
by the mid-1970s most banks in both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were either locally or 
government owned.
The Barbados case differed. Branches of foreign banks continued to operate until 1978 
when the first local bank was established. The second was not established until 1984.36 This
36 Since December 1992 a third local bank has been established.
contrasts with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago where most banks were local and their shares 
were publicly quoted.37By 1992, of the seven commercial banks operating in Barbados, five 
were branches of foreign banks. By 1992 there were six commercial banks in Barbados, eight 
in Trinidad and Tobago and eleven in Jamaica38, and their combined assets amounted to 
approximately US$5 billion at December 1992. Commercial banks’ assets grew rapidly during 
the seventies and the mid eighties, but slowed considerably towards the end of the eighties and 
into the early nineties as the economies of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago experienced 
macroeconomic difficulties. The Jamaica case differed, asset growth continued at an accelerated 
pace despite protracted macroeconomic problems (see Table 3.3).
Following the establishment of Central Banks, first in Jamaica in 1961, in Trinidad and 
Tobago in 1965, and in Barbados in 1972, much greater emphasis was placed on monetary 
policy. Central banks determined monetary policy and their concerns encompassed matters of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and accelerated economic growth. Financial systems became 
increasingly diversified in the 1970s and 1980s; non-banking activity increased rapidly, 
particularly in Jamaica where merchant banks, stock exchanges, and other specialist financial 
institutions were established in response to competitive opportunities and the range and scope 
of financial services widened [Williams (1989)]. As distinctions between commercial banks and 
other financial institutions narrowed and as financial assets became more accessible for 
transactions purposes there was a greater need to increase the scope of monetary control. In 
Jamaica, legislation extending control to non-banks was passed in 1974 through the Protection 
of Depositors Act and the Central Bank subsequently extended credit controls to trust 
companies and merchant banks in 1975. In Trinidad and Tobago the Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (NFIs) Act was passed in 1981 and revised in 1986. This Act extended monetary 
and prudential control to NFIs. Legal capacity for monetary control was not extended to non­
banks in Barbados until 1993.
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37 Up to 1992 the shares o f banks in Barbados were not publicly quoted. However, shares o f  publicly 
quoted banks in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica were permitted to cross-list on other Stock exchanges in the 
Region from 1988.
38 A  local cooperative bank was established in the early 20th century but was not operated on a full 
commercial basis.
As deposit growth increased, insufficient demand from the productive sectors such as 
manufacturing and agriculture, pushed banks into lending to the consuming sectors. The 
resulting large proportion of the assets of the banking system which was devoted to the 
financing of trade, principally imports, became a major concern of authorities because of the 
serious implications for foreign exchange sufficiency. Increased nominal incomes also 
contributed to the sharp rise in the level of personal loans and this sector became a major 
beneficiary of new credit in the 1970s. Personal loans, consumer loans and hire-purchase 
instalment credit rose rapidly and by the early 1970s central banks ( who deemed these to be 
non-priority sectors) moved to control their growth; particularly in Barbados and Jamaica 
(Table 3.4).
The impact on foreign exchange reserves of credit expansion in the distribution and 
personal sectors evident in Barbados and Jamaica was masked in the Trinidad and Tobago case 
by buoyant earnings from petroleum exports, where by 1972, the manufacturing sector had 
replaced distribution as the major recipient of credit. Credit controls there were mild and short­
lived.39 Controls were imposed on non-business loans in 1979 and limited new credit for 
consumer lending to 25% of total new credit. The policy was described as gradual but 
reasonably successful [Farrell (1990)]. To a large extent therefore the degree of credit 
regulation experienced by individual countries reflected the macroeconomic imperatives of each 
country and was influenced by existing production structures. Problems of foreign exchange 
adequacy were further magnified for Barbados and Jamaica as central banks, in support of the 
goal of accelerated economic growth, departed from the practice of backing local currency 
issues with foreign exchange holdings and provided substantial credit to the public sector.
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39 Controls were imposed on non-business loans in 1979 which limited new credit for consumer lending to 
25 % o f total new credit.
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Table 3.3
Growth o f Assets o f Commercial Banks 
Local Currency $ Million
Barbados
Annual
Average
Barbados 
% p.a
Jamaica
Annual
Average
Jamaica
%
p.a.
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Annual
Average
Trinidad
and
Tobago 
% p.a.
1972-77 434.9 12.5% 871.0 22.4% 1545.2 50.3%
1977-82 823.8 21.2% 2167.2 33.2% 4733.0 38.7%
1982-87 1445.5 12.1% 6375.2 40.5% 9648.7 5.1%
1 1987-92
R __ . 11 ..
20223.8 5.4% 20163 216.3% 11922.2 4.4%
Tobago.
3 .1 .4  The Sequence o f  Monetary Measures
There was a commonality in the monetary policy measures adopted. Controls on credit, 
interest rate controls and reserve requirements formed the core of monetary policy instruments. 
Regulation ranged from limited monetary control in Trinidad and Tobago, to moderately high 
levels in Barbados, to rigorous and complex systems of monetary control in Jamaica. (See 
Appendix 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 for details of the monetary measures used).The extent of foreign 
exchange insufficiency which prompted authorities to put monetary restrictions in place is 
demonstrated in Table 3.5.
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Personal Lending as a % o f Total Commercial Bank Assets
Table 3.4
Period Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
1972 n.a 13.49 35.4
1973 n.a 12.0 27.4
1974 16.21 11.79 21.2
1975 16.48 13.05 15.26
1976 18.13 10.76 29.83
1977 17.35 9.88 32.09
1978 16.53 7.76 28.41
1979 16.22 10.69 24.81
1980 15.27 8.61 24.55
1981 13.77 7.31 24.70
1982 11.80 5.35 21.35
1983 12.61 4.01 20.82
1984 12.24 2.63 24.41
1985 12.28 1.99 23.16
1986 13.10 2.25 20.0
1987 12.98 2.44 18.50
1988 15.34 2.16 19.37
1989 14.7 2.67 23.09
1990 12.99 3.2 23.09
1991 12.95 4.8 23.77
1992 11.66 4.4 23.36
Source: Monthly Digests of Statistics, Central bank of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago
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Table 3.5
Foreign Exchange Reserves -Equivalent Number of Months Imports
Period Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
1972 2.2 1.8 8.4
1977 1.7 -3.4 18.6
1982 2.0 -19.5 10.4
1987 3.4 -5.2 0.7
1992 2.7 -1.9 -0.2
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics - Central Banks of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago
Primary and secondary reserve requirements (liquid assets ratios) were employed to 
absorb excess liquidity in the system and to control consumption expenditure. Interest rate 
controls were also frequently applied to improve the affordability of credit to the productive 
sectors, to defend the balance of payments and to pre-empt capital flight, and interest rates 
were regulated to keep the cost of operation of business to affordable levels. At the same time 
authorities sought to restrict credit to foreign exchange-absorbing sectors and to redirect credit 
to foreign exchange-earning activities, applying both global and selective credit controls. Where 
credit limits evoked the desired response, authorities avoided imposing reserve requirements, 
particularly if the targeted adjustment was not significant, but as balance of payments problems 
intensified in the 1980s secondary reserve requirements were applied with increasing frequency.
3.1 .5  The Experience o f  the Caribbean with Reserve Requirements
The case of Barbados between 1973-1991 vividly illustrates the use of reserve 
requirements in response to changes in the balance on external account [Williams (1994)]. In 
a series of movements, primary and secondary reserve requirements were raised from 3 % of 
deposits in 1973 to 20% by 1978. They were again raised by 5 percentage points to 27 percent 
of deposits as the balance of payments drifted into deficit in 1980. They remained there until 
1986 when the securities component was increased by three percentage points and again in
1991 following two years o f successive balance o f payments deficits. Though banking 
legislation placed a statutory limit on permissible increases in cash reserve requirements, (in 
Barbados the legal limit was reached as early as 1978) this was substituted for by greater 
reliance on securities requirements (secondary reserves).
The escalation o f liquidity ratios (primary and secondary reserve requirements) was as 
rapid in Jamaica as in Barbados, rising from 15 % in early 1973 to as high as 40% in the early 
1980s, and to 48% in 1985 before it was reduced to 36% in 1986 when the non-cash portion 
was eliminated. While the range and frequency o f policy changes varied, reserve and securities 
requirements remained in place for most o f the 20 year period and secondary reserve 
requirements were a continuing feature o f monetary policy in both Barbados and Jamaica40 
(see Appendix 3.1 and 3.2). The vast proportion o f secondary requirements was held in 
government securities.
Authorities in Trinidad and Tobago kept a low and relatively steady liquid assets ratio 
o f 5%-7% throughout the 1970s and early 1980s when only cash reserve requirements were 
mandatory. This ratio grew to 15% by 1987 and included secondary reserves; principally 
treasury bills and other Government securities.41 At its highest it compared with levels o f 50% 
in Jamaica and 33% in Barbados. Increases in reserve requirements followed the end o f the 
oil boom, and in the post-1983 period reserve requirements were largely relied upon to respond 
to balance o f payments difficulties. Authorities in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica raised 
reserve requirements up to mid-1985 and thereafter lowered them as adjustments in the 
exchange rates permitted some ease in monetary policy (Appendix 3.3).
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40 In Barbados secondary reserve requirements include only government or government guaranteed 
securities, while in Jam aica and Trinidad and Tobago these requirements (referred to as liquidity ratios) include 
investments in public companies and other specified assets, as well as government securities. In Jam aica  
Certificates o f  D eposits issued by the Central Bank were included.
41 The cash portion w as raised to 12 % in 1989 and secondary reserves increased from  5 % to 11 % and 
reduced in the sam e year to 7% (see Appendix l.c ) .
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Comparative Reserve Requirements (Liquid Assets Ratios)
(% of Total Assets)
Table 3.6
Period Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
1972 0.0 13.13 8.49
1973 0.0 14.0 9.57
1974 7.62 14.49 10.93
1975 11.94 16.96 11.26
1976 14.32 17.48 12.26
1977 15.73 21.72 11.86
1978 6.06 19.43 11.36 !
1979 18.67 21.09 12.07
1980 16.81 19.93 13.22
1981 20.31 21.19 15.33
1982 21.18 23.44 15.54
1983 20.77 26.59 16.07
1984 21.03 30.0 16.28
1985 24.42 34.82 16.02
1986 23.15 26.63 14.58
1987 21.86 25.71 13.88
1988 23.59 14.46 14.15
1989 23.35 13.11 12.21
1990 23.63 22.27 11.70
1991 25.48 10.69 10.45
1992 24.80 27.21 10.8
Source: Monthly Digests o f Statistics, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
(Data are reported here as a percentage o f total assets in order to achieve comparability, since different 
items are excluded from deposits in each jurisdiction. However, for compliance purposes reserve 
requirements are usually calculated as a percentage o f deposits.)
3.1 .6  The Experience o f the Caribbean with Credit Controls
Three types of credit regulations were employed in the Caribbean: (1) selective credit 
controls imposed through the setting of credit limits, (2) ceilings on the total level of credit 
permitted to be outstanding by commercial banks 42 and (3) interest rate controls on credit 
outstanding to selected sectors. 4 3 (see Appendix 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 for details). Selective 
credit controls were consistently applied throughout the period and therefore form the main 
focus of the analysis of credit controls.
Controls on credit to the personal sector were more actively applied in Jamaica and 
Barbados. 45 In Barbados the share of personal lending in commercial banks’ total assets was 
pushed gradually from 16.2% of total credit in 1974 (prior to restrictions) to 11.7% in 1992. 
This compares to a decline in the case of Jamaica from 11.9% - in the period prior to 
imposition of controls - to 2.67 % in 1989.46 In contrast, personal lending absorbed 21% of 
total commercial bank assets in Trinidad and Tobago in 1974 and by 1992 absorbed slightly 
more, 23.4% (Table 3.4), confirming that selective credit controls in Trinidad and Tobago 
were used less vigorously than in Jamaica or Barbados.
Normally, credit controls on banks distribute wealth away from banks toward non­
banks. In the Caribbean this was moderated by the lack of sophistication in Caribbean markets, 
so that controls had a greater probability of being more effective since the techniques of 
circumvention were not as readily implementable. It is suggested that the faster growth of non­
banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago may have been associated with different levels of
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42 This occurred in 1989 in Trinidad and Tobago, and in 1991 in Barbados and both in the context o f IM F  
Stand-by arrangements with the IM F.
43 This is often considered an interest rate policy measure, but has important implications for the 
disbursement o f credit by commercial banks
44 Real estate and mortgage loans were excluded. Several other minor modifications were made from time 
to time, both in Barbados and in Jamaica.
45 Unlike Barbados the distributive sector was not subject to credit controls either in Jam aica or Trinidad 
and Tobago.
46 No attempt is made here to identify modifications to credit controls, the analysis concerns itself with 
whether credit controls were or were not in place.
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sophistication in these markets.47
Comparative Interest Rate Spreads
(Average lending rate minus minimum savings rate %)
Table 3.7
Period Barbados Jamaica * Trinidad and Tobago*
1972 5.75 4.59 4.3
1973 4.75 5.5 4.0
1974 5.37 7.5 3.25
1975 4.25 5.5 4.5
1976 4.25 6.5 3.3
1977 4.0 6.65 6.85
1978 4.5 6.60 7.50
1979 3.12 6.96 5.96
1980 3.63 7.68 5.0
1981 5.50 7.25 4.85
1982 5.87 7.43 5.03
1983 5.50 8.02 4.42
1984 5.50 7.10 2.90
1985 4.87 9.20 9.60
1986 5.50 10.60 10.80
1987 5.50 10.20 9.70
1988 5.25 11.90 10.60
1989 5.25 10.90 8.87
1990 5.25 13.59 11.01
1991 7.25 16.03 10.87
1992 7.38 23.04 11.54
Source: Monthly Digests of Statistics, Central Banks of1 Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad ar
Tobago.
* Average lending rates and average savings rates.
47 Whereas credit limits were first introduced in Barbados in 1977, it was over ten years later that the 
corporate sector adopted the facility o f leasing to circumvent these controls. This technique was commonly used 
in Trinidad and Tobago in the early 1980s.
3.1 .7  The Experience o f the Caribbean with Interest Rate Controls
One of the first monetary measures put in place by central banks in the region was the 
control of interest rates on deposits. In Barbados floors on the savings deposit rates, ceilings 
on the average lending rate, and ceilings on the residential mortgage rate, remained in force 
at different levels until 1991 when the ceiling on the average lending rate was removed.48 
These examples typified rate-setting regimes in Barbados and Jamaica in the late 1970s and 
1980s where direct controls were placed on deposits and lending rates49 (see Appendix 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3). This technique was never used in Trinidad and Tobago where there was little 
attempt overtly to control rates of interest. The Central Bank there depended principally on 
manipulation of the bank rate,50 and control of interest rates was not a prerequisite for balance 
of payments equilibrium until the late 1980s.
The experience with setting of interest rates in Jamaica was very similar.51 If one 
separates the highly restrictive pre-1985 period and the less restrictive post- 1985 period of 
monetary control, the former appears highly comparable to the Barbados situation for most of 
the period (Table 3.7). In both Jamaica and Barbados the minimum savings rate was used as 
a monetary and demand management tool. When slow deposit growth and rapid growth of 
credit combined to create liquidity and foreign exchange difficulties, authorities raised interest 
rates to slow the rate of credit expansion, to improve commercial bank liquidity and to protect 
the balance of payments through the dampening effect of higher interest rates on the real sector.
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48 Ceilings were placed on the maximum deposit rate in 1973 in Barbados, on the prime and average 
lending rates in 1976 and on the mortgage rate in the same year. The ceiling on deposit rates was changed to 
a floor in 1978 and floors on savings continued in force since that time.
49 Eighty percent o f  banks felt that the minimum savings rate did not help to encourage savings and suggest 
that savings were not interest-rate responsive.
50 The bank rate was also a heavily used monetary tool in Jamaica but in Barbados it was seldom set at 
highly punitive levels. This occurred only in 1981 and 1991, both years o f intense balance o f  payments 
difficulties.
51 Deposit rates in Jamaica were regulated for most o f the 1960s until 1970 when they were temporarily 
deregulated. In 1972 prime rates and deposits rates were again controlled but were raised appreciably in 1985. 
In 1990 the savings rate was deregulated, this time as part o f a general programme o f  deregulation.
Floors on deposit rates were from time to time adjusted relative to foreign interest rates 
in order to pre-empt capital flight. As the banking system became more international this 
became an increasingly important consideration and partly explains why deposit rates were 
raised during the IMF Stand-by programme of 1981-83 and 1991-1993. Periods in which 
international rates exceeded local rates coincided with periods of foreign exchange difficulties.
Table 3.8
Differential between Prime Rate and 3 Month Deposit Rate
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Period U .S. Barbados Jamaica T ’dad &  
T ’go
1975-80 1.39% 4.375% 6.6 5.51
1981-85 2.3% 4.25% 7.2 5.36
1986-90 1.2% 4.81% 11.4 10.2
Source: Digest of Statistics, Central banks of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
Normally, however, the interest rate differential between local and foreign rates reflects 
transactions costs, unwillingness to flout Exchange Control regulations, the probability of future 
cash shortages and the inability to access funds at short notice. Consequently, when low or 
negative economic growth recommend that interest rates be kept low, international interest rates 
sometimes prompt otherwise undesirable increases in regulated deposit and lending rates.
Interest rate spreads were much wider in the Caribbean than in North America, 
reflecting possibly the need to compensate banks for higher levels of secondary reserve 
requirements. Spreads were much wider in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago than in Barbados 
(Table 3.8). This may be reflect the position of Revell (1980) that gross margins of banks in 
countries where local banks predominate, tend to be wider than in countries with mainly 
foreign banks. (Most banks in Barbados were branches of foreign banks, while in Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago, banks were mostly local).
Interest rate controls assume an important role in the context of exchange rate 
adjustment, serving to stabilise the exchange rate. In the Jamaica case this role was assigned 
to the minimum savings rate, which, because of its direct impact on lending rates was an 
important support for demand management programmes. Between 1985 and 1990 the savings 
deposit rate was increased as the exchange rate came under pressure and assumed the role of 
a major policy instrument. Interest rate policy was used to indirectly influence the demand for 
cash balances.52
Failure to adhere to incomes policies which were essential for the success of monetary 
policy contributed to continued crises in the balance of payments in the Caribbean. [Blackman 
(1991)]. By the turn of the 1990s, as pressure on the balance of payments mounted, policy 
makers were unable to defend the role of monetary regulation as a prescription for 
macroeconomic stability or as a sustainable policy over the long term. The arguments for 
liberalisation therefore gained ground and the Caribbean was caught in the wave of financial 
liberalisation sweeping the developing world. In 1991 Jamaica embarked on a programme of 
virtual complete liberalisation. Tentative steps toward limited financial liberalisation were also 
observed in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 as reflected in the relaxation of reserve requirements 
and later of credit controls. In Barbados cautious steps toward liberalisation became evident in 
1992 with the removal of selective credit controls and reduced interest rate regulation.53 
However, for most of the period tight monetary controls were in place and commercial banks 
were highly regulated.
Table 3.9 lists the tools of monetary policy applied in the Caribbean. Though the types of 
controls described appear to be wide, many are modifications of the same control mechanism. 
Controls are not easily quantifiable or ranked by intensity since they are to a large extent 
qualitative and differ in degree of intensity among countries (Appendix 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3).
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52 In Jamaica, between 1985 and 1990 the savings deposit rate was increased as the exchange rate came 
under pressure. In this period certificates o f deposits were market determined for most o f the period 1985-90. 
Ceilings on the average lending rate were not set by the Bank o f  Jamaica after 1990.
53 In 1992 authorities in Barbados ceased to set the ceiling on the average lending rate but continued to set 
the minimum savings rate.
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Table 3.9
Tools of Monetary Regulation in the Caribbean
Banks (BK) and non-banks.(NB^ BK KB
Country B J T B J T
-Cash reserve requirements (non-interest bearing) a a a A A
-Cash -reserve requirements, (interest bearing) *
-Secondary reserve requirements - Government 
securities only
*
-liquid assets ratio- cash and specified securities 
(J.T.)
a * * a A
-Voluntary liquid assets ratio. *
-Limits on bank lending to the personal and 
distributive sectors.
* *
-Global credit limits.(B.J.) * *
-minimum downpayments and maximum repayment period 
for consumer credit.
a * a A
-limits on consumer credit outstanding by 
commercial banks.
* a * A
-Limits on new non-business loans as a percent of 
incremental credit.
a
-Certificates of deposit held with the Central 
Bank.46
*
-Ceilings on mortgage interest rate. * * A A
-Floor on interest rates on savings deposits. * a
-Ceiling on the prime lending rate. a *
-Ceiling on the weighted average lending rate. * a
-discount rate/bank rate-borrowing rate for banks 
experiencing liquidity difficulties.
* a *
BK - banks
KB - non-banks
B- applicable to Barbados
B - applicable to Jamaica
T - applicable to Trinidad and Tobago.
* = in effect
The above table does not indicate the periods during which these monetary tools were in place. For 
these details see Appendix 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1 .8  Exchange Rate Changes - Liberalisation or Regulation?
Decisions to adjust the exchange rate were deferred for as long as possible. Financial 
liberalisation was avoided and attempts were made to change demand and supply directly 
through regulation. In the Jamaica case, even though there was considerable exchange rate 
adjustment it was heavily supplemented by monetary controls.54 In many cases monetary 
controls were more intense in Jamaica where the exchange rate was a more frequently used 
adjustment measure than in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago where it was not.
Jamaica’s experiments with exchange rate adjustments far pre-dated those of its 
neighbours.55 First floating with the pound sterling in 1972, Jamaica devalued its currency 
in 1973 and since then made frequent exchange rate adjustments. These include devaluations, 
the floating of its currency and the implementation of a two-tier exchange rate system. During 
this period authorities kept monetary controls in place. Frequent modifications were however 
made to controls on interest rates and on credit. The year 1985 was a turning point in the 
liberalisation process for Jamaica [Brown (1991)] and since that time Jamaica tended toward 
an increasingly less regulated system and announced virtual total liberalisation of the financial 
system in 1991. In that year Jamaica abolished exchange controls, dramatically reducing 
interest rate controls with a view to their eventual removal, and completely removed credit 
controls. Secondary reserve requirements were abolished but cash reserve requirements 
remained. Commercial banks were expected to satisfy all foreign currency requirements 
including those of Government through the forces of demand and supply. The exchange rate 
which had been freed for some time remained liberalised.
Exchange rate liberalisation in Jamaica permitted banks to earn substantial sums in the 
foreign exchange markets. The Jamaica case where deregulation exerted a positive influence 
on bank profitability tends "a priori" to suggest valid grounds for the view that the reverse
I l l
54 For most o f  this period Jam aica’ s exchange rate was not a market rate but a managed rate.
55 Devaluations and exchange rate depreciation are not included in the study as areas o f  regulatory control 
since they are usually seen by authorities and by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as indicators o f  
liberalisation rather than regulation. However, for completeness, in the empirical analysis, the exchange rate 
is included among the independent variables influencing bank profitability.
situation - that is, regulation - is likely to have impacted adversely on bank profitability.
Even though Trinidad and Tobago twice devalued its currency (in December of 1985 
and June of 1988) for most of the period Trinidad and Tobago kept a fixed and unchanged 
exchange rate.56 Exchange rates in Barbados remained unchanged throughout the period.
3.1 .9  Prudential Concerns
Prudential concerns of Central Banks increased in importance simultaneously with 
heightened monetary regulation. As control formerly exerted by head offices declined and 
ownership became more localised, the vast resources of the overseas parent were no longer 
accessible to local banks. Responsibility shifted to local authorities and increased regulatory 
measures were put in place to maintain and improve the efficiency and stability of the system. 
There was growing implicit recognition that foreign ownership carried a significant benefit in 
respect of providing an implicit guarantee of the solvency and liquidity of banks operating in 
the local economy [Farrell (1990)]. Capital criteria, customer concentration ratios and audit 
and supervision were the main areas of prudential regulation. Levels of capital ranged from 
US$1 million to US$5 million and seemed to be adequate in the case of Barbados and Jamaica.
The level of concentration as well as the method of decision making in Caribbean 
banking systems prompted several writers to describe the banking system as oligopolistic, for 
example, Farrell (1990)], Howard (1976), Bourne (1977) and Blackman (1982). Their views 
tend to confirm the observation of Fry (1988) that financial markets in developing countries not 
only tend to be oligopolistic but that detailed regulations concerning financial transactions are 
enforced more consistently and effectively. Conclusions about the oligopolistic nature of the 
banking system in the Caribbean are to a large extent influenced by the level of bank 
concentration which remains relatively high. At the beginning of the 1990s in Jamaica three 
banks controlled 70% of the market, while in Barbados three banks controlled 60% of the 
market and the same number controlled 58% of the market in Trinidad and Tobago. It is
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56 Trinidad and Tobago floated its exchange rate in 1993.
however postulated that despite high levels of concentration, in the 1980s markets were less 
oligopolistic than in the 1960s and 1970s. The past and to a lesser extent present oligopolistic 
nature of markets in the Caribbean present an interesting case for testing Jordan’s (1972) 
hypothesis that in markets with a poor oligopolistic structure, regulation causes prices to rise 
and that evidence relating higher levels of regulation to lower rates of return on profit is much 
weaker.
Concentration of deposits was not officially controlled and was managed at the level 
of the individual bank. Credit concentration was applied in the form of ceilings on lending to 
a single customer and was either related to bank capital or to total assets and applied with 
varying degrees of flexibility in the three countries.57 Many of these issues of concentration 
were not however, problems of developing countries but problems of size and are mirrored in 
the operations of small banks in developed countries and were not specific to the Caribbean. 
However, flexibility in applying rules relating to concentration tends to become more important 
in small economies where the financing options of large businesses are few.
Most regulations apply to banks uniformly but impact differently on small banks than 
on large, and on local banks differently from foreign. Distinctions between local and foreign 
banks became more important in the post 1970 period following the collusive rate-setting 
environment of the pre - 1970s.58 Access of branch banks to international support systems and 
to international finance available to foreign branch banks became the critical difference 
separating local and foreign banks as they sought to adjust to monetary and prudential 
regulations simultaneously.
For example, prudential regulations relating to capital requirements tend to affect local
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57 The question o f whether concentration ratios should be modified depending on asset risk has not been 
resolved. Legislation in Jamaica offers the flexibility o f examining individual cases. The Barbados legislation 
does not.
58 Prior to the establishment o f Central banks in the Caribbean interest rates were set by agreement among 
banks operating in each Caribbean country.
banks more than foreign.59 Central Banks have full authority to require indigenous banks to 
increase their capital but in some jurisdictions (for example, Barbados), branch banks are 
allowed to rely on global capital.60 6iCapital criteria therefore theoretically apply to overseas 
branches, but branch assets represent so small a percentage of total global portfolios that on 
the basis of materiality, head offices do not voluntarily assign capital specifically to individual 
branch locations.62
Procedures for the audit and supervision of banks were put in place from the 
establishment of central banks in the Caribbean and gradually improved in depth and coverage. 
Despite delays in implementing regulations to correct problems created by product 
diversification, the banking system in Barbados remained relatively free of prudential 
problems63 [(Williams (1989)]. This is possibly explained by the role of moral suasion in the 
regulatory process and an agreed "cooperative ethos" in die market and illustrates the benefit 
of small size. Many of the older banks remain bound by common customs and traditions and 
frown on all out competitive behaviour, preferring the signalling of policy intentions through 
informal channels. (The exception to this might be Jamaica where competition is more intense). 
This cooperative ethos makes it possible for the emerging process of financial liberalisation to 
be put into effect through moral suasion and the informal signalling of required targets in a
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59 Authorities have refrained from restricting banks’ involvement in leasing activity because o f concerns o f  
social efficiency and accelerated economic development. However, high levels o f  exposure o f  non-banks on 
leasing activities contributed to the failure o f some non-banks in Trinidad and Tobago in the mid 1980s.
60 In the Caribbean assignment o f capital was not in place up to 1992 but it is included in the new Financial 
Intermediaries Regulatory Act o f Barbados (which came into operation in 1992) and applies to new banks only.
61 F ive o f the seven banks in Barbados are branches o f international banks which are signatories to the 
Basle Accord and are obligated to impose on internationally active banks minimum risk-based Tier 1 and total 
capital ratio requirements o f 4 % and 8 % respectively.
62 Net long term borrowing is sometime used as a proxy for the capital o f branch banks. However, to the 
extent that these liabilities can be repaid at the option o f  the local branch they cannot be relied upon as 
protection for depositors in the event o f a crisis.
63 In Barbados the deposit-taking activities o f commercial houses - some with commercial bank connections - 
partly prompted the implementation o f  new legislation in 1993.
cooperative approach to monetary control.64
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Some Caribbean countries elected to deal with the question of depositor protection 
through the establishment of deposit insurance schemes, on the principle that by contributing 
small amounts to a fund, one is protected from large catastrophes (see Appendix 3.4). In 
Trinidad and Tobago where a scheme was implemented following the collapse there of several 
non-banking institutions, deposit insurance was quite costly. Both commercial banks and 
finance companies contribute to a deposit insurance fund in Trinidad and Tobago, but in 
Barbados to date there is no deposit insurance, despite the collapse of Trade Confirmers Ltd 
in 1987 and the shut-down of the Bank of Credit and Commerce in 1990. In Jamaica there is 
no deposit insurance.
Indeed the implication might be that since the greatest number of bank and non-bank 
failures occurred in Trinidad and Tobago, the only country which offered deposit insurance, 
there might instead be some moral hazard associated with deposit insurance, particularly where 
no risk-based capital adequacy criteria exist. This is possibly explained by the fact that the 
presence of deposit insurance is not sufficient to assure security of deposits, but that deposit 
insurance needs to be accompanied by a risk based measurement of capital with constraints on 
leverage.
Off-balance sheet liabilities, contingent liabilities, guarantees and exchange rate 
exposures arising from risks originating in the Caribbean are another prudential concern.65 
Since these liabilities attract no reserve requirements, are fee-earning and in the Caribbean to 
date do not require supporting capital;66 they form a cushion against loss of profitability
64 In Barbados new legislation, finalised in 1992, and made operative from 1993 put in place a system o f  
licensing for commercial houses, requiring them to seek permission to take deposits from the public, and 
requiring that their deposit-taking be supported by bank guarantees, collateral securities or deposit insurance 
and otherwise placing their financial standing under scrutiny.
65 Regional currencies are aligned to the US dollar.
66 Regulatory authorities in the U .S , for example, in assigning exchange rate risk against portfolios, where 
exchange rates are volatile assign a (/?) o f 1, i.e. they require that the exposure must be fully covered by capital. 
The character (/3) measures the degree o f  risk on a scale from 0 to 1.
Whereas in a market without capital regulation the choice of the capital asset ratio is 
determined endogenously by portfolio composition, the stability of cash flows, the skill of 
management and the competitive environment, in the highly regulated case of the Caribbean 
the scope for adjustment in these areas is reduced. Not only are they now exogenously 
determined but it is argued [Tobin (1969)] that, in such environments, at the general 
equilibrium level, increases in the ratio of the marginal product of physical capital and the 
clearing rate now alter the equilibrium stock of physical capital. Tobin further suggests that 
regulators tend to set optimum capital at levels higher than the social optimum, largely because 
it is their responsibility to minimise the social cost of bank failure. He implies that the market 
clearing process may take place at rates which impact adversely on profitability because of 
higher levels of required capital. It is however virtually impossible to test this hypothesis for 
the case of the Caribbean and, if relevant, could have application only to locally incorporated 
banks who are required to hold local capital to support their operations. However, the 
difficulties experienced by local banks, at least in Trinidad and Tobago, do not tend to support 
this hypothesis for the Caribbean case.
3.1 .10 Non - banks: a Structural or a Prudential Concern?
The growth of non-banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago has been one of the most 
significant developments in the financial system in the 1980s. Growth of non-banks outstripped 
that of banks up to the mid-eighties and, with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago where 
significant non-bank failures slowed non-bank growth beginning in the late 1980s, this growth 
continued into the late 1980s and early nineties (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). The number of non­
banks in Jamaica rose from six in 1972 to twenty nine in 1992. In Trinidad and Tobago twenty- 
one non-banks were established by 1982 at the height of the expansion compared with eight 
previously in operation.
The rapid rise of non-banks in the 1970s and early 1980s in Trinidad and Tobago was 
followed by several non-bank failures in the mid-1980s. Between 1981-86 five non-banks 
collapsed in Trinidad and Tobago and one was restructured. The implementation of the
• 116
associated with regulation, both prudential and monetary.
Financial Institutions (Non-Banking ) Act which came into effect in 1981 was too late to 
prevent the problems of insolvency inherent within the finance companies. A revised Act which 
improved on many of the features of the earlier legislation was put in place in February 1986, 
but by that time the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago had committed itself to substantial 
support of non-bank financial intermediaries (NFIs) [Farrell (1990)].67
Table 3.10
Number o f  Banks and Non-banks68
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Number o f banks Number o f Non-Banks
1972 1982 1992 1972 1982 1992
Barbados 5 7 6 1 4 7
T ’dad &  T ’go 8 8 8 8 21 16
Jamaica 6 9 11 9 27 29
Source: Central Banks of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados
67 By 1986 the Central Bank o f Trinidad and Tobago had committed itself to TT$142 million in support to 
N FIs.
68 Non-banks include merchant banks, trust companies and finance companies but excludes credit unions, 
insurance companies and government mortgage banks.
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Table 3.11
Growth of Non-Banks
$ Million Local Currency
Barbados
Average
BDS$
Million
Barbados 
Growth 
% p.a
Jamaica 
Average 
J$  Million
Jamaica 
Growth 
% p.a.
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
Average 
TT$M illion
Trinidad
and
Tobago 
Growth 
% p.a.
1972- 77 18.3 88.0 283.6 6.0P n.a n.a
1977- 82 85.3 70.8 314.7 6.0 465.7 72.2
1982- 87 197.8 82.7 1,420.0 87.8 2842.8 8.4
1988- 92 341.0 66.7 4,901.8 49.0 3404.1 2.9
Source: Annual Reports o f  Monthly Economic Digest o f Statistics - Barbados, Jam aica and Trinidad and 
Tobago
p .a — per annum 
n.a =  not available
Figures are in the currency o f each country
In the Barbados case one non-banking institution collapsed in 1987 but69 Jamaica was 
virtually free of either bank or non-bank failures.
The degree of regulation of non-banks differed as did the degree of monetary control 
but in all cases non-banks were less closely regulated.70 Non-financial institutions in some 
jurisdictions were not required to hold legal reserves. This shifted more transactions balances 
to non-bank financial institutions, and less total reserves were required to be held with the 
result that the money multiplier process was significantly increased. Though the proliferation 
of non-banks, particularly in Trinidad and Tobago, is partly explained by their virtual exclusion
69 The collapse o f  the Bank o f Credit and Commerce in 1992 was unrelated to the domestic environment 
and is not included in the count.
70 Credit unions also increased their share o f the market; partly in response to official encouragement and 
partly due to a competitive edge arising from their exemption from limits on lending for consumer credit and 
from tax privileges enjoyed by their members.
from regulation up to 1986,71 non-banks relied on commercial banks’ lines of credit to 
supplement liquidity so that increasingly banks had greater responsibility as virtual lenders of 
last resort. Though some jurisdictions have imposed primary reserve requirements on non­
banks (Jamaica in 1986) authorities did not generally require non-banks to hold secondary 
reserves.72 In other jurisdictions commercial banks created non-banking arms which were 
able to accept deposits not subject to secondary reserve requirements so increasing their 
flexibility in portfolio management and enhancing profitability of the group.73
The virtual exclusion of non-banks from regulation by authorities was based partly on 
small size and materiality but was also influenced by social considerations which had their 
genesis in the objective of encouraging institutions which provide services to small savers. In 
addition, since commercial banks, rather than non-banks influenced the level of high powered 
money, monetary authorities were more concerned with the regulation of banks and less 
concerned with non-banks. More recent attempts to require non-banks to hold reserves are, 
however, likely to bring them more closely under the control of monetary authorities.
A list of the tools of prudential regulation applied in the Caribbean is set out in Table 3.12.
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71 In 1981 monetary authorities in Trinidad and Tobago imposed a 3 % reserve requirement on non-banks. 
This did not appear to halt the rise o f non- banks. It compared with a ratio o f 9 % for commercial banks.
72 In Barbados non-banks are required to hold neither primary nor secondary reserves.
73 Many non-banks , though not empowered to open chequing accounts dawn on themselves, have done 
so through commercial banks.
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Table 3.12
Tools of Prudential Regulation used in the Caribbean
Banks(BK and non-banks(NB) BK NB
Country B J T B J T
-Minimum capital requirements * * * * ft
-Powers of inspection. * * * * * *
-Requirement to report annual profit and loss 
and balance sheet results.
* * * * *
-Limits on loans to a single borrower or group. * * *
-#Provision for doubtful loans. * * *
-#Minimum solvency standards. * * #
-#Measurement of capital. * ft ft
-#Strict provisions concerning action/sanctions 
as a result of audits/inspections.
* * *
-SCease and desist orders. * * *
Bk -  ban ks
NB -  n o n -b a n k s
B -  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  B a r b a d o s .
J -  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  J a m a ic a .
T - A p p l i c a b l e  t o  T r i n i d a d  and T o b a go .  
*  = in  e f f e c t
# T h e s e  f e a t u r e s  ha ve  b een  i n c l u d e d  in  v e r y  r e c e n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  p a s s e d  and d i d  n o t  fo r m  p a r t  o f  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  B an king A c t s  o f  B a r b a d o s ,  Jam aica  and T r i n i d a d  and T o b a g o .  The f i r s t  f o u r  f e a t u r e s  m e n t io n e d  
w ere  h ow ever  i n  p l a c e  fro m  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  Banking A c t s  in  each  j u r i s d i c t i o n .
3.2 Performance o f  Commercial Banks in the Caribbean 
3.2.1 Cost o f  Regulation
Returns on government securities in Barbados and Jamaica were lower relative to 
returns on credit to the private sector. Interest on Government treasury bills ranged from 3-5 % 
in Trinidad and Tobago and from 3-16% in Barbados. The differentials between treasury bill 
yields and lending rates for Barbados (See Table 3.13) were typical of the lower returns on 
government securities. Using the Barbados example, simple calculations which assume away 
other costs other than interest costs, show that increases in cash reserve requirements lead to 
increases in net costs (measured by alternative earnings at the weighted average lending rate), 
of 0.6 percentage points. The cost of holding required Government securities of (on average) 
25% over the period is calculated to be equivalent to an interest rate of 1.5 percentage points 
when the differential between average treasury bill yields and weighted average lending rates 
is taken into account. The total cost of cash and securities regulation was therefore 2 .1 % points 
as compared with interest spreads which were widened by 1 .1  percentage points, resulting in 
an overall net loss to equity holders of 1% point in equivalent interest (see Table 3.14).
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Table 3.13
Comparison of Average Lending Rate and Treasury Bill Yields - Barbados
Period Av lending rate (actual) Treasury Bill yields
1973 12.0 8.1
1974 12.0 8.08
1975 11.3 4.0
1976 10.3 4.5
1977 10.0 5.0
1978 10.0 4.79
1979 10.1 4.95
1980 11.0 6.19
1981 13.9 13.82
1982 13.7 11.34
1983 11.9 6.81
1984 11.9 7.19
1985 10.9 4.58
1986 10.3 4.34
1987 10.3 4.99
1988 11.1 4.71
1989 12.7 5.82
1990 12.1 8.06
1991 15.0 11.30
1992 12.6 6.6
the abbreviation Av denotes average.
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, Central Banks of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago.
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Interest (% p.a.) Spreads (% Points)
Barbados
Table 3.14
Period Spread 
between 3 
month 
deposit and 
average 
lending rate
cash
reserve
require-;
ment
Interest 
cost of Cash 
reserve 
requirements
secur­
ities
require­
ments
Interest 
cost of 
secur-ities 
require­
ments
Inter­
est cost
Averages
(1966-77)
4.4% 2%
voluntary
(.2%) 0% (0%) (.2%)
After
regulation
5.5% 8% (.8%) 25% (1.5%) (2.3%)
Difference 1.1% 6% (.6%) 25% (1.5%) 1%
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, Central Banks of Barbados.
3.2.2 Cost of Financial Intermediation
Evidence suggests that intense regulation raised the cost of financial intermediation. 
Using methods employed by Revell (1980), now the accepted yardstick for measuring cost 
comparisons of commercial banks; operating costs as a ratio of total assets in the Caribbean 
averaged (11%) in Jamaica, in Trinidad and Tobago (9%) and Barbados (8.5%) (Table 3.15). 
This compares with an average ratio of operational costs to earning assets 3.39% of U.S. 
insured banks in 1976 [Fry (1988)]. Such high costs may have stymied domestic resource 
mobilisation and tend to support the view of Terrell (1986) that banks in countries which 
exclude foreign banks have higher operating costs than countries that permit foreign banks.74
74 In Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago foreign commercial banks were not excluded but were expected 
to cede majority control to local ownership. This was not the case in Barbados.
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(Operating costs as a % of total assets)
Table 3.15
Cost of Intermediation of Caribbean Commercial Banks_
Period Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
1972 n.a. n.a. 6.3
1973 n.a. n.a. 6.8
1974 10.2 n.a. 8.0
1975 8.9 n.a. 6.9
1976 8.1 n.a. 6.3
1977 8.4 n.a. 6.3
1978 7.9 n.a. 6.7
1979 7.3 10.0 6.9
1980 7.8 11.7 8.0
1981 9.7 9.1 12.5
1982 11.3 11.0 9.0
1983 9.7 9.6 3.9
1984 9.7 14.5 3.3
1985 9.4 17.9 2.4
1986 8.4 16.7 8.9
1987 7.2 15.7 9.7
1988 7.4 11.4 10.2
1989 8.1 14.4 10.1
1990 8.9 17.8 9.0
1991 9.3 17.0 9.1
1992 9.7 19.5 10.8
Source: Central banks of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
However, Hanson Roberto de Rezende Rocha (1985) in a comparative study of 
developed and developing countries found no evidence that banking is necessarily more costly 
in developing countries than in the OECD countries. However, his measure of efficiency - the 
spread between the gross costs of borrowing and the net returns on lending - concentrates on 
spreads rather than costs and so minimises the importance of domestic resource mobilisation 
which can result from lower operating costs.
3.2.3 Regulation and Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediation ratios averaged 47% in Barbados, 43% in Jamaica and 35% 
in Trinidad and Tobago over the period but when these ratios measured by broad money to 
GDP are applied to Barbados they indicate a tendency to decline or stagnate during periods of 
intense regulation (Table 3.16). This occurred in Barbados between 1978-8775. In 1991, for 
example, the financial intermediation ratio for Barbados was 7.2 percentage points lower than 
in 1972. Despite a sharp increase in financial intermediation ratios in 1992 following 
liberalisation of credit controls and reductions in interest rate controls, the financial 
intermediation ratio had risen by only 1 percentage point over the past twenty years.
The trend for Jamaica was similar. Financial intermediation stagnated up to 1985, 
registering zero growth in 1972-85, a period of intense regulation, but increased by 10.2 
percentage points following the gradual liberalisation of the system between 1985 and 1992. 
In Trinidad and Tobago where the level of bank regulation was considerably lower, this ratio 
rose slowly but gradually over the period. These trends tend to support the view that banks in 
highly regulated economies are asphyxiated by regulation as observed by Clarke (1986).
However, this measure of financial intermediation does not take fully take into account 
the quality of financial assets or the variety of financial instruments, factors which have become 
important criteria in assessing the extent of financial development. It is therefore only a 
proximate indicator of financial development. However, it remains a frequently used measure 
and its application to the Caribbean discloses stagnation of financial intermediation levels in 
periods of intense regulation and, in the Barbados case, for the entire period.
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75 Credit controls were abolished in Barbados in 1987 and were reintroduced in 1989.
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Table 3.16
(Broad money as a % of GDP)
Financial Intermediation Ratios in the Caribbean
Period Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
1972 58.1 36.7 34.7
1973 46.9 33.6 32.1
1974 39.6 31.8 26.2
1975 40.9 31.8 26.2
1976 40.9 33.2 30.6
1977 44.0 35.3 31.3
1978 48.8 32.9 34.4
1979 45.1 33.1 34.5
1980 40.1 35.9 31.3
1981 41.5 41.4 33.4
1982 42.2 47.3 38.6
1983 44.0 50.4 42.4
1984 43.4 44.8 44.8
1985 45.3 36.8 47.4
1986 45.7 49.9 47.6
1987 46.8 47.3 49.2
1988 49.1 53.1 49.5
1989 44.8 47.6 49.5
1990 50.7 43.2 44.4
1991 50.9 46.0 44.2
1992 59.1 47.0 39.8
Source: Digest of Statistics and Annual Reports of Regional Central Banks and various IMF 
Statistical Reports.
3.2.4 The Outturn for Bank Performance
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 plot trends in commercial bank profitability in Barbados, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. In the Barbados case, the declining trend in 1982 followed 
a series of steep increases in reserve requirements and slightly improved returns in 1987 
coincided with the removal of credit controls in that year (Table 3.17 and Appendix 3.1). In 
the case of Trinidad and Tobago where controls were very limited a change in trend was 
evident in the period 1980 -1984 and seems associated with the difficulties being experienced 
by non-banks and a possible shift back to commercial banks (Figure 3.2). In the Jamaica case, 
banks experienced improved profitability from 1983 onward, a period of increasing monetary 
and exchange rate liberalisation. In all cases, changes in the profitability of banks seemed 
associated with some form of structural, monetary or prudential regulation, mostly the former 
(Figure 3.3).
Commercial banks in Barbados tended to be more liquid than in Jamaica and banks in 
Trinidad and Tobago appeared to suffer periodic illiquidity, particularly in the post 1985 
period, a period of monetary tightening in Trinidad and Tobago (Table 3.20). Banks in 
Trinidad and Tobago were more heavily capitalised while in Barbados solvency levels were 
low, partly because of predominantly branch type operations. Solvency levels in Jamaica were 
relatively higher and this was reflected in an enviable record of avoidance of bank failures. 
Banks in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago where economies were liberalised more slowly, 
lost more market share to non-banks compared with Jamaica, where commercial banks 
benefited from liberalisation of the banking system at a much earlier stage (Tables 3.18, 3.19 
and 3.20).
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Table 3.17
(Barbados Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
%
Comparative Commercial Bank Profitability
Period Barbados Jamaica Trin idad  and Tobago
1973 n.a n .a 1.33
1974 .11 n.a 1.06
1975 .53 n.a 1.02
1976 .60 n.a 1.43
1977 .43 n.a 1.72
1978 .58 n.a 1.56
1979 .62 .86 1.45
1980 .80 .79 1.60
1981 .77 1.35 3.12
1982 .78 2.21 2.86
1983 .56 3.15 2 .77
1984 .40 3.22 2.49
1985 .25 1.92 1.72
1986 .00 2.60 .64
1987 .63 2.44 .57
1988 .56 2.79 .49
1989 .67 3.26 .76
1990 .56 .90 .72
1991 .47 3.75 1.07
1992 .47 7.40 1.43
Source: Central banks of Barbados , Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
* returns are measured as profits before tax
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Table 3.18
Bank Performance Indicators - Barbados
Year Profitability Liquidity Risk Solvency Market Share
1977 .417 .951 .008 0.00 94.4
1978 .605 9.01 .046 1.23 92.7
1979 .768 7.06 .08 1.24 91.2
1980 .758 6.34 .036 1.01 90.5
1981 .761 2.39 .018 1.11 88.7
1982 .544 2.91 .013 .84 87.7
1983 .386 1.03 .038 .721 87.5
1984 .446 3.05 .066 .660 86.7
1985 .601 2.67 .140 1.75 87.5
1986 .628 3.21 .038 1.63 86.1
1987 .536 3.90 .040 1.89 86.1
1 1988 .659 4.38 .064 1.83 83.6
1989 .677 1.25 .012 1.34 82.6
1990 .547 1.84 .016 1.15 83.2
1991 .471 1.26 .014 1.26 82.1
1992 .470 1.22 .011 1.22 82.6
Source: Central Bank of Barbados Annual Digests of Statistics various issues and 
Statistics supplied by the Central Bank. (See page 33 for methodology for computing ratios)
Bank Performance Indicators - Jamaica
132
Table 3.19
Period Profitability Liquidity Risk Solvency Market Share
1977 1.01 7.61 0.07 4.83 84,72
1978 1.03 6.96 0.00 4.10 85.69
1979 1.23 6.62 0.01 3.68 86.65
1980 1.06 6.10 0.06 3.41 90.64
1981 1.19 7.95 0.00 2.28 93.62
1982 1.49 4.91 0.06 3.43 92.50
1983 1.75 5.64 0.14 3.72 89.64
1984 1.73 -0.06 0.00 3.81 89.49
1985 1.42 1.12 0.00 .70 86.83
1986 1.59 5.76 0.01 3.91 81.39
1987 1.74 4.61 0.01 5.13 84.25
1988 1.87 20.89 0.04 3.76 81.91
1989 2.46 10.42 0.29 4.34 80.14
1990 2.13 1.18 0.00 5.15 80.00
1991 2.71 5.98 0.17 4.62 81.84
1992 5.00 6.44 3.68 5.06 81.24
Source: Central Bank of Jamaica and Jamaica Stock Exchange. (See page 3 for methodology for 
computing ratios)
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Table 3.20
Bank Performance Indicators - Trinidad and Tobago
Period Profitability Liquidity Risk Solvency Market Share
1975 1.01 14.12 0.01 13.68 87.2
1976 1.43 14.94 0.04 17.56 85.3
1977 1.71 7.74 0.16 15.90 84.7
1978 1.55 2.95 0.01 12.85 82.1
1979 1.44 8.83 0.01 10.90 83.7
1980 1.59 5.68 0.00 10.21 80.9
1981 3.11 2.74 1.37 8.69 79.8
1982 2.85 5.54 0.24 6.00 82.00
1983 2.76 1.63 0.03 6.98 78.3
1984 2.48 -0.27 0.18 7.76 76.3
1985 1.72 2.04 0.56 8.76 75.8
1986 0.64 -0.08 1.58 6.73 75.6
1987 0.57 -0.05 0.61 6.15 77.7
1988 0.49 0.13 0.13 6.31 74.1
1989 0.76 0.65 0.02 6.75 76.1
1990 0.72 1.45 0.04 6.89 81.3
1991 1.06 -0.47 0.11 6.43 81.5
1992 1.43 -0.13 0.21 7.24 78.8
33 for methodology for computing ratios)
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3 .3  C o n c lu s io n
In summary, monetary regulation was intense for most of the period, particularly in 
Barbados and Jamaica where fractional reserve ratios, particularly secondary reserve 
requirements were very high and credit and interest rate controls were in place. Simultaneously, 
financial intermediation costs rose and financial intermediation ratios declined. While some of 
this decline may be attributable to the diversification of the financial system which is expected 
to occur as financial systems mature [Goldsmith (1969)], these periods of declining 
intermediation coincided with high levels of bank regulation, suggesting that the loss of market 
share was attributable to more than simply a maturing system. Bank performance measures 
point to increasing bank profitability in periods of deregulation in Jamaica and to a lesser extent 
in Barbados despite the short period of time during which these systems benefited from 
deregulation, and to a loss of bank market share throughout the region, suggesting that the 
decline in financial intermediation was greater than otherwise would have been the case in the 
absence of regulation.
R e g u la tio n  and C om m ercia l B ank P erfo rm ance : E v idence  fro m  a S u rve y  o f  B anks
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CHAPTER 4
4 .1  In tro d u c tio n
This chapter presents the views of commercial banks about the impact of bank 
regulation on the five measures of bank performance used in the study, bank profitability, bank 
liquidity, bank risk, bank solvency and bank market share. The analysis is based on responses 
to questionnaires sent to commercial banks in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Response rates were considerably higher in Barbados (83%) than in Jamaica (50%) and 
Trinidad and Tobago (75%). (See Appendix 4 for questionnaires and summary of responses).
Each review section ends with a brief summary of expectations and these views are 
summarised in Table 4.1 at the end of the chapter based on whether the impact on bank 
performance is expected by banks to be positive or negative. This exercise assists in choosing 
the relevant variables for testing in the empirical chapter and offers the opportunity of 
empirically testing some of the views of commercial banks about regulation and its impact on 
bank performance, many of which are based on casual empiricism. Responses are illustrated 
by graphical representation of data trends.
4 .2  B ank P ro fita b ility
4.2 .1  Im pact on Bank Profitability from  Reserve Requirements
Banks observe that of the monetary control tools applied in the Caribbean, reserve 
requirements was the most heavily used (Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) and represented a significant 
opportunity cost to banks. Unsatisfied demand for credit to the private sector (for which higher 
rates could be charged) would have impacted adversely on profitability given the high levels 
of compulsory credit. In the Barbados case, authorities appeared to attempt to deliberately 
compensate banks by bidding up interest rates on treasury bills so as to retain commercial bank 
financing. Since limits on credit to non-priority sectors effectively reduced banks investment 
options, the bidding up of treasury bill yields may have constituted an element of cost- 
axiomatic or accommodative pricing in the regulatory process.
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Figure 4.3
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Banks offer that a purely mathematical calculation shows that reserve requirements 
reduce bank profitability in the absence of adjustment, banks they will attempt to adjust since 
it is their aim to maintain some profit level represented as;
U = r A ( D - R )  - j XC { X - R )  f  {X)  d X  ( 4 . 1 )
The first order condition for this problem results in some reserve quantity that satisfies the 
condition:
r A= c f * f ( X )  dX (4.2)
Where:
D=deposits 
R = reserves 
X=a density function 
rA = return on assets
The overall return is specified in a single return rA. The expression for a single return is an 
oversimplified form of the adjustment process as there are several adjustments which banks 
make simultaneously to their portfolios to accommodate the reserve requirement change.
Based on the responses of commercial banks to questionnaires, the adjustment of banks 
to changes in secondary reserve requirements is modelled below:
A=D-(R+G) (4.3)
where A= Assets of commercial banks net of government securities and reserve 
requirements.
D = deposits
R= cash reserve requirements 
G= Govermnent securities.
It is assumed that over some finite period commercial banks will adjust their portfolios 
to accommodate increased reserve requirements. Responses of commercial banks to 
questionnaires indicate that all banks responded to increased reserve requirements by attempting 
to increase deposits. In Barbados 83% of banks stated that they would also restrict credit 
generally, 50% stated they would also increase interest rates and 33% would reduce credit 
lines.
Commercial banks indicate that changes in reserve requirements prompt first a volume 
adjustment which implies changes in cost and profits. For simplicity we assume that the cash 
reserve portion of reserve requirements is non interest bearing76 and that commercial banks
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76 Commercial banks in Jamaica received interest on excess liquid assets held with the central bank from 
1979.
do not aim to hold excess securities. Eighty three percent of banks in Barbados confirmed the 
latter response as did all banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Seventeen percent of 
banks in Barbados indicated that they had a predetermined policy of holding excess reserves. 
The relationships described below reflect the views of the majority of banks.
The cost to the bank of a change in reserve requirements can therefore be represented
b y :
(G i-G r) ( 4 . 4 )
where:
r = the yield on Government securities, 
i = the current return on assets.
G = the volume of government securities acquired through each process.
The first expression represents the opportunity cost of buying Government bonds over 
offering new loans to customers and the second the cost of servicing additional business. It is 
assumed that the cost of managing new loans is the same as managing Government securities 
and that r<i.  While other securities are included in the secondary reserve requirements, 
treasury bills tend to predominate. A brief comparison of treasury bill rates and the average 
rate on commercial bank loans discloses that commercial banks’ average lending rates have 
been consistently in excess of treasury bill rates for most of the period so that each increase 
in secondary reserve requirements is a cost to banks.77
Banks seek to recover profitability levels by raising interest rates, adjusting other costs 
until the resulting increase in profit is equivalent to the loss represented by the expression at 
(4.3) and may be expressed as:
(R i-C ) = (Gi-Gr) ( 4 . 5 )
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77 The return on government bonds and debentures is generally lower than treasury bill yields.
where Ri = the return on additional business and C = the cost of obtaining additional 
business.
In the Barbados case, however, the scope for increasing interest rates is limited by the 
restrictions on the minimum lending rate and the ceiling on the average lending rate. Fifty 
percent of banks indicated they would offer higher interest rates and eighty three percent that 
they would immediately restrict lending. This assumes that banks are able to satisfy cash 
reserve requirements by selling excess securities in their portfolios or by liquidating other 
investments. These adjustments are now decomposed into the major changes affecting costs and 
profits.
Where banks are illiquid prior to the imposition of increased reserve requirements they 
will first try to borrow on the interbank market. For the system as a whole this is not a means 
of obtaining additional finance. Extensive use of the interbank market bids up interbank rates 
and leads to a general increase in interest rates. Where banks borrow on the interbank market 
or from non-banks to meet reserve requirements the cost to them can be represented by: (Rb)
(4.6)
Where b= the interbank rate.
The opportunity cost of borrowing on the interbank to satisfy securities requirements can be 
represented as
( G b-C ) ( 4 . 7 )
Where r > b < i.
While commercial banks’ costs tend to be covered by the yield on Government securities, 
returns are less than could be earned had borrowed funds been on-lent to the private sector. 
Efforts to bid up the rate on treasury bills improve the profitability of buying government 
securities but worsen the deficit ( through higher debt charges) and increase the reliance on 
bank financing.
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Where neither option is available banks must wait for the proceeds of loan repayments 
or must compete aggressively for deposits. Most banks in Barbados indicate that the time 
frame taken to respond to increased in reserve requirements was between two weeks and two 
months (see Appendix 4.a.) depending on the existing liquidity situation. The time frame for 
adjustment by banks in Trinidad and Tobago was much shorter and in Jamaica it was almost 
immediate and seems to reflect the varying depth of the capital and money markets in each 
country.
Responses of commercial banks suggest that increases in reserve requirements push 
deposit rates up and lead to general interest rate increases. Also, the premium for loss of 
customer satisfaction in preferring bonds over loans may not be sufficiently high to attract 
commercial banks into holding more than the statutory amount of securities. If banks are unable 
to borrow on the interbank most banks will in the interim borrow at the central bank’s discount 
window. The cost of doing so can be represented in the case of cash reserve requirements by 
the expression: (Gd)
Where d = the central bank discount rate.
In the case of securities requirements the total cost to commercial banks of borrowing at the 
discount rate is:
(Gd-C) ( 4 . 8 )
Where d > r.
A possible conclusion is that banks will increase deposit and lending rates, widening the spread 
between them and effecting other cost adjustments to compensate for the losses incurred at (4.4) 
through (4.8). Summing the changes in costs over time the bank will aim to increase earnings 
until the lost profit (II) is recovered. Since banks may use each of these approaches to partly 
recover part of its profitability the terms ctu are used to represent the partial use of each 
technique, so that
n =  (G i-G r) = [ a 1 (R i-C ) +<x2 {Gb-C) +oc3 {Gd-C) ] +u ( 4 . 9
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The three separate effects on the interest rate structure are triggered depending on the size of 
the adjustment. The adjustments in the expression at (4.4) always occurs. The additional 
pressure on costs and hence on interest rates represented by the expressions at (4.6),(4.7) and
(4.8) will occur when banks are illiquid at the time of the imposition of the requirements. All 
banks indicated in the questionnaire that the adjustments to increases in reserve requirements 
often entailed increases in interest rates offered on deposits. To the extent that the Central 
Bank increases interest rates at the discount window the adjustment costs represented by the 
expression at (4.7) will rise. This adjustment process described by commercial banks and 
outlined here informs the variables to be included in empirical testing of the impact of 
regulation on bank profitability.
4 .2 .2  Im pact on Bank Profitability from  Credit Controls
Banks report that the limits on credit to the low priority sectors has two dimensions, 
one is the profitability impact and another is the liquidity impact. They represent that credit 
controls restrict the scope for decision- making over part of their portfolio and the scope for 
internally determined levels of profit. In Barbados the real interest rate on consumer loans was 
approximately 6-8 percentage points above other quoted rates because they are calculated on 
the original principal and not the amortised balance.78 "A priori" indications would therefore 
suggest that the impact on bank profitability resulting from credit controls would have been 
significant and would have been greater in Barbados where a) controls were more strict b) 
where consumer credit was relatively more attractive and c) this type of credit represented a 
significant share of banks’ portfolio.
A comparison of yields on government securities and the share of credit to the non­
priority (restricted) sectors shows that as banks’ share in credit to these sectors fell, treasury 
bill yields rose, suggesting that banks turned to government securities to absorb liquidity rather
Commercial banks were allowed to exclude credit for consumer loans from the calculation of the 
average lending rate.
Where d > r.
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□ restricted credit % + Treasury bill yield
than to priority (high-risk/high return) sectors. Results of questionnaires suggest that some 
banks will risk failure to meet primary and secondary reserve requirements in order to satisfy 
borrowing requirements of prime customers at low or unchanged rates for fear of loss of large 
accounts and possibly market share. Smaller and less preferred customers are therefore either 
deprived of funds or obtain them at a cost which covers the loss on funding provided to prime 
customers, suggesting a possible trade-off between profitability and market share.
Banks in Barbados indicate that credit controls restricted profitability more during 
periods of surplus liquidity. Eighty percent of all banks in Barbados agreed that in periods of 
positive growth there was considerable pent-up demand for credit to the controlled sectors, 
suggesting potentially higher earnings from credit to these sectors and supporting the view that 
in Barbados controls on credit to the non-priority sectors reduced bank profitability and that 
increases in credit to these sectors tended to improve profitability.
In Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica indications are that returns on lending to the non­
priority sectors (personal, consumer and distribution) are not necessarily higher than returns 
on credit to priority sectors (see Appendix 4.6) and thirty percent of respondents in Trinidad 
and Tobago indicted that they were lower. The case of Trinidad and Tobago where credit to 
the higher risk priority sectors (for example, manufacturing) surpassed both credit to the 
distributive and the personal sectors, tends to reject the notion that selective controls in 
themselves, (i.e. in the absence of interest rate controls), deter banks from lending to the high 
priority (high-return) sectors. The critical factor determining the impact of such controls on 
bank profitability appears to be whether selective credit controls are also accompanied by strict 
interest rate controls on lending.
While selective credit controls tend to encourage loan rationing, to the extent that there 
is pent-up demand in the higher yielding sectors, profitability can be adversely affected. 
Rationing, in the absence of credit controls, would appear to lead to a different portfolio 
allocation than exists under a regime of limits on selective credit, particularly where unsatisfied 
demand exists among good credit risk customers. Also, large outstanding unused loan 
commitments to the distributive sector tend to reduce the effect of credit controls, hence the 
period for compliance tends to be longer and the impact on profitability milder. The result in 
the Barbados case was evident in continued extensions in the period given for compliance and, 
by implication, a milder impact on bank performance.
In cases where broad lending guidelines were indicated by head offices on preferred 
areas for granting of credit, these often differed from the areas being promoted by local 
authorities. This coincides with the widely held view that Caribbean branch banks are viewed 
firstly by head offices as profit centres and that managers are judged on returns in the short 
term and possibly that profitability is more important than market share. The lack of 
correspondence between head office guidelines and actual portfolio distribution further suggests 
that monetary controls which influence banks’ selection of the optimum profit maximising 
portfolio often conflict with the goals of the parent bank and that credit controls are considered 
by head offices to result in a less than optimum profit maximising portfolio.
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4 .2 .3  Im pact on Bank Profitability from  Interest Rate Regulation
Where the loan rate is also fixed, as in the highly regulated case of Barbados, and 
controlled as in the case of Jamaica in the 1980s, profitability is reportedly determined by 
absolute levels, by interest rate spreads and by other structural parameters such as elasticities 
of loan demand and supply and marginal costs attached to increases in both loans and 
deposits.79 Where there are both floors and ceilings on interest rates the impact on bank 
profitability is through the interest rate spread. Banks indicated that constraints on the spread 
between the weighted average on deposits and the weighted average on loans was the main 
difficulty in adjusting to interest rate ceilings on lending.80 (See Appendix 4.c). The 
reasonableness of spreads can be judged by the record of compliance. The record shows that 
in some cases commercial banks will breach the regulations on interest rates if prescribed 
interest rates are likely to limit loan profitability more than they find acceptable.81 82
Despite the assumption that controlled interest rates are likely to lead to narrower 
interest spreads, spreads in Barbados actually widened during the period when regulations were 
in place, particularly between 1981-1991. This was so in both Barbados and Jamaica in Jamaica 
and conflicts with the generally held view that interest rate regulation impacts adversely on 
bank profitability.
In a scenario with a binding cap on the loan rate the implication is that operating costs 
force greater efficiencies on banks unless rate-setting is accommodative. The extent to which
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79 In the Caribbean there was generally no ceiling on deposit rates but there was a floor. This was generally 
the case except for the period 1873-1978 in Barbados and the early 1970s in Jamaica.
80 A comparison of spreads between the 3 month deposit rate and the prime lending rate in Barbados before 
and after regulation shows that on average, spreads between 3 month deposit rates and prime lending rates 
widened by 1% point after 1978.
81 The weighted average lending rate for compliance puiposes tended to be higher than the overall weighted 
average on all loans (due to exemptions from the calculations.).
82 This occurred in 1978 and 1979 when the required minimum savings rate was 8 % and commercial banks 
offered deposit rates no higher than 6.5 % on non-term savings deposit despite the minimum rate set. The failure 
of commercial banks to comply with this directive may have been attributable to the short lead time given for 
compliance.
banks are able to adjust to regulations while maintaining profitability will depend on such 
efficiencies and on the level of cost-axiomatic pricing. There is evidence to suggest that in the 
Caribbean case cost-axiomatic pricing was employed on an informal basis even though specific 
formulae may not have been explicitly used in formal calculations of appropriate rate-setting. 
Wider spreads between deposit and lending rates in the Caribbean relative to metropolitan 
countries evident in the period 1981-1991 in Barbados, may be attributable to such 
compensatory margins permitted by regulators due to the cost of regulation83.
However, while spreads tended to widen with increasing regulation, banks note that this 
may not necessarily indicate greater profitability unless spreads were sufficiently wide to 
compensate for lost margins on forgone profit at higher yields. This introduces the question of 
whether pricing was cost-axiomatic or merely accommodative. Even if accommodative, the 
evidence suggests that commercial banks did not always consider spreads to be satisfactory. In 
1991, in Barbados, for example, commercial banks increased spreads sharply immediately 
following the removal of the ceiling on the average lending rate, immediately exceeding for the 
first time pre-1973 spreads (i.e. pre-regulation spreads).
4 .2 .4  Im pact on Bank Profitability from  Prudential Regulation
Responses to questionnaires sent to commercial banks showed uncertainty among banks 
about the impact of prudential requirements on bank profitability. Forty percent of respondents 
felt that prudential regulation adversely impacted commercial bank profitability. A plot of 
consolidated capital, reserves and net long term borrowing as a ratio of total assets shows a 
distinct negative relationship of capital and bank profitability with some lag 84 (Figure 4.5).
146
83 The disparity in interest rate spreads between banks in the Caribbean and in North America is 
approximately as 2-3 percentage points.
84 In the case of branches of overseas banks, reserves and long term borrowing are sometimes considered 
substitutes for capital.
147
Figure 4.5 
CapitaI^reserves& Borrow!ng
□ Cap+res+borrowrng % + return on aseets-JS
However, logically, since deposit costs tend to show a positive covariance with asset 
return, the implication is that deposit rates are likely to fall with increases in capital 
requirements. The trade-off in terms of safety may require that other costs resulting from 
regulation are modified in order to accommodate a plan of increased capital adequacy criteria 
with leveraging constraints.85 However, banks were careful to make the distinction between 
the effect of capital adequacy provisions on short term profitability, which they saw as 
unfavourable, compared with the impact on long term profitability which was seen as 
favourable. Eighty percent of banks saw capital requirements as generally favourable for bank 
profitability.86
In summary, the expectation is that bank profitability suffers primarily as a result o f 
monetary regulation, principally, reserve requirements, credit controls as well as interest rate
85 Leveraging constraints refer to the obligation to increase capital requirements in line with increased 
obligations and exposures, or alternatively to restrict portfolio growth.
86 Branches of foreign banks in Barbados are not required to hold local capital. Five of the seven banks 
at the time of reporting were foreign branch banks.
controls, despite possible cost-axiomatic or accommodative pricing, and that capital regulation 
adversely impacts on profitability in the short run. The overall impact on profitability is 
expected to be negative.
4 .3  Bank liquidity
4 .3 .1  Im pact on Bank Liquidity from  Bank Regulation
While there is always a cost to the holding of excess liquidity and a greater cost when 
this exceeds normal precautionary levels, because of the continued availability of income 
earning government securities, a reserve deficiency carries an even greater cost in terms of 
borrowing at the central bank’s discount window at punitive rates. The relative cost of a 
reserve deficiency is therefore more likely to have an adverse impact on bank performance than 
the cost of reserve excesses. The discussion below makes this point.
4.3.2 Impact on Bank Liquidity from Reserve Requirements
Initial conditions are important in evaluating the impact of reserve requirements. 
Where banks hold no surplus liquidity at the time of increases in reserve requirements the 
proceeds of loan repayments are used to buy required securities. Commercial banks report that 
higher reserve requirements generally lead to a drawdown of deposits, reduce bank liquidity, 
prompt increases in deposit rates and push lending rates up. Higher reserve requirements 
therefore tighten both the loan market and lead to tighter liquidity as cash is withdrawn. Where 
banks hold surplus liquidity at the time of increases in statutory reserve requirements, the 
immediate cost of compliance is reduced but the problem of narrower flexibility in portfolio 
management remains.
The underdeveloped state of the stock market and the consequent illiquidity of securities 
in the Caribbean assists banks in preventing possible loss of deposits to the Government 
securities market. This lowers the effective cost to the banks of holding reserve requirements, 
as the thinness of the market reduces the risk of a movement out of deposits into bonds even 
where returns on government securities exceed deposit rates of comparable maturities.
148
Growing internationalisation of the banking system permits banks to alleviate liquidity
difficulties arising from regulation by borrowing abroad, yet only twenty-five percent of foreign 
branches in Barbados indicate that they would borrow from head offices to satisfy increases in 
primary or secondary reserve requirements. 87 88 While this depends on risk and return 
relative to domestic interest rates, uncertainty resulting from frequent exchange rate changes 
in Jamaica especially, tended to raise risk premiums on foreign borrowing to exorbitantly high 
levels, increasing the cost of adjustment for banks in a liquidity squeeze.
The holding of liquidity cushions above normal levels also increased costs and reduced 
bank profitability in Barbados. Twenty percent of commercial banks in Barbados indicated that 
they held liquidity cushions against expectations of future increases in reserve requirements. 
This seemed related to the inability of authorities to reverse increases in cash and security 
requirements. Banks in Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago did not factor expectations about future 
increases in reserve requirements into their holding of liquid assets.
4 .3 .3  Im pact on Bank Liquidity from  Credit Controls
Though credit controls are aimed at selected sectors they may also affect asset yields 
and prices in other markets, since increased liquidity resulting from unplaced funds can depress 
the price of credit generally. Overall, bank profitability may be affected and not simply 
earnings on credit advanced to the restricted sectors. Low levels of liquidity prevent banks from 
investing sufficiently large amounts in alternative areas to compensate for loss of higher return 
assets, as larger volumes of new credit are required to produce the same return. Higher levels 
of unplaced funds resulting from credit limits may have been offset by greater cash withdrawals 
of deposits, at least in the short term, as customers try to maintain spending patterns.
4 .3 .4  Im pact on Bank Liquidity from  Interest Rate Regulation
A plot of the relationship between excess liquidity (or liquidity shortages) and the 12 
month deposit rate displays a lack of correlation between deposit rates and liquidity shortages
87 Banks indicated that they borrowed overseas only as a last resort, after having launched a deposit drive 
and after cutting back on spending.
88 Locally owned banks, principally in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, have considerably less access to 
overseas borrowing than do local banks.
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Figure 4.6 
L i q u i d i t y  and Deposit Rate v a r i a n c e
Barbados
□ Excess cash + 12mth dep-min sav
(Figure 4.6). For example in 1991 when the system experienced considerable liquidity 
shortages there was no interest rate response. This lack of correlation was reflected as well 
in uncertainty in the responses of commercial banks to the question of the impact of interest 
rate controls on liquidity.
Twenty percent of banks in Barbados observed that controls on savings deposit rates 
adversely affect the ability of banks to compete for fixed deposits during periods of illiquidity. 
Commercial banks tended to adopt a strategy of keeping the basic rate on savings low to offset 
lower earnings on higher levels of required secondary reserves, so allowing them to offer more 
attractive returns on term deposits. 89 90 Hesitancy of individuals to move funds out of the
89 In the Barbados case the floor on the savings rate tended to keep other deposit rates down. The weighted 
average return on deposits differed from the minimum savings rate by, on average, only approximately one 
percentage point.
90 The central bank discount rate is not emphasised in the study because it tends to move in tandem with 
other rates. In Barbados the discount rate tend to be punitive only in extreme balance of payments difficulties. 
In the past twenty years this occurred twice in the Barbados case; in 1981-83 and in 1991 when rates were 
raised from normal levels of 8-12% to as high as 22% and 18% respectively - both periods of Stand-by 
programmes with the IMF.
country in search of higher returns reduced the likelihood of withdrawal of liquidity from the 
system. This was less applicable in Jamaica where movements of capital abroad were 
compounded not only by interest rate changes but by exchange rate volatility.
4 .3 .5  Im pact on Bank Liquidity from  Prudential Regulation
Capital adequacy requirements are expected unequivocally to improve liquidity of 
commercial banks. The result can be derived from the simple balance sheet movements.
In summary the impact o f monetary regulation on bank liquidity is expected to vary with initial 
conditions but in general tends to tighten the loan and deposit markets. Capital adequacy 
requirements tend to impact on liquidity positively.
4 .4  Bank R isk
Im pact o f Bank Regulation on Bank Risk
4 .4 .1  Im pact on Bank R isk from  Reserve Requirements
While regulators tend to view the regulatory aspect of reserve requirements as an 
additional safeguard, and depositors see reserve requirements as providing some protection in 
the event that banks experience financial difficulties, bankers suggest that for the deposit 
quantity-constrained bank, risk (however measured) is affected negatively by reserve 
requirements.
Volatility in the level of reserve requirements affects the degree of confidence which 
banks place on their ability to deliver on commitments and banks have been known to opt out 
of commitments following increases in reserve requirements.91 Forty percent of banks 
responding to questionnaires indicate a policy of reducing credit lines in response to increased 
reserve requirements. Banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago indicated that they would 
neither cut credit lines nor cancel loan commitments, while 17% of banks in Barbados indicated 
they would cancel loan commitments. This suggests that the level of regulation in each country
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91 In some cases there is a way out through a " material adverse change clause" which allows banks to avoid 
contracts if the borrowers’ credit worthiness declines. It is a development which has been observed in other 
countries in retail banking but is more common in international loan negotiations.
influences the loan commitment process in each jurisdiction but foregone credit and cancelled 
loan commitments impact adversely on banks in all jurisdictions.
4 .4 .2  Im pact on Bank R isk from  Credit Controls
Selective credit controls are more likely to reduce than increase risk. The view that 
selective credit controls increase risk works through the uncontrolled portion of the bank’s 
portfolio rather than through the controlled portion. However, responses to questionnaires 
suggest that controls on credit to the foreign exchange-using (non-priority) sectors did not lead 
to increases in credit to the foreign exchange earning ( higher risk) sectors. Two-thirds of banks 
in Barbados observed that there was no increase in the number of applications from the 
productive sectors when credit controls were in place and one-third were not sure.
A plot of credit outstanding to the manufacturing sector in Barbados relative to excess 
liquidity tends to confirm the observation of banks there that in the presence of credit controls 
excess liquidity did not lead to increases in credit to the priority sectors (Figure 4.8). 
Responses of banks suggest that those banks (one-third) who indicated that controls on credit 
led to increased credit to high risk sectors ( priority sectors) tended to be the smaller and newer 
banks.
In Barbados, the failure of the productive sectors to benefit substantially from 
reductions in credit to the non-priority sectors illustrates the limited scope for appropriate risk- 
return trade-off resulting from regulation. Banks claim that ceilings on lending rates discourage 
lending to high-risk sectors and suggest that increased lending to the priority (high-risk) sectors 
would have improved commercial bank profitability had banks been able to charge appropriate 
risk premiums. Premiums charged seemed more related to risk in Trinidad and Tobago and 
Jamaica and stem from the absence of interest rate controls in Trinidad and Tobago, and in the 
case of Jamaica, from the absence of an interest rate ceiling. Credit controls were therefore 
more likely to have adversely affected banks’ risk-taking in the Barbados case where interest 
rate ceilings exist.
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Figure 4.7
E x c e s s  l i q u i d i t y  / M a n u f a c t u r i n g  C r e d i t
Barbados
□ Credit to Manufac. + Excess liquidity
4 .4 .3  Im pact on Bank R isk from  Interest Rate Controls
A consequence of higher yields on Government securities in Barbados relative to other 
Caribbean countries is that it increases the interest rate premium which banks require in order 
to invest in higher-risk credit to the foreign exchange earning sectors. In the Jamaica case 
where returns on government securities tend to be lower, this lower risk-free rate permits 
greater scope for risk premiums charged to higher-risk customers, but in Barbados higher rates 
were not at the complete discretion of the bank. Two-thirds of banks thought the minimum 
savings rate helped to keep interest rates down.
Whae
spreads are too narrow financial intermediation may be reduced if deposit-taking is 
discouraged. The case of time and savings deposits attracting identical rates without recognition 
of time to maturity suggests that commercial banks took action from time to time to discourage 
deposit- taking. This occurred in Barbados in 1991 and was a clear sign of disintermediation 
triggered by prescribed interest rates which were out of line with the market expectations.
4 .4 .4  Im pact on Bank Risk from  Prudential Regulation
In an environment where prudential capital adequacy guidelines are risk- based banks 
have an incentive to avoid risky claims. Thus where banks must hold different capitalization 
rates for different assets, as is suggested by the Basle Committee of Bank Supervisors, banks 
will hesitate to extend credit to high risk customers. This has been observed in the reduced 
willingness of U.S. banks to lend to developing countries consequent on the introduction of 
risk-based capital criteria by authorities. Though risk-based capital criteria were not explicitly 
implemented in the Caribbean up to 1992, there might have been a tendency for risk reduction 
by banks arising from the informal application of capital adequacy ratios, and in such cases this 
may have helped to reduce bank risk.
Where banks are controlled by large conglomerates or where they specialise in particular 
types of lending, 92 over-exposure increases risk. 93 However, responses from banks in 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago differed markedly from Barbados on the question of 
concentration by customer. In Barbados eighty percent of respondents did not think that limits 
on customer concentration ratios affected banks adversely.94 However, in Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago all banks saw this as a major problem affecting profitability. This reflects 
the fact that banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are mostly local banks and are not as 
highly capitalised as large international banks in Barbados (who are permitted to rely on global 
capital). In addition, firms in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago tend to be larger and a greater 
number of firms are therefore likely to be affected by the limitation on lending to a single 
customer.
Bank concentration ratios as opposed to product concentration, which is an outcome 
of oligopoly, seem to be inversely related to bank profitability offering a possible interpretation
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92 Firms may be otherwise perfectly good credit risks based on balance sheet assessments but the spread 
of assets could reflect a disproportionate percentage of the bank’s assets devoted to a single sector.
93 In Barbados customer concentration is limited to 25 % of capital.
94 Branches of foreign banks who are able to base customer concentration ratios on global capital are not 
as seriously affected by this prudential guideline than are locally incorporated banks.
that large banks are not necessarily more profitable.
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In summary, monetary regulation appears to impact bank risk negatively, particularly 
credit controls, by impacting the quality o f the loan portfolio. Where adequate risk premiums 
are not available interest rate controls and credit controls are likely to increase bank risk. 
However, reserve requirements and capital are expected to impact bank risk positively.
4.5 Bank Solvency
4.5 .1  Im pact on Bank Solvency from  Reserve Requirements
Remedies used by authorities in Trinidad and Tobago in solving the problem of non­
banks during the mid 1980s suggest a perception that reserve requirements improve bank 
solvency. For example, the decision to extend reserve requirements to include non-banks 
following the collapse of four non-banks there underscores the perceived prudential role of 
reserve requirements - a tool normally viewed as monetary.
Commercial bankers, however, observe that solvency in an accounting sense differs 
from functional solvency, noting that while the security of depositors is boosted by the holding 
of high levels of reserve deposits with the Central Bank, where these funds are not accessible 
to banks or are only accessible at prohibitive rates of interest, the traditional backing provided 
by the monetary authorities becomes inaccessible, so that high levels of reserve requirements 
begin to create problems of "operational" solvency for commercial banks. This is the case even 
though on a break-up basis these banks may be classified as solvent based on high but "frozen" 
reserve requirements.
4.5.2 Impact on Bank Solvency from Credit Controls
Indications are that credit limits contribute to solvency difficulties for small new banks. 
Smaller banks seem forced to lend to high risk customers and loan losses are therefore likely 
to be greater. While, in some case, solvency problems may have resulted even in the absence 
of credit limits, the argument is often made that the solvency of small banks is worsened by 
credit controls [Farrell (1989)]. Also, since reduced profitability affects net worth over time, 
where lower profitability is related to defaults arising from pressures to unload excess funds
resulting from credit controls, bank solvency can be affected.
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New banks, particularly marginal banks appear to be most affected by credit controls, 
while older and larger banks tend to have a greater proportion of high quality loans. To that 
extent, regulations, it is argued, can adversely affect the solvency of newer and smaller banks 
as they are pushed in to lending to marginal customers because the lower risk areas are 
controlled.
4.5.3 Impact on Bank Solvency from Interest Rate Controls
The major impact on solvency from interest rate controls appears to be through reduced 
profitability.
4.5.4 Impact on Bank Solvency from Prudential Regulation
Most banks viewed the impact of capital adequacy regulations on bank solvency 
positively. Some noted that increasing support given by commercial banks to other financial 
institutions as their lender of last resort in an environment where the concern of authorities with 
macroeconomic stability puts pressure on the profitability and can create problems of solvency 
for commercial banks, and that solvency regulations must therefore be closely linked to lender 
of last resort facilities.
The general consensus, both from responses to questionnaires and from examination 
o f data trends, is that bank solvency is affected by regulation, particularly by credit regulations 
and that the solvency o f smaller banks is negatively affected.
4.6 Bank Market Share
4.6.1 Impact on Market Share from Reseive Requirements
Changes in cash and securities requirements in Barbados and the assets of non-banks 
show a clear positive correlation of reserve requirements with the growth of non-banks
In some cases, the number of banks actually declined while non-banks grew. This tends
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to support the generally accepted view that reserve requirements reduce bank size relative to
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Figure 4.10
P e r  f o d
non banks and that it is related to the absence of an obligation to hold reserves or an obligation 
to hold only a low level of cash and securities relative to banks.95
4.6.2 Impact on Market Share from Credit Controls
The declining market share of banks evident in the Caribbean (see Figure 4.8, 4.9 and 
4.10) occurred at different times in each country. Up to 1984 in Barbados non-banks were not 
subject to credit controls, and were never so subject in Trinidad and Tobago. In the Jamaica 
case, limits on consumer credit were extended to include non-banks, yet non-banks there grew 
much more rapidly than in Barbados where control was not extended until 1984. So that the 
answer may lie not in exclusion from credit controls but in the generally lighter regulatory 
burden.
Control of the ceiling on residential mortgage rates reduced the market share of banks,
95 For a short period in 1977 and 1978 there were eight banks operating in Barbados. However, with the 
closure of Bank of Credit and Commerce and before the reopening of its successor in 1992 there were 6 banks 
operating in Barbados.
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F i g u r e  4.11
M o r t g a g e  r a t e s  a n d  M o r g a g e  L o a n s
as a 56 of total loans
□ *5 of portfol to + mortgage rate
resulting in the virtual withdrawal of commercial banks from the mortgage market and 
contributing to the rise of non-banks 96 which, at first, had no obligation to hold reserves 
either of a primary or secondary nature. (Figure 4.11).
4.6.3 Impact on Market Share from Interest Rate Controls
Despite the importance of interest rate spreads, actual lending rates are indicators to 
customers of the affordability of credit and hence influence effective demand and market share 
through loan volumes achieved. In periods of high interest rates, lending rates tended to bunch 
as ceilings on lending rates were raised 97 as non-prime customers tended to subsidise interest 
charged to prime customers during regimes of high interest rates. This tendency may have 
helped banks to retain market share of prime customers but may have been at the expense of 
non-prime customers. The net effect may have been loss of market share.
96 Bank profits were also adversely affected by the in-roads into the granting of credit by commercial 
houses, credit unions and by the activities of companies involved in leasing.
97 The bunching of lending rates was particularly evident in Barbados in 1981 and again in 1991, both 
periods of particularly high interest rate regimes.
If interest rates were cost-axiomatic and market clearing, then interest rate controls 
should not have impacted as adversely on market share as would otherwise have been the case. 
If they were accommodative and not fully cost-axiomatic they may have had a less positive 
impact on bank profitability. However, neither accommodative nor cost-axiomatic pricing 
permits banks control over profit margins. This control over bank profits creates opportunities 
for non-banks who have much greater flexibility in decision making.
4.6.4 Impact on Market Share from Prudential Regulations
Where capital requirements apply to banks and not to non-banks and where such 
unregulated institutions offer similar facilities, banks’ comparative advantage in such areas will 
be eroded and banks’ market share can be adversely affected.
Summary and Conclusions
In summary, monetary controls are expected to impact negatively on bank market share 
in every case, and increases in capital are expected to impact negatively on solvency in the 
short run.
4 .7  Summary o f Views and Expectations
A summary o f "a priori“ expectations about the impact o f regulation on bank, 
performance is set out in matrix form in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Expectations about Regulatory Changes - The Caribbean Experience
Effect on P ro fita b ility L iquid ity Solvency Market
Share
Risk
Monetary
Selective Credit Controls - + - - -
Reserve Requirements 
(Secondary)
- - + - -
Interest Rate controls - + /- - - -
Prudential
Capital -S+L + -S+L -
Structural
Setting of Boundaries - -S+L - -
+ denotes a positive impact 
- denotes a negative impact
S denotes short term 
L denotes long term
Since the expected regulatory impact appears to be negative for each regulatory tool, 
the expectation is that a composite index of regulation will be negatively related to bank 
performance, principally as a result of the impact on profitability, market share and bank risk. 
The outcome for liquidity and solvency is mixed but seems unlikely to reverse the overall 
expected result of a negative impact on bank performance.
Chapters 5 and 6 develop and test a model for evaluating the impact of regulation on 
each of the above measures of bank performance, applying OLS regression and cointegration 
techniques. A composite measure of bank performance is then developed using discriminant 
analysis for testing the overall impact of regulation measured by a composite regulation index 
on the overall performance of commercial banks in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the model and its assumptions, identifies the variables used, 
points out the constraints imposed by data deficiencies and describes the procedures used for 
testing. These include 1) a description of OLS regression analysis, tests for stationarity, tests 
establishing cointegration, the deriving of error correction models and maximum likelihood 
estimates, 2) the technique of multiple discriminant analysis used for developing a single 
composite score of bank performance and regulation and 3) Granger causality tests for testing 
causality between composite performance and composite regulation indices and between the 
main regulatory variable and the main performance measure.
Conventional methodologies employed for testing the impact of regulation on 
commercial banks are principally, the traditional event studies and linear regression analysis. 
A third possibility is comparison of the pre-regulation period with the regulated period. 
Traditional event studies however, require frequent data on the dependent and independent 
variables in order to show the response of the dependent variable to the event being studied. 
Therefore, data constraints do not permit the use of this methodology in the Caribbean case. 
In addition, since regulatory measures overlapped or were imposed simultaneously, the event 
studies methods is likely to have been unreliable. Informational difficulties relating to the pre­
regulation period did not offer a series of acceptable length for testing of the impact on 
profitability of the regulated compared to the unregulated environment. The study therefore 
adopts the linear least squares (OLS) regression technique, an approach used in studies on 
bank profitability and shareholder wealth by several writers [Kane and Unal (1990), Dermine 
and Hill ion (1992) and Bourke (1988) (1989)].
5.2 Assumptions
The following are some of the assumptions of the model.
1. It is assumed that costs influence choices relating to all assets and liabilities and 
that no liabilities are specifically earmarked for funding particular assets.
Chapter 5
A Model for Testing the Impact of Regulation on Bank Performance
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2. No special treatment is given to the impact of the mortgage rate on bank 
profitability. The impact of the mortgage rate is captured in the general interest rate control 
variable. The maximum rate on mortgages is a prescribed rate, but mortgages represent a 
small proportion of commercial banks’ asset portfolio.
3. Earnings on government securities are exogenously determined. Earnings on 
credit to the private sector are subject to a ceiling on lending rates, either the average or the 
prime rate. The ratios in which these assets are held are partly regulated and partly 
endogenously determined through secondary reserve requirements and credit limits.
4. Costs are expected to influence the structure of assets and liabilities as well as 
deposits through size and through their influence on liquidity costs, solvency costs and the 
opportunity cost of equity funds, all of which influence expected profits.
5. The impact of regulation on other bank performance measures are based principally 
on the equation developed for evaluating the impact on profitability.
6. No single constraint on the structure of liabilities other than the capital constraint 
could be identified, though consideration was given to using the ratio of savings deposits to 
total deposits given the prescribed minimum savings rate but the need for this was not 
supported by interviews with commercial banks.
5.3 The model
The model employs an equation represented by the conventional profit function 
transformation curve:
n = £  ( r ^ )  ( s .d a
i =1 j =1
(5.1)
Where qE; represents return on assets, SjDj the cost of deposits and II represents bank profits. 
This approach has been applied in efficiency studies, for example by Hannan (1991) to 
analyze efficiency in banking firms in the U.S.
To establish the link between microeconomic analysis of costs and bank profitability 
and to relate this to macroeconomic impulses which give rise to regulation, the equation for 
the production transformation curve is combined with the representation of the balance sheet 
of the banking system to arrive at a modified and testable model. The model is derived from 
the following system of equations.
A = R  + E = D +  W ( 5 . 2 )
Equation (5.2) represents the structural form of the consolidated balance sheet of the banking 
system, where total assets are represented by the symbol (A), reserves (R), earning assets (E), 
total liabilities, deposits (D) and equity (W). This permits macroeconomic decisions prompted 
by the reserve variable (R) to be combined with the production transformation function. (R) 
is assumed to be non income earning, changes in (W) before distribution of profits are 
attributable to returns on earning assets less costs of deposits in that period.
AiV=n= £  (r iEi ) -  J) ( s-D A  ( 5 . 3 )
i = l  j = l
Taking account of other costs other than interest costs and restating in balance sheet form
n = £  U iE A  - t  (SjDA -  t c ( D A  - ' t c ( E A  ( 5 . 4 )
i = 1 j = l  3 3 ic=l g=1 9
Equation (5.3) represents the intertemporal profit maximising objective function of 
commercial banks specified in equation (5.4) where costs other than interest costs are 
separately identified as a function of earning assets and deposits.If we let the first expresion 
on the right hand side in (5.4) be represented by TjE, the second by SjD, the third by C(D) 
and the fourth by C(E), these costs are further respecified in equation (5.5) as
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C(D) +C(E) = B + L+ S + Q ( 5 . 5 )
The expressions at (5.4) and (5.5) state that bank profits are determined by return on earning 
assets (E) less returns to depositors (rD) after adjusting for resource costs (B), liquidity costs 
(L), insolvency costs (S) and the opportunity cost of equity funds (Q). Substituting (5.2) and 
(5.5) into (5.4) and solving for II we obtain:
(D+W-R) -S jD -B -L -S -Q  ( 5 . 6 )
or
U ^ r ^ -S jD -B -L -S -Q  ( 5 . 7 )
A modified form of the equation takes account of parameters representing asset 
structures and liability structures and reflects the share of the regulated portfolio in 
commercial banks’ total portfolio. The most important asset parameter structure is identified 
as the share of government securities in the banks’ portfolios. It also performs the function 
of a regulatory variable when the required portion of these assets is utilised.
The model separates commercial banks’ asset into assets held in compliance with 
regulated primary and secondary reserve requirements and other assets, so as to facilitate 
testing of the effect of regulation on the chosen measures of commercial bank evaluation. The 
approach to the final determination of the model is an eclectic one which builds on the profit 
function developed above but is adjusted to more accurately reflect the perceived determinants 
of bank profitability in the highly regulated case of the Caribbean.
The general form of the equation is given by 
ROA = f(TB, SF, M, RR ,CON , I, LD, CAPB, dumin, dumcr, si, s2,s3 )
(5.8)
5.4 Explanation of the Independent Variables used
The symbols used are:
TB = opportunity cost of equity funds.
RR = asset parameter structure.
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M = money supply.
r = loan rate net of all costs such as administration and information costs 
t = nominal interest rate on deposits 
I = interest rate spreads (t-r).
SF = resource costs
CON = bank concentration ratio
LD = loan deposit ratio proxies liquidity costs
SOLV = expected cost of insolvency and capital deficiency, proxied by the capital 
asset ratio and when long term borrowing is included (CAPB).
The opportunity cost of equity funds and the interest rate on Government securities 
are combined in the variable (TB), the treasury bill rate, in the context of the underdeveloped 
state of the capital markets and the dominance of Government securities. A variable 
representing the loan deposit ratio was also included and served as a liquidity variable.
Credit to government is represented by the holding of secondary reserve requirements 
and serves as a proxy for the asset parameter structure. Assets required to be statutorily held, 
principally Government securities are represented by the term (RR).
Deposit growth is represented by money broadly defined and is denoted by the 
symbol (M). This is considered the traditional measure of financial intermediation. It is 
expected that growth in the total market would produce the capability for banks to earn 
increased profits, though not necessarily at higher relative rates of return on assets.
The actual interest rate spread (t-r), the result of the regulated average lending rate 
(r) and the weighted average savings rate (t), is used to represent the spread on interest rates 
on the basis that while the minimum savings rate is the controlled rate, all other savings rates 
are indirectly controlled through control of the minimum savings rate. Use of the spread 
variable also facilitates homogeneity in tests of equations for countries such as Trinidad and 
Tobago where there were no controls on interest rates.
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Resource and information costs are proxied by staff expenses (SF). This variable 
represents a large proportion of non-interest costs. These costs also serve to examine Edwards 
(1977) theory that excess or supernormal profits of regulated industries may be directed away 
from net profit into sub-optimal expenditure patterns related to management as opposed to 
shareholder preferences.
A concentration ratio (CON) is also employed to examine whether regulatory 
forbearance is greater for large banks than for small. This ratio represents the relative share 
of the three largest banks - the C3 variable." The concentration ratio can be determined by 
number of firms or by size. The size variable was chosen here. The most frequently used 
measure of market concentration is the 3 - bank or 4- bank ratio. This measures the 
proportion of the industry controlled by the 3 or 4 largest firms. Given the limited number 
of banks in the Caribbean countries being studied, the three-bank (C3) ratio was used. The 
inability of the concentration ratio to take into account disparities of size among larger banks 
was not considered a handicap given the objective of the study.
Liquidity costs are seen as a function principally of primary and secondary reserves 
and of the bank rate, while insolvency costs are a function of capital requirements and the 
cost of deposit protection. The model uses capital requirements as a proxy for the cost of 
insolvency.100 The opportunity cost of equity funds is a function of the market rate on the 
alternative use of funds and is proxied by the treasury bill yield.
The cost of insolvency is proxied by capital and reserves (SOLV) and where branch 
banks dominate, by a expression which includes long term borrowing as well (CAPB).
Changes in regulations are represented where possible by actual data on interest rates
"  A dummy variable for government ownership was found not to be significant and was removed from 
the equations.
100 Consideration was given to including the deposit insurance premium as a proxy for the cost of 
insolvency in the Trinidad and Tobago case (the only case in the Caribbean where deposit insurance exists) but 
data constraints did not permit. However, these rates seem to be heavily subsidised by Government and may 
not represent the true cost of insolvency.
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and reserve requirements. Where these changes could not be quantified dummy variables are 
used, for example the credit control variable is both quantitative and qualitative - a dummy 
variable was therefore employed. Both a dummy for interest rate regulation (dumcr) and a 
variable representing interest rate spreads (I) were included. The inclusion of both is intended 
to test for the possibility of cost-axiomatic or accommodative pricing. Credit was represented 
only by the dummy variable. These took the value 1 when restrictions were on and zero when 
they were off. Since the data series are quarterly, seasonal dummies were included for three 
of the quarters to take account of seasonality.
Private sector assets subject to control on volume are represented by credit to the 
distributive sector and the personal sector. Consumer credit is a subset of personal credit and 
is captured in the regulation of personal lending. Commercial banks are customarily granted 
a period of approximately three months to comply with credit control measures, therefore 
three months after announcement is therefore considered the effective date. 101
The Central bank discount rate was found to be insignificant and was withdrawn from 
later equations.
An inflation variable, used by some researchers, e.g. Bourke (1988) in empirical 
tests, was not found to be significant in preliminary testing for the Barbados case and was 
removed from the equations.
Of the above variables those which represent regulatory control are:
(1) credit outstanding to the personal and distributive sector (dummies are also
used to show when controls on this sector are on or off).
(2) primary and secondary reserve requirements
(3) interest rate spreads, and
(4) capital and reserves.
168
101 Checking of the announcements and discussions with bank personnel involved confirm that three months 
is the normal period granted for compliance with regulations.
With the exception of the inflation variable, all other variables used in the model 
parallel variables typically used in the literature. 102 This model specifically adds four 
regulatory variables mentioned above to reflect the presence of financial regulation.
5.5 Profitability Measures
Two different measures of profitability are employed.
These are:
(ROA) -net before tax profit as a % of total assets
(BTSETA) - net before tax profit + staff expenses as a % of total assets.
The first indicator of profitability was measured before tax to avoid a result influenced 
by tax payable by banks at differing time periods. This measure takes account of actual loan 
losses and recoveries. The second measure is included to adjust for potential net profit 
which is appropriated as staff expenses. Bourke(1988) notes that this provides a value added 
concept of net profit before tax and staff expenses. The profitability measure (profits plus 
staff expenses) is designed to adjust for possible inefficiencies in the use of resources. Staff 
expenses are the major expense item and this measure indicates the level of profits in the 
presence of approximately uniform efficiency levels.103 A third measure, return on operating 
profits (ROPA) was included in initial tests but results did not differ materially from those 
obtained from using the profitability measure (BTSETA) so it was dropped from the analysis.
A measure which includes foreign long term borrowing plus capital and reserves as 
a dependent variable is included among the equations as a means of introducing a proxy for 
bank capital applicable to branches of foreign banks. Data on changes in shareholder wealth 
are not available for Barbados as bank shares are not listed on the stock exchange. Since the 
study focuses principally on Barbados and references Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago only
102 These are capital, liquidity ratios or loan deposit ratios, overhead expenses, and other external factors 
such as bank size, market growth and interest rates.
103 A measure of profitability added back loan losses was considered but this practice differed so widely 
among banks that it was removed from the measures of profitability employed. While there are other areas of 
efficiencies other than efficiencies related to use of manpower resources, the study identified only the major area 
of possible efficiencies.
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for comparative purposes, the impact of regulation on shareholder wealth is not dealt with 
except by way of reference. In addition, data series on stock prices for Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago were only available from 1981 and 1983 respectively, half-yearly in the case of 
Trinidad and Tobago and annually in the case of Jamaica. These intervals were too wide and 
the series too short to provide dependable results on the impact of regulation on shareholder 
wealth.
A fourth possible measure, used by some researchers, profits plus loan loss 
provisions, is applied to the Barbados case in a separate run but is not used in partitioned 
testing because the practice of loan loss provisioning was not particularly used in Barbados 
during the period, partly because most of the banks were branch banks and provisioning was 
left largely to head office. More recently however increasing emphasis is being placed by 
regulatory authorities on the practice of loan provisioning. Examination of the data shows that 
for most of the period examined loan loss provisioning was minimal. Nevertheless, a sample 
OLS regression was run using this definition of profit and results are set out in Appendix 6.3.
A fifth measure of bank profitability often used in the literature is net profit as a 
percent of capital and reserves, but it is not deemed to be applicable to the Barbados situation 
because of the dominating presence of branches of large international banks which were not 
required to hold local capital.
There was no change in most other prudential regulatory requirements during the 
period. The only prudential measure included was therefore the more important measure, 
capital.
Negative returns on assets (ROA) in the third quarter of 1985 precluded the use of 
logs in initial tests. However, a log transform for the measure of bank profitability which 
contained only positive numbers in the series - profits plus staff expenses as a percentage of 
total assets (denoted BTSETA) was relied upon in most of the tests of bank profitability.
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5.6 Tests Using Other Bank Performance Measures - Dependent Variables
The impact of regulation on
1) bank profitability is treated in considerable detail since banks (see results of 
questionnaires in Appendix 3) place considerably more importance on this variable 
than on any other. Tests on the impact of regulation on
2) bank solvency,
3) bank liquidity and
4) bank market share are given detailed treatment where theory and " a priori" 
indications suggest this.
The general form of the equation is adjusted depending on the dependent variable 
being tested, but all the regulatory variables are retained.
In the equation which tests the impact on other measures of bank performance:
(1) excess liquidity which is represented by the term (LIQ)
(2) solvency which is represented by capital and reserves (SOLV)
(3) industry market share, that is, the share of the assets of banks relative to
banks and non-banks represented by the term (MKS)
(4) bank risk, or profit variance, denoted by the term (RISK).
Though the study seeks to measure the impact of regulation on commercial bank 
performance, particularly bank profitability, and does not seek to identify the determinants 
of bank regulation, other variables which influence profitability but which are not regulatory 
are included to improve the goodness of fit. Data are standardised by division by total assets 
in order to minimise the impact of heteroscedasticity on the standard errors of the estimates 
of the regression coefficients.
5.7 Data Constraints
Data differences, data unavailability, and the need to avoid near singularity in the 
correlation matrix required summing variables. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago and 
Jamaica cash and securities requirements are combined in a variable termed the liquid assets
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ratio and the cash reserve requirement itself is part of stipulated liquid assets. The use of a 
single variable also increases the degrees of freedom in those cases where only annual data 
were available.
Much of the data was obtained from annual, quarterly and monthly digests of statistics 
of the regional Central Banks. Time series data on commercial banks and data from the stock 
exchanges in the region provide the main monetary data base for analysis. Data from the 
regional central banks on the type and frequency of monetary tools used over the period 
establish the main tools of monetary policy in the Caribbean over the period 1972-1992. 
Publications of chronological lists of regulatory changes were available from the three central 
banks and with some updating, provided the evidence on regulatory changes. Information on 
prudential aspects of regulation was obtained from the central banks and by an examination 
of the legislation of each country.
The frequency of the data series and the short length of the series in some cases posed 
some difficulties. Data on bank profits for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were available 
only on an annual basis. More frequent data on commercial banks’ assets and liabilities for 
all three countries for the past twenty years were available but could not be put to maximum 
use as banks reported profit data much less frequently. In the Jamaica case, in order to 
establish a series from 1975, since data were only available from the Bank of Jamaica from 
1980, data from the Jamaica Stock Exchange were used. As a result, privately incorporated 
banks (which represent less than one quarter of the market) are not included. Data by bank 
were obtainable only from Barbados and were grouped according to size and ownership 
structure. Individual bank data were only available for banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago whose shares were publicly quoted.
In the Barbados case, data were collected on selected assets and liabilities of all banks 
on a quarterly basis for the period 1972-1992, but because of gaps in quarterly income 
expenditure data during the early period, the final equation covers the period 1977-92.
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Consumer instalment credit was not included as a separate explanatory variable
because it was continually in effect for the entire period and qualitative changes in the 
regulations such as variations in down payments and lengthening or shortening of repayment 
periods were not easily converted to a measurable basis.104 Dummies for hire purchase 
controls were not used because hire purchase controls were continually in effect and this 
would have led to a near singular correlation matrix.
The first and more extensive tests were run on bank profitability as the dependent 
variable.
The order of testing the performance measures is:
1) bank profitability,
2) bank risk, defined here as variability of bank profits,
3) bank liquidity,
4) bank solvency
5) and bank market share relative to non-banks.
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104 Also, when credit controls on volume were removed between 1987 and 1989, hire purchases controls 
which fixed minimum downpayments and maximum repayment periods remained in effect.
5 .8  Stages o f T e s tin g
5 .8 .1  O LS  R egressions -  R e g u la tio n  and B ank P erform ance -  th e  P ro fita b ility  M easure
Preliminary OLS regressions are first run to demonstrate that the inclusion of 
regulatory variables improve the ability of the equation to explain bank profitability.
1. The series are first tested for stationarity (see section 5.8.2).
2. OLS regressions are then run using ungrouped data employing first an equation which 
includes lagged monetary variables only and then another which includes a prudential 
variable, capital. The credit control dummy variable takes effect one quarter after 
announcement.
A constant and three seasonal dummies are included to correct for seasonality.
The equations are of the form:
BTSETA = f(TB, SF,M, CON, RR, LD, I, dumin, dumcr,sl,s2,s3)
(5.9)
2. OLS regressions are also ran on bank data grouped by size and according to local or 
foreign ownership.
3. Tests are also conducted on bank data employing other performance measures.
LIQ = f  (RR,TB ,M,CON,LD,CAPB, dumin dumcr,sl, s2,s3)
RISK = f  (TB, M,SF,RR,CON , LD, dumin, dumcr,sl,s2,s3)
SOLV = f  (TB, M, SF, RR, LD, CON, dumin, dumcr,sl,s2,s3)
MKS = f (TB, SF, M, CON, RR, LD, I, dumin, dumer, si, s2, s3)
( variables are dropped or added as indicated by the testing procedure.)
4. The regulatory variable invoking the greatest response is chosen for causality testing on 
bank profitability.
5. A composite index of bank performance is then developed and applied to test the impact 
of regulatory measures on overall performance.
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(5.10)
(5.11)
(5.12)
(5.13)
6. The same composite index is then applied in causality tests to establish possible causality 
between bank performance and regulation.
7. Causality tests are then run on the composite indices of bank regulation and bank 
performance.
5.8.2 Tests for Stationarity
Tests for stationarity are based on the view [Engle and Granger (1987)] that if a 
model includes only stationary variables then one can assume that estimates are normally 
distributed and confidence intervals can be calculated using the Students t - distribution. 
However, in the presence of non-stationarity, tests applied under such circumstances can lead 
to spurious results. The first requirement for stationarity is that the first and second moments 
are time invariant. The series is therefore said to be 1(0). Where the series are not stationary, 
differencing replaces a global trend by a local trend and a stationary series is constructed. A 
series which is stationary after differencing (d) times is said to be integrated of order (d) and 
X ~  I (d). Where two variables Yt and Xt are non-stationary but the form of stationarity is 
such that their first differences are stationary, then Yt and Xt are said to be integrated of order 
one, and AYt and AXt are 1(0).
Diagnostic tests for stationarity used in the study are the Dickey Fuller(DF) and 
Augmented Dickey Fuller(ADF) tests. The form of the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test used in the 
paper is:
Ayt=a+±>yt_1 +Lzt ( 5 . 1 4 )
The term ut is a white noise error term. When ut serially correlated the augmented Dickey 
Fuller test is applied for k lagged differences. The ADF test is based on the regression
K
a CjAy^j+Uf. ( 5 . 1 5 )
j=i
where k differenced terms on the right hand side are included to correct for autocorrelation 
and a trend is incorporated into (5.14) and (5.15) when testing against the alternative of trend 
stationarity.
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5.8.3 Cointegratkm
The components of a vector xt are said to be cointegrated of order d,b, denoted 
xt,~CI (d,b), if (i) all components of \  are 1(d); and (ii) if there exists a vector a (4= 0) so 
that
zt = o!'xt is ~  I(d-b), b > 0. (5.17)
The vector a is called the cointegrating vector. If zt is stationary, and d-b =0, then the 
cointegration equation can be consistently estimated with ordinary least squares, with any 
variable treated as the dependent variable.
If xt has N components, then there may be more than one cointegrating vector a. It 
is clearly possible for several equilibrium relations to govern the joint behaviour of the 
variables of the variable. The rank of a is r, and is referred to as the cointegrating rank of 
xt. The residuals from the regression will tend to be serially correlated but must be 1(0). This 
can be tested by applying unit root tests to the residuals. Residuals from the cointegrating 
regression are included in a second equation. First differencing is usually required for 
stationarity. The differenced equation is then used to confirm that the OLS residuals are I 
(0). This indicates co integration. Tests used are those provided by Engle and Granger105
(1987). This is the method applied in this study. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the 
presence of cointegration and establishes the reliability of the OLS regression results.
5.8.4 Uniqueness of Vector - Deriving an Error Correction Model
Though a valid cointegrating relationship may exist, it may not be unique. Johansen’s
(1988) procedure is adopted as a means of testing for more than one cointegration 
relationship. It also permits the testing of long run relationships adjusted for shortrun 
changes. It is an expansion of the cointegration approach used by Granger (1983) and Engle 
and Granger (1987). The procedure calls for a vector autoregressive model
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105 Dickey Fuller tests for unit roots assume a process with zero mean and no trend. Where there is a trend 
in the data generating process Augmented Dickey Fuller tests which test for both trended and non-trended 
variables are applied.
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where Xt and et are of dimension (pxl),et ~ N(0,fl), and Dt is a vector of deterministic 
variables such as a constant and dummy variables to account for fixed seasonal effects, and 
the IIs and p are unknown coefficients. The levels model can be reparameterised as
AXt=ILX't_1. . . . AXt_1 +AXt_£+1 +FZl t +Gt ( 5 . 1 9 )
where A is the difference operator, II = (nx -t- .... + n k - I),Zlt is the vector AXt_k+1 ,DtJ and 
II and T are the corresponding coefficients. The II matrix provides information about the long 
term relationships among the series. If the series are stationary and cointegrated, then 0 < 
r= rank II< p and equation (5.19) is an error correction model. In this case, II = ccffi 
where a and (3 are the cointegrating relationships among the series, and (3 are the 
cointegrating vectors.
An error correction model is indicated where the short run impact of regulation on 
bank performance differs from the long run impact. This appears to be the case based on 
responses to questionnaires by banks in the Caribbean (Table 4.12). Such models allow long 
mn components of variables to obey equilibrium constraints where short mn components have 
a flexible dynamic specification. Equations in levels ignore all short mn dynamics, while 
equations in first differences ignore all long run information. Engle and Granger (1987) 
observe that where a cointegration equation exists there exists also an error correction model, 
and vice versa, which takes into account short mn dynamics of the relationship between the 
variables. The error correction model is based on the assertion that a proportion of the 
disequilibrium from one period is corrected in the next period.
A vector time series Xt has an error correction representation if it can be expressed
as
............. + H ( 5 .1 8 )
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where ut is a stationary multivariate disturbance, with A(0)=I, A(I) has all elements finite, 
ZT~u'xT and 7 =(= 0. In this representation only the disequilibrium in the previous period is 
an explanatory variable. However, by rearranging terms, any set of lags of Z can be written 
in this form. Therefore it permits any type of gradual adjustment toward a new equilibrium. 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed an approach which enabled testing of more than one 
cointegration relationship and delivered a clear identification of the error structure of the 
dynamic process. The procedure is based on the following error correction model and is 
applied in some of the test equations employed in the study. Using A = 1 - L where L is the 
lag operator, the error correction model may be written as
A x t=r1A x t_1+ . . . .  +r /c-iAjYt_JC+1 +nx(._i.+jj,+^L>c+et/ ( 5 . 2 1 )
where
r i=-(7-n1-...-n i), (7=1 ,......k-i), (5.22)
and
n=-(/-n1-...-ni). (5.23)
Equation 5.21 is VAR model in first differences except for the presence of the lagged level 
n x t k or error correction term.
The coefficient n  contains the relevant information about the nature of the long run 
relationship among the variables in the vector X. The model enables 3 possible tests for the 
rank of n  whereby
1) Rank II = p, i.e the matrix is of full rank, indicating that the vector process X is
stationary which suggests a levels VAR is an appropriate description of the data.
2) Rank II = 0 i.e. the matrix II is a null matrix and there is no long run information
A(B) ( l - B ) X t= X Z ^  + u,. ( 5 . 2 0 )
giving rise to a traditional differenced VAR.
3) 0 < Rank II = r, where 0 < r < p giving rise to cointegration and implying 
that there are p x r matrices a and b such that II = ah'.
The cointegrating vectors b have the property that b'X is stationary even though Xt itself is 
non-stationary and can be interpreted as an error correction model [Engle and Granger 
(1987)].
Thus the main hypothesis embedded in die hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors
tf2: H =ab' (5-24)
where a and b are p x r matrices.
The weights with which each cointegrating vector enters each of the AXj equations 
are captured through a. Through maximum likelihood estimation, the likelihood ratio statistics 
enables testing of the order of cointegration (r) and restrictions on the parameters of the n  
matrix, i.e a and b.
5.8.5 Use of Diagnostics
Likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis of no more than (r) stationary linear 
combinations of the series versus, respectively, the alternative of possible stationarity of all 
series (that is, r < p) and the alternative of at most (r+ 1) stationary combinations of the 
series are:
- r ] T  ln(l -4>f) (5.25)
i=r+1
and
Distributions of these test statistics depend on the number of unit roots in the model under 
the null hypothesis. Johansen and Juselius (1990).
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Once the number of cointegrating relationships among the series is determined, the 
cointegrating vector(s) are given by the eigenvectors corresponding to the largest eigenvalues,
so for given r,
0 < r < p.
Cointegration LR tests based on the trace of the stochastic matrix are applied as a test 
procedure using the Johansen maximum likelihood procedure for the case of a trend in the 
data generation process.
This methodology was applied to test the relationship between regulatory variables 
and selected measures of bank performance.
5 .8 .6  C a lcu la tin g  a C om posite  M easure o f B ank P erform ance 
U s in g  D is c rim in a n t A n a lys is
Discriminant analysis is the technique used to develop a single composite score, in 
this case, a bank performance score and a bank regulation score. Multiple discriminant 
analysis is the appropriate statistical technique to use when the dependent variable consists of 
more than one group of classifications [Hotteling (1933), Levine (1977) and Hair et al 
(1992)]. The procedure assigns weights to each variable and adds these products together. 
The result is a single composite discriminant score for all individual categories within the 
group. A composite score derived from this procedure is of the form
The usual procedure is to divide the total sample into groups or functions. A covariance or 
correlation matrix is then derived. These can be standardised to produce a correlation matrix 
of standarised variates i.e. the deviation of a variable mean divided by its standard deviation.
(5.27)
Z — atX + S2 Y + a3K (5.28)
Eigenvectors are then derived.105 Using the notation
a linear combination of the X variables is formed, as a linear combination of the Y variables. 
Of the large number of possible linear combinations for each set, coefficients are chosen such 
that the resultant linear combination of the X set variables is maximally correlated with the 
linear combination of the Y set variables. If we let x* and y* be defined by x* = E ajX;, and 
y* =  EbjXj, canonical correlation analysis selects those values for the a;S and b;s such that r*,y* 
is the maximum possible value. Thus we can say that x* represents that combination of X 
set variables which have the highest correlation with any combination of the Y set variables 
and furthermore y* is that combination of the Y variables normally correlated with any X 
combination. Of the large number of linear combinations of the two sets of variables we have 
found that particular pair most highly related to one another. The correlation coefficient 
between x* and y* is termed a canonical correlation.
The eigenvector with the eigenvalue yielding the highest variance is identified as the canonical 
function which contributes to the maximum amount of variation. These are the canonical 
discriminant functions and are identified in descending order of importance.
A structure matrix of component loadings is then developed. Each component loading 
factor represents the correlation coefficient between the canonical discriminant function and 
the set of standardised discriminating variables. Discriminant loadings referred to as structural 
correlations, measure the simple linear correlation between each dependent variable and the 
discriminant function. The solution is rotated to produce a structure which lists the variables 
of each function in the order of its contribution to variability.
A test of the null hypothesis that the means of all discriminant functions in all groups
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z  -  (5.29)
i=1
105 (Any vector, whose direction is unchanged after transformation, is said to be an eigenvector of the 
transformation (or of its associated matrix). The factor by which its length is increased is called the eigenvalue 
of the vector.)
in the population are really equal to 0 can be based on Wilk’s lambda. It provides a test of 
the null hypothesis that the population means are equal. When the significance level using 
the F test or Chi square test, is small (less than 0.05) the hypothesis that all group means are 
equal is rejected.107
The SPSS108 package used for calculation of discriminant functions removes outliers from 
the list of eligible variables, but these can be reintroduced if desired, if it is the intention to 
show the contribution of all variables regardless of their contribution to the composite score. 
The pooled within - group correlation matrix is obtained by averaging the separate correlation 
matrices for all groups and then computing the correlation matrix.
The contribution of a variable to a discriminant function ( its discriminant loading or 
weight) and the relative contribution of the function to the overall solution (a relative measure 
among the eigenvalues of the functions) can then be calculated. It is obtained by dividing the 
component weight of each variable by the corresponding eigenvalue.
The composite is the sum of the overall indices across all significant discriminating 
functions. The weights do not add to unity and may be negative. If this occurs, they can be 
rescaled to unity by adding 1 to each component and multiplying by 100, thus retaining the 
relative distance between coefficients.
Interpretation of the composite measure is useful in depicting the relative position 
such as the rank or order of each variable; in this case an overall bank performance measure. 
A similar bank performance measure called the "Z score" or "Zeta score" currently used by 
banks, investors, stock exchanges as well as regulators, has been developed by Altman (1979, 
1984). Other contributions include those of Altman, Marco and Varetto (1994) Earl and
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107 In discriminant analysis percentage correctly classified is analogous to regression’s R2' It reveals how 
well the statistical function classifies the statistical units. The F test is analogous to the Chi square test of
significance in discriminant analysis.
SPSS statistical package for social sciences108
Marais (1979) and Taffler (1982). However, none was explicitly designed to capture the 
impact of regulation.
Applying this technique, a bank performance index is then calculated for Barbados 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and using similar techniques, an index of regulation. On 
the basis of the similarities of the economies and the similarities in the monetary and 
prudential measures applied in the three countries, the weights calculated for Barbados are 
applied to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and indices of bank performance and indices 
of monetary and prudential regulation are calculated.
Tests for causality are conducted between the more important regulatory variable and the 
more important measure of performance. Similarly, causality tests are conducted between the 
performance index and the regulation index. The procedure for causality testing is described 
below.
5.8.7 Causality Tests
To test the null hypothesis that Y does not cause X, one can apply the direct approach 
which is to regress Xt on X ^ ^ X ^  and Yt_1(...Yt.s, and use a conventional test of exclusion 
restrictions to test the effect of omitting the lagged Y variables. If these exclusion restrictions 
are accepted, then we accept that Y does not cause X. A second method requires a regression 
of Yt on past, current and future values of X. The null hypothesis is still that Y does not 
cause X, but the exclusion restrictions tested are that future values of X may be excluded. If 
these exclusions are accepted, we again accept that Y does not cause X.
The methodology used here is Granger causality tests.
m m
r , = V E  «A -i  +E  (530)
1=1 /=1
In equation (5.30), X is said to cause Y, provided some is not zero and in equation (5.31) 
where Y causes X if some a; is not zero. If both of these events occur there is feedback.
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m m
XrC0+'£ a iY,.l+'£ b JXH*e, 
f=1 J=1
(5.31)
Causality tests are conducted in a bivariate framework since only the most critical 
variable identified in OLS regressions and in the cointegrating equation is chosen for testing. 
The bivariate approach is applied because we are deemed to be investigating prima facie 
causality [Suppes (1970) and Granger (1980)]. A (set of) variable(s) is a prima facie cause 
of another set of variable© Y if X precedes Y in time and if the conditional and 
unconditional probabilities of event Y are unequal, P(Y | X) 4= P(Y). If the relationship is 
linear, this implies that in a regression context, Xt4(i >0) and Yt are correlated. Reliance on 
an extra-statistical framework in which to make causal claims have been made by Zellner 
(1979, 1988), Holland (1986) and Bassmann (1988). They emphasize that the necessary 
conditions for a variable X to be a cause of Y must include an understandable mechanism 
or law relating to X, and Bassman has specified that one must be able to conceive of a 
conceptual experiment relating X and Y in which X is controlled. This is established from 
the mathematical fact that returns on reserve requirements are lower than returns on private 
sector loans, and hence there exists the basis for expectation of a causal impact on bank 
performance.
Two alternatives to a complete search of the lag space are (a) to identify the 
appropriate lag structure for the equations based on some statistical criterion [Hsaio (1981)] 
or b) to specify alternative lag structures, Hsaio’s (1981) research strategy involves selection 
of the "optimal" univariate lag length M*, of the autoregressive null model followed by 
selection of the optimal lag length, n*, conditional upon m=m*, in the full model. The 
structure of the optimal causal model under the alternative hypothesis of prima facie causality 
is given by m* and n* causal model under the alternative hypothesis. Given prior testing and 
prior indications of lag length, the alternative approach of using an iterative method for 
arriving at an optimal lag length is used in this study.
The test for causality applied is based on an F statistic that is calculated by estimating the
expression below in both the constrained and unconstrained forms. 
Where:
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SSEr-SSEu /m 
SSEU l(T-2m-1)
(5 .3 2 )
Where SSEr,SSEu = residual sum of squares of the restricted and unrestricted models 
respectively
T = number of observations 
m = number of lags.
The above procedures are described in the order in which they are employed in the ensuing 
analysis.
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Introduction
This chapter establishes that improved results can be obtained for determining the 
factors which influence bank performance when such models include regulatory variables. In 
the tests that follow, OLS regressions are conducted using the profitability measure as the 
dependent variable. Cointegration tests are employed and error correction models. 
Maximum likelihood estimates [Johansen and Juselius (1990)] are developed where economic 
theory would suggest that a long run relationship exists which can be further explained by this 
procedure. This is likely to be the case for two of the measures of bank performance, bank 
profitability and market share. Tests are conducted first for Barbados, then for Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago. Other regressions formulated as reaction functions analyse the impact 
of regulation on bank risk, bank liquidity and bank solvency. In each case, comparative 
testing is conducted for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Discriminant analysis is then 
employed to develop composite measures of bank performance and of regulation, and 
causality tests are conducted on the performance and regulation indices and on reserve 
requirements and bank performance.
The study focuses on the economics of the relationships between variables. Given 
the wide range of comparative tests to be conducted, econometric techniques are used simply 
as a means of establishing such relationships. More extensive testing is employed using the 
measure of bank profitability, before tax profit plus staff expenses (BTSETA), as it is the 
only measure of bank profitability without negative values and so facilitates testing in 
loglinear form. Tests using other measures of bank profitability are performed more sparingly 
and are frequently reported in the appendices. Variables are retained in the equations even 
though they are not significant in order to demonstrate their lack of significance.
6.2 Bank Profitability - The Barbados Case
6.2.1 Preliminary Testing
In preliminary testing using OLS regressions the conventional variables used by
Chapter 6
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Bourke (1988) and Hannan (1991) in the determination of bank performance were employed, 
that is, regulatory variables were excluded. [Typically such variables are money or deposits, 
interest rates, investments (securities), staff expenses, and inflation]. When regulatory 
variables were added and new regressions run, results establish that equations which include 
regulatory variables have considerably more explanatory power. All regulated monetary 
variables were significant (see Appendix 6.1).
6.2.2 Profitability as the Dependent Variable
The testing procedure then commenced with tests for stationarity. Plots of each 
variable were conducted to establish whether each was trend stationary or a random walk with 
drift. Dickey -Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were employed to test for 
stationarity. Where stationarity changed as lags were added, regression on a constant, a 
trend, a lagged level, and a differenced value of the dependent variable was conducted. Tests 
for autocorrelation were then performed to confirm whether the variable was really 1(0) or 
1(1). Such variables carry the symbol in Table 6.1. For example, in the case of the 
variable LBTSETA, which unit root tests showed to be 1(0) for ADF1 and 1(1) for ADF2, 
ADF3 and ADF4, tests for autocorrelation revealed that LBTSETA was an 1(1) variable 
(having a X2 LM value of 8.54(.073) for ADF(3)). ADF tests indicated that of the other 
variables, five were 1(0), the concentration ratio (LCON) and interest rate spreads (LI), staff 
expenses (LSF), treasury bill yields (LTB) and the loans deposit ratio (LD). Two were 1(1); 
money supply (LM) and reserve requirements (LRR). First differencing of these variables was 
therefore necessary to achieve stationarity. Below are the calculated values of the Dickey- 
Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests used for comparison with critical values (see Table 
6.1).
Critical Dickey-Fuller values were- 2.9077 (non-trended) and -3.4812 (trended) and 
ADF values are -2.9084 (non trended) and -3.4824 (trended) and were computed using the 
formula provided by MacKinnon (1990).
A long run cointegating equation was estimated for profitability as the dependent 
variable in logs and was of the form
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LBTSETA = c + XjLTB + x2LSF +x3LM+ x4LCON + x5LRR +x6LLD + x7LI + 
djdumin + d2dumcr + 7^1 + 72s2 + 73s3 (6 .1)
Where (BTSETA) = return on assets plus staff expenses.
A test for unit roots was conducted on the residuals of the cointegrating vector which was 
derived from the equation above. The cointegrating equation represents the long run model 
and the coefficients are interpreted as long run elasticities (see Table 6.2).
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Table 6.1
D ickey-Fuller (DF) and Augm ented D ickey-Fuller (AD F) Tests -  Part 1
Variable D ickey- 
Fuller (D F) 
(logs)
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
(A D F ) (logs)
First
Differences
DF
First
Differences
A D F
LTB(N T) -1.5890 -2.5743 -4.2815 ’ -3.3928
L M (T ) -1.9732 -1.8836 ! -8.1323 -7.24448
LSF(T) -4.7574 -3.5485 -12.3510 -10 .6764
L R R (T ) -3.0000 -2.1857 -10.3659 -6.5716
LC O N (T ) -7.8548 -5.4358 -13.4130 -9.3289
LI(N T) -6.2140 -3.9740 -13.5987 -7.4991
L L D (T ) -2.9001 -3.1813 -7.4217 -7.8468
LBTSETA*
(T)
-4.9218 -2.1377
(A D F 3)
-11.3919 -10.3042
(T) denotes a trend in the data series and (NT) denotes a non- trended series)
(The prefix (L) before the variable denotes the loglinear form)
A test of the residual is of the form
Au=put 1 + E  p Aut +et (^ .3 )
M
H0: p =0 
H,p < 0
MacKinnon (1990) tables were used as a guide for computing critical values and 
the results of these regressions also prove useful in selecting the vector of relevance in
maximum likelihood estimates later in the study.
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The calculated ADF1 value of the residual was -5.30, thus rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. This test is based on the assumption that a system is 
cointegrated if a linear combination of 1(0) and 1(1) variables is also 1(0) [Engle and Granger 
(1987)]. Results from the cointegrating equation are presented in Table 6.2.
The residuals from the cointegrating equation were fed into a second equation in first 
differences utilising the Engle-Granger two-step approach to derive an error correction model 
(ECM), and lags were added. The ECM combines long run effects as well as short run 
dynamics. The coefficient of these residuals was significant and negative and had a value of - 
.715. The residual of the ECM was also white noise based on the Box Pierce Q statistic of 
19.82 which was less than a X2 value for 20 degrees of freedom at the 95% quantile of 
31.41. This suggests that the error correction model was not misspecified and that the relevant 
factors were included in the error term.
Diagnostic tests were conducted to confirm whether the linear regression analysis 
satisfied classical assumptions of homoscedasticity and serial correlation of the unobservable 
disturbance term. Tests for serial correlation employ Durbin-Watson tests for non­
autocorrelated errors and the Lagrange multiplier tests [Breusch and Pagan (1980). The 
normality of residuals test applied is a test of skewness and kurtosis based on Bera and Jarque 
(1980). The test for heteroscedasticity is a simple test of the homoscedasticity assumption that 
the disturbances \\ have a constant variance and provides an LM test of 7 = 0 in the model
B(u?) = e2,= e2+ Y(x,'p 
Such a test is also robust with respect to non-normality of the disturbances.
A test for functional form employs Ramsey’s (1969) RESET test for the case of the 
square of the fitted values and a test for heteroscedasticity is based on the regression of 
squared residuals on squared fitted values. There was no evidence of heteroscedasticity. 
There was however some slight serial correlation of the residual using the X2 LM version so 
that the results of the F version were relied upon. Kiviet (1985) notes that in small samples 
the F version is more reliable.
Results indicate that independent variables are associated with 62% of the variation 
in commercial bank profitability measured by the adjusted multiple coefficient of 
determination in the long run.
6.2.3 Results of Tests Excluding Capital (a prudential variable)
Results indicate that two monetary measures impact adversely on bank profitability 
both in the ECM and in the long run model (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). The coefficients for two 
of the regulatory variables representing monetary regulation, i.e. credit controls and reserve 
requirements, were significant at the 5% level and were negatively associated with bank 
profitability.
In the long run model for every 10% increase in reserve requirements there was a 4% 
decline in bank profitability. The views of Romer (1985) and Osborne and Zaher (1992) that 
equity holders bear some of the costs of increases in reserve requirements tend to be 
supported by the results. This negative association of reserve requirements with profitability 
implies an adverse impact on equity holders, (since profits become the property of equity 
holders on declaration of dividends). The absence of a stock market precluded direct 
measurement of the impact on shareholder wealth and the above relationship is deduced from 
the association of regulatory measures with bank profitability. Generally, results using the 
profitability measure (ROA) unequivocally support the view of a negative impact of reserve 
requirements and credit controls on bank profitability as well as the hypothesis of cost- 
axiomatic pricing (see Table 6 .6).
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Barbados 
Results: Cointegrating Equation 
Bank Profitability (LBTSETA) - A Long Run Model 
(excluding capital)
Table 6.2
DESCRIPTION Coefficient
C -1.51 (-3.15)
LTB .226 (3.95)
LSF .004 (.002)
L M .179 (1.76)
LCO N 1.79 (3.45)
LR R -.409 (-2.35)
LLD -.233 (-.748)
LI .275 (2.21)
dumin .171 (4.21)
dumcr -.115 (-2.74)
R2 .690
R  bar squared .617
D .W . 1.97
F statistic (12 ,51) 9.46
s.e. .110
M isspecification M SI [X 2 (1)] M S2 
[F (1,50]
4.11 3.43
Normality N [X 2 (2) 1.36
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) F [1.62] .023 .022
Serial Correlation X 2 (4), F  [4,47] .439 .081
(t-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients). 
(Results are based on quarterly data 1977ql to 1992 q4)
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Table 6.3
Barbados 
Results: Error Correction M odel 
Bank Profitability (DIJBTSETA) 
(excluding capital)
DESCRIPTION
C -.538 (-1.80)
LTB 1.92 (2.15)
LSF .593 (1.69)
D L M 1.92 (2.15)
LCO N .145 (2.15)
D L R R t.3 -.690 (-2.43)
LLD .568 (.787)
LIm -.219 (-1.31)
residt., -.715 (-3.13)
dumin^ .028 (.403)
dumcrt4 -.049 (-.809)
R 2 .408
R  bar squared .287
D .W . 2.29
F statistic (10 ,49) 3.38
s.e. .157
M isspecification M SI [X 2 (1)] 
M S2 [F (1,47]
1.26 1.03
Normality N [X 2 (2) 4.21
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) 
F [1,58]
3.93 4.06
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) F 
[4,44]
11.35 2.63
(t-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients).
(Results are based on quarterly data from 1977ql to 1992q4)
The conclusion that reserve requirements constrain the size of the banking firm is also 
inferred from the results. To the extent that equity is needed to match increases in bank size, 
and since reserve requirements reduce internally generated equity financing, the views of 
Ramakhrisnan and Thakor (1984) and Osborne and Zaher (1992) that reserve requirements 
constrain the size of the banking firm are supported by the results. This conclusion remains 
tentative and more specific results will depend on causality tests to be conducted later in the 
chapter.
Similarly, results show that the imposition of credit controls was associated 
with a .79 % decline in bank profitability. Since the dummy credit control variable is retained 
in the ECM, the calculation of its long run effect on BTSETA was adjusted.
Generally,
residt=yt-  +dicxnt (6.3a)
From Table 6.2
residhl =  LBTSETAhl -(-1.51+.226LIB^ +.004LSt lF  +.179LM,-,409LRRt I - 
.233LLDhl+.275Uhl+ . 171duminhl-J15dumcrJ (6.3b)
In general form
reside =LBTSETAtA -C-dfTBt  ^-a^SFt_^ .... andumcrt_1 (6.3c)
Solving the ECM in Table 6.3 for the long run solution we obtain:
O — O ~.715(LBTSETA 171dumin - .115dumcr)+ .028dwnin -
,049dtmicr (6.3d)
The effect of the variables (dumin) and (dumcr) on BTSETA is calculated as
.171-(.028/-.715) 
and -.115-(-.049/-.715)
= .21 (dumin) and - .79 (dumcr) respectively 
The credit control variable was more strongly negative in the ECM formulation.
The observed slow response in utilising leasing arrangements could help to explain this 
outcome. In addition, investors are not likely to take decisions to establish non-banking arms
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in competition with banks if monetary controls are thought to be temporary. (In Barbados 
credit controls were in effect continuously for approximately 10 years before they were 
temporarily removed).
The coefficient of the interest rate control dummy variable was positive both in the 
long ran and in the ECM adjusted for short run dynamics, and was significant at the 1 % level 
in the long ran model. This result, combined with a positive and significant coefficient for 
the actual interest rate spread, favours an interpretation of accommodative interest rate- setting 
by authorities. It suggests that while the size of interest rate spreads influences bank 
profitability, the level at which regulators set rates tends to accommodate banks’ cost 
structures such that interest rate regulation does not necessarily depress bank profitability. It 
supports the argument of cost-axiomatic or accommodative pricing by regulators. Whether 
accommodative pricing by regulators was the result of bargaining determines whether this 
system of pricing can be considered an example of Aumann-Shapley prices [Aumann and 
Shapley (1974)]. Based on responses to questionnaires submitted by commercial banks, no 
overt bargaining was, however, evident in the setting of interest rates as is required for 
Aumann Shapley prices to exist; so that to the extent that prices were market clearing, they 
may rather be considered anonymously equitable, or cost-axiomatic. A positive association 
of interest rate controls with bank profitability would suggest accommodative pricing, but 
whether pricing as market-clearing is more difficult to confirm, so that the most definitive 
position on the pricing structure of interest rates indicated by the result is that at the 
minimum, pricing was accommodative. Accommodative pricing is a subset of cost-axiomatic 
pricing. However, an indication that pricing is market clearing or anonymous equitable (see 
Chapter 2) does not require that the interest rate spread variable be significant. Neutrality 
of this coefficient would appear to be sufficient.
Generally, results on bank profitability (Table 4.1) tend to support the views of 
commercial banks with respect to reserve requirements and credit controls, that is, that they 
impact negatively on bank profitability (see Table 4.1). However, results do not support 
commercial banks’ views that interest rate controls impact negatively on bank profitability 
(Appendix 4.c and Table 4.1).
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6.2.4 Results of Tests: Including the Prudential Variable
A similar equation using BTSETA as the dependent profitability variable was run and 
included capital and reserves. Given the branch type operations which dominate the banking 
system in Barbados, an adjusted measure of capital, namely capital reserves and long term 
borrowing was substituted. This is justified on the basis that though branch banks engage in 
substantial long term borrowing from overseas head offices to support their operations they 
are not required to hold capital locally.
The cointegrating equation was put in log linear form.
LBTSETA = ao + arfTB + a2LM + a3LRR +a4LLD + a5LSF + a6LCON +a7LI 
+ a8LCAPB + dt dumin + d2dumcr +yjSl +y2s2 +y3s3 (6.4)
where L denotes the log of the variable and CAPB represents capital, reserves and long term 
borrowing and is 1(1). CAPB is a trended variable and has a calculated ADF 1 value of -5.39 
compared to a critical value of -3.48 as per the Augmented Dickey Fuller test statistic.
When capital is included among the independent variables, reserve requirements are 
not as significant in the long ran, but continue to carry a negative sign on the coefficient and 
is less than unity (-.62). Credit control carried a negative sign in the ECM and was significant 
at the 5 % level but was not significant in the long ran model though the sign was negative. 
In the long run the variable representing capital reserves and long term borrowing was 
significant at the 5% level and negatively associated with bank profitability (Table 6.4) but 
was neither negative nor significant in the model adjusted for short run dynamics. The 
adjusted variable for capital and long term borrowings CAPB reflects borrowing abroad by 
branch banks to finance their operations. Significant foreign borrowings by commercial banks 
in 1981 and 1990, both years in which reserve requirements were increased, and would tend 
to support this result. However, in the long ran, increased capital and borrowing appears to 
have been at the expense of profitability and supports the views of banks interviewed in 
Barbados as well as in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, that capital requirements tend to 
reduce bank profitability (see Appendix 4.d and Table 4.1).
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6.2.5 Non-regulatory Variables
Results tend to confirm that profitability increases with market concentration. This 
is inferred from the positive and significant coefficient on the concentration variable and 
applies both in the long run model and in the ECM, suggesting that bank profitability of the 
system appears to increase with the level of oligopoly as judged by concentration.
6.2.6 Other Profitability Measures
Subsequent testing in levels was conducted on profitability measured by (ROA) return 
on assets. ( Negative numbers in the series did not permit use of the loglinear form).
This equation was of the general form
ROA = ao + a/TB + a2SF + a3M + a4CON + a5RRt_3 + a^D + a7It.! + d^umin  ^ + 
d2dumcrt.1 + \ 1sl + ^ 2  + A3s3 (6.2)
and results of the error correction model (ECM) are shown in Table 6 .6 .
Using the measure of bank profitability (ROA), where staff expenses are not added 
back to profits, staff expenses are revealed to vary negatively with return on assets but are 
not significant (Table 6 .6)109. Results do not therefore support the view of Edwards (1977) 
that commercial banks earning supernormal profits engage in suboptimal expenditures even 
in the absence of a definition of "supernormal" profits.
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109 The significance o f  this variable would have been offset by  the process o f  adding back.
Results: Including Capital as a Prudential Variable 
Bank Profitability - The Cointegrating Equation - a Long Run Model
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Table 6.4
Barbados
D ESCRIPTION LBTSETA
C -1.176 (-.235 )
LTB .092 1.05
LSF -.062 (-.241 )
L M .083 (.746)
L C O N .198 (3.83)
L R R -.139 (-.62)
LLD -.266 (-.875 )
LI .229 (1.85)
LCAPB -.14 (-2 .06)
dumin .101 (1.84)
dumcr -.063 (-1 .26)
R2 .710
R  bar squared .634
D .W . 2.07
F statistic 9.42
s.e. .108
M isspecification M S I [X 2 (1)] M S2 [F 4.31 3.84
(1,50]
Normality N [X 2 (2)] 1.92
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) F [1,62] .034 .033
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) F [4,47] .695 .126
(T-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients)
(R esults are based on quarterly data from  1977ql to 1992q4)
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Barbados Table 6 .5
Results: Engle - Granger Two-Step 
Error Correction Model - All Banks- DLBTSETA 
(includes capital as a prudential variable)
DESCRIPTION Value
C -.563 (-1 .80)
LTB .044 (.631)
LSF .520 (1.49)
D L M 1.89 (1.99)
LCO N .155 (2.19)
D L R R t.3 -.639 (-2 .24)
LLD .474 (.615)
L I,, .212 (-1 .26)
D LC A PB t., .073 (.458)
RESIDtl -.815 (-3.33)
duinint.! -.029 (-.411)
dumcrt., -.053 (-1 .976)
R2 .423
R  bar squared .291
D .W . 2.22
F statistic (11 ,48) 3.21
s.e. .157
M isspecification M SI [X 2 (1)] M S2 
[F (1,47]
2.91 2.39
Normality N [X 2 (2)] 5 .58
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) F 
[1,47]
2 .55 2.58
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) F  [4,44] 11.17 2.52
(T-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients).
(The prefix "D " denotes first differences and the prefix "L" denotes logs. 
(Results are based on quarterly data from  1977ql to 1992q4).
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Table 6,6
Barbados 
Other Measures of Bank Profitability 
ROA (Return on Assets) - ECM
DESCRIPTION R O A  (in  levels)
C -.521 (-2.00)
TB .019 (2.40)
DSF -.165 (-.379)
D M .006 ( 1.49)
CON .009 (4.01)
d r R|_3 -.044  (-2 .76)
LD .614 (.868)
L i .193 (1.56)
RESIDt., .261 (1.39)
dumint.[ .125 (2.23)
dumcrt_, -.104  (-2.10)
R 2 .498
R  bar squared .398
D .W . 1.81
F statistic 4.98
s.e. .131
M isspecification M SI [X 2 (1)] M S2 
[F (1,49]
1.19 .978
Normality N [X 2 (2)] 2.93
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) F 
[1,59]
.796 .780
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) F [4,46] 17.65 4.68
(This regression was run in levels)
(T-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients)
(Results are based on quarterly data from  1977ql - 1992q4).
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6.2.7 Maximum Likelihood Estimates : (Including Capital and Long Term Borrowing as a 
Prudential Variable Johansen Procedure)
The error correction model which included capital as a prudential variable carried a 
higher adjusted multiple coefficient of correlation than that which included monetary variables 
only, and the capital variable was significant and negative in the long run. This outcome 
suggests that prudential considerations need to be taken into account in the setting of monetary 
regulations. The II matrix of the Johansen procedure permits further investigation of the 
interrelationship between these variables. Since the only other regulatory variable which is 
1(1) is the reserve requirement variable, the analysis will focus on the relationship between 
this variable and adjusted capital (CAPB). The 1(1) variables are LBTSETA, LM, LRR ,^ 
LCAPB  ^the 1(0) variables were LCON, LI, LTB dumin ,^ dumcr ,^ si, s2, s3.uo
Table 6.7 presents results of cointegration LR tests based on maximal eigenvalues of the 
stochastic matrix.
Table 6.7
Cointegration LR Tests based on Maximal Eigenvalues of the Stochastic Matrix
Null Alternative Statistic 95%  Critical Value
r =  0 r =  1 58.27 27.07
r <  =  1 r =  2 20.00 20.96
r <  =  2 r =  3 31.19 14.06
r =  3 r =  4 4.54 3.76
Results based on the trace were similar. The VAR is of order 4.
110 Regression on a constant a trend and a lagged level o f  BTSETA indicate that this variable is 1(1). It also 
becomes 1(1) for tests o f  AD F3 and AD F4.
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Table 6.8
Maximum Likelihood Procedure : Cointegration LR Test based on the Trace of the 
Stochastic Matrix
Null Alternative Statistic 95%  Critical Value
r =  0 r >  =  1 58.27 27.06
r <  =  1 r >  =  2 20 .00 20.96
r <  =  2 r >  =  3 13.19 14.07
r <  =  3 r >  =  4 4.54 3.76
Cointegration LR tests based on maximal eigenvalues of the stochastic matrix and 
cointegration LR tests based on the trace of the stochastic matrix both indicate that there is 
one vector holding the system together. However, the area of interest is the II matrix reported 
by ab' (see equation 5.24). The cointegrating vector has already been identified employing 
the Engle- Granger two step methodology, so that this step may be omitted.
Table 6.9
Estimated Long Run Matrix: Johansen Estimation
LBTSETA L M LR R jjj L C A P B t_i
LBTSETA -.26573 .74588 1.1571 .18897
L M .047368 -.13296 .20626 -.033687
LR R t.3 -.012971 .03649 -.056480 .0092246
LCAPB,.! -.013430 .037696 -.058477 .0095506
( The prefix (L) denotes the logl inear form of the variable)
The objective is to examine the relationship between the variables more especially between
the regulatory variable reserve requirements (RR) and adjusted capital (CAPB) with a view 
to examining possible conflicts between prudential and monetary regulation. The relationship 
turns out to be positive and has a coefficient of .06 (see Table 6.9). Results provide a 
reasonable comparison with results obtained from a simple correlation coefficient of .04, but 
conflict with results of the long run model from the cointegrating equation which showed a 
negative correlation between capital and bank profitability in the long run and suggested a 
possible conflict with prudential objectives.
6.2.8 Tests of Partitioned Data by Bank Grouping - Bank Profitability: Barbados
The data set was partitioned in order to test whether regulatory resilience was greater 
for large banks than for small or for foreign banks than for local. Other hypotheses relating 
to the relative profitability of large and small banks are also considered in the analysis. The 
variables were plotted to establish whether each series was trended or non-trended and 
Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were conducted. Results of those tests can 
be seen in Table 6.10.
In Table 6 .10 the prefix (LA) denotes large banks and the prefix (SM) denotes small 
banks. (LAMKS) therefore denotes the market share of large banks, and (SMMKS) denotes 
the market share of small banks. These are measured as that group’s share in the total assets 
of all banks. A variable representing deposits of the group (DEP) is substituted for broad 
money (M) in the equation used earlier for all banks. All other symbols are the same as 
employed for the consolidated banking system in earlier equations with prefixes added to 
denote the appropriate bank group.
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D ickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests -  Part 2
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Table 6.10
Large Banks D F (logs) AD F (logs) First D ifferences 
(D F)
First
Differences
(A D F )
LA LB TSE TA (T) -9.5034 -6.3081 -14 .8700 -10.3814
L A LD E P  (N T) -3.8922 -2.0275 -14.2641 -6.8897
L A L M K S(T ) -7.3207 -3.6831 -16.4932 -8.2347
L A L L D (N T ) -6.8929 -4.7724 -12 .9524 -7.7309
L A L S F (T ) -4.9953 -3.5915 -12.3201 -13.7260
L A L I(N T ) -7.9651 -5.4375 -13.6748 -9.3323
Small Banks
SM LBTSETA(T) -4.9049 -3.6572 -11 .9512 -9.2892
SM LD EP(T) -4.4169 -2.7848 -10.8989 -8 .2434
SM LM K S(T) -5.7457 -5.0778 -10.4160 -8.2161
SM L L D (T ) -3.7909 -2.7848 -10.0139 -6 .2380
SM LI(N T) -6.8549 -4.3029 -13.8389 -8.6462
SM LR R (T) -4.0866 -3.1096 -10.6807 -7.3367
SM LSF(T) -7.2453 -5.0551 -13.1956 -10.3016
In the test equation for large banks four of the variables were trended and four were trend 
stationary (Table 6.10 shows DF and ADF values for the new variables only). Equations 
were run in loglinear form for large banks, small banks, and foreign banks, employing the 
measure of bank profitability (BTSETA). An equation in levels was employed for local banks.
A cointegrating equation was formulated and was of the general form
LBTSETA = ao+ atLTB -fafrSF + a3LDEP +a4LMKS + a5LRR 
+a6LDD +a7LLI + djdumin + d2dumcr + 7^1 + 72s2 + 73s3 (6 .6)
Residuals from the three equations were all stationary, estimated by critical values in tables 
provided by Mackinnon 1990. Calculated values were more negative than the critical values 
and the series were therefore cointegrated. The calculated values were:
-6.55622 for large banks 
-5.3687 for small banks 
-5.3057 for foreign banks.
The residual was then included in a second equation in first differences to derive an Engle - 
Granger two step error correction model. For large banks that equation is of the general form
LLABTSETA = a«,+ afrLATB ri-a^LASF + agDLLADEP +a4LLAMKS + a5DLLARRt.3 
+ a6DLLALD + a7DLLAIt_! + RESID t_, + d jd u m in ^  + d 2dum crt_1 (6.7)
The equation for small banks ( prefix SM) is given by
LSMBTSETA = a^  a^SMTB TafrSMSF + a3DLSMDEP +a4LSMMKS + a5DLSMRRt3 
+a6DLSMLD +a7DLSMLIt.j + RESID t.t + d1dumint.1 + d^umcr^
(6.8)
and the equation for foreign banks is given by
DLNLBTSETA = a*,* afrNLTB +a2LNLSF + a3DLNLDEP +a4DLNLMKS + a5LNLRRt.3 
+ a6DLNLLD +a7DLNLLIt_! + RESID t_, + djdumin^  + d^umcr^
(6.9)
The first letter denotes the first difference and the second the log and the following two the 
identify the group. Seasonal dummies are added to equations (6.7), (6 .8) and (6.9).
Coefficients of the residuals from the cointegrating equations were: for large banks -.325 
(t-value -1.94), for small banks -.749 (t-value -4.31) and foreign banks -.807 (t-value - 
4.34).
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6.2.9 Profitability: Large Banks: Barbados
The results of the long run equation for large banks was as follows
LABTSETA = -960-.006LLATB +.407 LLASF + .009LLADEP + .040LLAMKS 
(-.358) (-1.011) (2.34) (.019) (.146)
-.354LLARR -.072 LALD -.018LAI -.032 dumin -.47dumcr 
(-3.55) (-.270) (-.421) (-.567) (-.902)
The coefficients of the cointegrating equation represent long run elasticities and the 
coefficients of the ECM provide the short run impact. The results of the ECM are shown 
in Table 6.12.
Reserve requirements continued to be negatively associated with bank profitability, 
even of large banks. The elasticity coefficient was -.32 in the model adjusted for short run 
dynamics. Interest rate controls and credit limits did not affect the profitability of large banks 
in the long run suggesting that for large banks regulatory resilience was rather strong. The 
presence of a local bank in this bank group contributed to a problem of normality in the 
series. Results suggest that larger banks may be able to cushion some of the impact of 
regulation on profitability. Also, inspection of the data indicates that large banks tend to be 
less profitable than small banks - a result which supports the views of Benston (1973) and 
Rhodes and Savage (1981) that large banks experience little in the way of economies of 
scale.111 The market share variable for large banks was positive but not significant. A 
positive and significant sign would have been necessary to support the above view, but lack 
of significance of this variable did not permit its rejection for the Barbados case.
6.2.10 Profitability: Small Banks: Barbados
Similar equations were run for small banks (denoted by prefix SM), where the prefix 
(L) denotes the loglinear form. The long run cointegrating equation is given by 
LSMBTSETA = .602 +.674LSMTB +.062LSMSF +.294LSMDEP +• .465LSMMKS
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111 The outturn for  this group may have been influenced by the presence o f  a government ow ned Bank in 
this category w hich was not subject to the same capital criteria as other banks.
(.082) (4.31) (.187) (.372) (.464)
-.431LSMRR- - . 125LSMLD -.014LSMI + .38dumin - .32dumcr
(-1.42) (-1.86) (-.374) (2.35) (-3.35)
Where the symbols are as before, treasury bill yields(TB), staff expenses (SF), deposits 
(DEP) market share (MKS) in the case of the group this refers to the market share of the 
group, reserve requirements (RR), loans deposit ratio (LD), interest rate spreads (I), the 
interest rate control variable (dumin) and the credit control variable (dumcr).
Results of the corresponding error correction model are displayed in Table 6.12.
Diagnostic results disclosed no signs of serial correlation using either the Durbin Watson 
tests for non autocorrelated errors or the Lagrange multiplier test [Breusch and Pagan (1980)] 
and no sign of heteroscedasticity based on the regression of the residuals on squared fitted 
values.
Small banks were most affected by credit controls. This variable was significant at 
the 5% level, its effect on BTSETA was -.74, after adjusting to take account of its inclusion 
both in the cointegrating equation and in the ECM (see methodology at page 194). It was 
negatively associated with bank profitability. As with the entire banking system, interest rate 
controls were positively associated with bank profitability, again contradicting the generally 
held view of commercial banks that interest rate setting by authorities adversely impacts on 
bank profitability. There was some evidence of a problem of normality in the series and using 
the method of variable deletion it was attributed to the market share variable and seems 
related to the take-over of a bank by a small bank.
6.2.11 Profitability: Foreign Banks: Barbados
Similar regressions were run for foreign banks. Results of the cointegrating equation 
in loglinear form provided long run elasticities and was as follows.
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LNLBSETA = -6.73 -.433 LNLTB -.536LNLSF + 1.48LNLDEP -1.84 LNLMKS 
(-2.73) (-5.26) (-1.46) (+2.94) (-2.06)
-.401LNLRR +.711 LNLLD -.38LNLI + .074 dumin - .185 dumcr 
(-1.82) (1.70) (-1.76) (.765) (-2.22)
Where the prefix L denotes the log and the prefix NL denotes non-local or foreign. 
Additional tests for stationarity relevant to foreign and local banks are presented in Table 
6.11.
LNLBTSETA denotes profits before tax plus staff expenses of foreign banks and 
LNDEP denotes deposits as a ratio of total assets of foreign banks. LNLMKS denotes market 
share of foreign banks. All other variables are the same except that the prefixes L and NL 
are added to denote log linear form and application to foreign banks. The 1(1) variables are 
LNLTBR, LNLTDPA, LNLMKS LNLRR, LNLLD, LNLI and LNLSF.
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Table 6.11
Dickey - Fuller and Augmented Dickey - Fuller Tests - Part 3
Variable
DF (Logs) ADF (logs) First Diff 
DF
First Diff 
(ADF)
Foreinn Banks
LNLBTSETA (NT) -5.3497 -3.4064 -14.2631 -11.2106
LNLMKS (T) -2.0341 -1.9129 -9.6019 -5.1711
LNLRR(T) -3.6892 -2.4041 -11.7522 -6.9961
LNLLD(T) -2.9166 -2.7747 -8.9081 -7.6727
LNLI(NT) -2.9454 -2.1829 -10.6286 -6.6162
LNLSF(T) -3.2231 -4.4276 -14.2130 -9.4367
LNLDEP(T) -5.8620 -2.7018 -17.0038 -7.0912
Local Banks
LBCBTSETA(NT) -8.2739 -5.6210 -13.1585 -9.5003
LBCSF(NT) -13.7269 -4.0404 -3.9130 -3.4875
LBCMKS(NT) -8.3972 -2.1892 -23.1372 -8.9994
LBCRR(T) -2.6832 -2.0476 -9.6543 -6.0871
LBCLD(T) -2.8259 -4.5307 -13.1913 -5.2691
LBCI(NT) -4.9579 -1.3699 -15.7772 -3.4875
"Diff" is a shortened torm of difference. 1Tie prefix (BC) denotes local banks and (NL)
foreign banks.
Results indicate that both in the long mn and the short run, required secondary 
reserve requirements have punitive implications for the profitability of foreign banks. The 
t-value was significant and negative at the 5% level, and its elasticity was .40 in the long run 
model. Increasing size seemed to be associated with declining profitability of foreign banks 
in the long run model as indicated by the coefficient of the market share variable which was 
negative and significant. Credit controls were negatively associated with the profitability of 
foreign banks, but interest rate controls did not seem to influence the profitability of foreign 
banks, either negatively or positively.
This equation tended to explain approximately one third of the fluctuations in bank 
profitability. However, since the objective of the exercise is not to formulate the determinants 
of bank profitability but rather to establish whether the selected variables influenced bank 
performance, the low multiple coefficient of determination simply indicated that regulatory 
variables do not explain all changes in bank profitability.
6.2.12 Local Banks: Barbados
Modelling local banks proved very difficult, as local banks, among which is a 
government owned bank, did not seem to respond to the same impulses as other commercial 
banks. A levels model was used for the modelling of local banks because of the negative 
numbers in the series. Most diagnostics for local banks were acceptable but there was some 
abnormality in this series for the reason mentioned earlier.
In the case of local banks a cointegrating equation and an Engle -Granger two-step 
error correction model were employed. The result for reserve requirements was quite 
perverse. Most significantly, reserve requirements were positively associated with the 
profitability of local banks. This was the only category of bank where profitability was not 
negatively associated with reserve requirements. Government securities appear to have 
constituted a major income earning asset for local banks implying that returns on non - 
government held assets of local banks are relatively lower than those of foreign banks, so that 
higher reserve requirements would not have reduced profitability since earnings for the bank 
as a whole were lower. Also, the positive association of reserve requirements with bank 
profitability of local banks suggests that there might be a deposit-maximising aspect of reserve 
requirements with respect to local banks [Courakis (1984)3 and that depositors may have felt 
safer in placing funds with local banks as reserve requirements increased (see Chapter 2).
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Credit controls were however negatively associated with the profitability of local 
banks and suggest that, like small banks this category of bank depended rather heavily on 
credit to the personal sector, a controlled category of credit.
The interest rate coefficient, was positive but was not sufficiently significant to 
confirm the hypothesis of cost-axiomatic pricing. Generally, bank regulation explained the 
profitability of local banks to a much lesser extent than that of other banks or of the system 
as a whole. The negative sign of the market share variable suggests that local banks become 
less profitable as they increase in size and may indicate premature expansion of local banks.
While the equation was cointegrated (the ADF for the residual from the cointegrating 
equation was -5.556 compared with a critical value of -2.91) there was considerable 
abnormality in the series and results of the ECM are not therefore reported. Though results 
of the long run cointegrating equation are reported, results must be interpreted as only 
tentative (Table 6.13).
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Regulation and Profitability -  Barbados 
Regression Results for  Large, Small and Foreign banks -  E C M  M odels (logs)
T able 6 .1 2
Description LAR G E (LA ) SM A LL (SM ) FOREIGN(N L)*
C .186 (.137) -8.28 (1.58) .492 (.801)
LTB -.006 (-.098) .018 (.130) -.003 (-.009 )
LSF .296 (1.57) .322 (.885) -.048  (-.678 )
LDEP -.086 (-1 .82 )* -.718 (-.606) .404 (.668 )*
LM KS .200 (.693) -1.33 (1.49) -.870  (-.563 )*
L R R t.3 -.320 (-3 .21 )* -.279 (-.632 )* -.879 (-2 .95 )
LL D .086 (.873) -1 .04 (-1 .44 )* .127 (.236 )*
L I,, -.001 (-.090) .030 (837)* -.246  (-.962 )*
dumint_, .089 (1.33) -.065 (-.467) -.042  (-.551 )
dum cr,, -.091 (-1 .49) -.080 (-2 .66) -.021 (-2 .299)
r e s id e -.325 (1.94) -.749 (-4 .31) -.807  (-4 .34 )
R 2 .327 .446 .457
R  bar squared .19 .333 .348
D .W 2.10 2.00 2 .20
F statistic (10 ,49) 2.48 3.95 4 .20
M isspecification M S I [X 2 (1)] 
M S2[F  (4,47)]
.042 .034 6.99 6.36 .281 .227
Normality N  [X 2 ,(2)] 7.41 7.17 .473
Heteroscedasticity L M  (2) F [l,5 9 ] .309 .301 .239 .377 2 .17 2 .17
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) F [4,45] 7.11 1.72 1.71 .329 5.06 1.04
(t-values are placed in brackets next to the coefficients.)
The prefix "L " denotes logs. The symbol "* "  denotes the first difference. 
Results are based on quarterly data from  1977ql to 1992q4)
Regulation and Profitability - Barbados 
OLS Regression Results - Cointegrating Equation - Local Banks (levels)
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Table 6.13
DESCRIPTION BTSETA
C .185 (.138)
TB -.034 (-1 .70)
SF .468 (.591)
DEP -.011 (-.122)
M KS -2.21 (-2 .02)
R R .036 (1.72)
LD .379 (.790)
I -.046 (-.943 )
dumin .122 (.921)
dumcr -.219 (-2 .92)
R2 .308
R  bar squared .132
D .W . 7.06
F statistic (12 ,47) 1.75
M isspecification M SI [X 2( l )  M S2 
[F (1 ,51]
1.13 .884
Normality N [X 2 (2)] 11.33
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) F 
[1,62]
.579 .566
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) 
F (4 ,48)
1.633 .301
(t-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients) 
(Results are based oil quarterly data from  1977ql to 192q4)
6.2.13 Regulation and Profitability - Jamaica
In the case of Jamaica, profitability data were available only on an annual basis and 
required the use of more parsimonious models.
The exchange rate (ER) and the bank rate (BKR) assume much greater importance 
in the Jamaica case since a flexible exchange rate regime existed for most of the period. 
Because of the short length of the series, some of the non- regulatory variables used in earlier 
OLS regressions for Barbados were dropped in order to maximise on the number of degrees 
of freedom. All regulatory variables were however retained.
The equation employed for testing regulation and profitability in Jamaica was in log linear 
form and was as follows:
JLROA = ao + aJLRR + a^LI + a^LER +a4JLBKR + a5JLINF + djdumcr +d2dumin
(6.10)
Where the prefix (L) denotes the log of the variable and the prefix (J) indicates that 
the data are for Jamaica. Tests for stationarity revealed that all variables in the six variable 
system (plus dummies) were 1(1).
The cointegrating equation in loglinear form was as follows 
JLROA = .239 - .299JLRR + .321JLI + .135 JLER -.352JLBKR + .254JLINF- .025
(.151) (-1.51) (1.17) (.485) (-.991) (9.841) (-.098)
-.040 Jdumin 
(-.170)
An error correction was developed and results are presented in Table 6.14.
The exchange rate emerged as one of the most important factors influencing the 
profitability of commercial banks in Jamaica in the ECM equation adjusted for short run 
dynamics (Table 6.14). This variable was significant at the 5% level and supported the view 
that commercial bank profitability improved with devaluation and with a depreciating 
exchange rate. The equation however explained only 30% of the variation in bank profits. 
Interest rate control variable (dumin) and the interest rate spread variable (Dl) were both 
positive and significantly associated with bank profitability (the latter at the 10% level).
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Reserve requirements were negatively related to bank profitability at just about the 
5% level. Surprisingly, controls on sectoral credit were positively associated with bank 
profitability. This differed from the result for Barbados and tends to confirm the assertion 
by banks in Jamaica who responded to the questionnaires, that the controlled sector was not 
necessarily the sector offering the highest return, as was the case for Barbados (see Table
6.14 and Appendix 4.b).
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Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
Regulation and Bank Profitability - ECM
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Table 6.14
Description Jamaica Trinidad and 
T obago
C -1.41 (-1 .88) -.133 (-.522 )
D R R -.136 (-1 .99) -2.08 (-2 .88 )
D I .561 (2.01) -293 (-.493 )
D E R .075 (2.80) -.213 (-.167 )
D BK R -.986 (-2 .28) -.035 (-1 .58 )
DINF 1.83 (1.40) .225 (.466 )
D M 1.05 (1 .91 )
D TB .781 (.894 )
dumcr .947 (1.69) -.052  (-.179 )
dumin .285 (1.76) ••
reside -.504  (-2 .11) -.771 (-1 .895)
R 2 .628 .665
R  bar squared .298 .282
D  W 1.40 1.78
F statistic 1.90 1.74
M isspecification F ( l , l l )  X 2 (1,11) 3.61 2.00 3.63 1.76
Normality N  X 2 (2) .135 .657
Heteroscedasticity F (1 ,17 ) L  (7 ,(1) 3.55 3.93 .079 .029
Serial Correlation F ( L l r f X 2 (1) 3.61 2.00 4 .44 5.38
R esu lts are based on annual data - 1975-1992)
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6.2.14 Regulation and Bank Profitability: Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad and Tobago
A similar approach to testing was applied to the case of Trinidad and Tobago. Tests were 
run on annual data because of the data difficulties. Variables were first tested for stationarity 
and Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller tests applied. All variables were 1(1).
Reserve requirements proved to be the single most important factor influencing the 
profitability (ROA) of banks in Trinidad and Tobago. The sign of the credit control variable 
was negative but not significant, reflecting the mildness of credit controls in Trinidad and 
Tobago.
There was no interest rate control in Trinidad and Tobago and very limited credit 
control. The latter was represented by a dummy variable which took the value one when 
controls were in place and the value zero when they were not.
Results confirm that the range of regulatory measures used in Trinidad and Tobago 
was much more limited than in the case of Barbados and Jamaica and that reserve 
requirements (or the liquid assets ratio as it was termed in Trinidad and Tobago) and to a 
lesser extent the bank rate were the more important regulatory variables.
6.2.15 Causality Tests: Reserve Requirements and Bank Profitability
In view of the consistently negative association between reserve requirements and 
bank profitability, Granger causality tests were conducted to ascertain whether the relationship 
between reserve requirements and bank profitability was causal. Tests are based on the 
premise that if past values of X are better predictors of Y then it is likely that X causes Y. 
Tests were conducted for the case of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Results 
showed no causality for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, but showed causality between 
reserve requirements and bank profitability in the Barbados case with the direction of 
causality running from reserve requirements to profitability.
Table 6.15
Granger Causality Tests 
(Running from Reserve Requirements to Bank Profitability)
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Restricted Unrestricted
constant .125 (1.76) .247 (2.12)
ROA(-l) .310 (2.42 .325 (2.54)
ROA(-2) .071 (.546) .098 (.806)
ROA(-3) .079 (.608) .002 (.017)
ROA(-4) .297 (2.39) .320 (2.75)
RR(-l) .017( 1.07)
RR(-2) -.003 (-.161)
RR(-3) -.061 (-3.21)
RR(-4) -.038 (-2.24)
(t values are placed in brackets next to coefficients)
The test for causality applied is based on an F statistic that is calculated by estimating the 
expression following in both the constrained and unconstrained forms.
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p _JSEiyS E J m _
1 SSEU /(T-2»i-1)
Where SSEr,SSEu = residual sum of squares of the reduced and unrestricted models 
respectively
T = number of observations 
m = number of lags.
Results using the F test show a critical value of 3.53 compared with a test statistic of 2.10 
for 8 degrees of freedom and 53 observations; confirming causality in the Granger sense 
from reserve requirements to bank profitability. Reliance on extra statistical support on which 
to base causal claims [Zellner (1979), Holland (1986) and Bassman (1988)] seem to provide 
"a priori" grounds for a case for Granger causality.
6.2.16 Summary of Results on Bank Profitability
Results suggest that regulation impacted bank profitability more in the Barbados case 
than in Jamaica or in Trinidad and Tobago, but reserve requirements were negatively 
associated with bank profitability in all cases. The result tends to confirm the tentative 
conclusion reached earlier in support of the views of Ramakhrisnan and Thakor (1984) and 
Osborne and Zaher (1992) that the cost of reserve requirements are partly borne by equity 
holders and that reserve requirements constrain the size of the banking firm. Indications are 
that profitability increases with the level of concentration in the banking industry but large 
banks are not necessarily more profitable than small banks. Also, the impact of reserve 
requirements on profitability appears to be causal in the Granger sense for the Barbados case. 
Residuals from the cointegrating equations when included in the ECMs were negative and 
significant. The size of the coefficients suggest that much of the response was in the short 
term and that the response to regulation was not totally a long run response. This was 
particularly the case for Barbados and tends to support the views of Fry (1988) and Brown 
(1991) that in countries with fixed exchange rates monetary regulation is not a long term 
solution. This may have implications for the sustainability of the regulatory system and may
Where:
find support in the views of Brown (1991) that high levels of monetary regulation are not 
sustainable over the long term.
The views of Stigliz and Weiss (1981) that regulated ceilings on lending do not 
necessarily affect bank profitability (since higher rates will be accompanied by higher risks 
and therefore greater losses) were not borne out by the results for Barbados. Benston’s 
(1972) observation that large banks are not necessarily more profitable than small banks is 
supported, based on results for Barbados.
Generally, results for the Barbados case tend to confirm the views of Bourke (1988) 
that regulation tends to depress profitability. For the case of Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago this applies to reserve requirements only.
6.3 Regulation and Bank Risk
Diagnostic tests for the ECM with bank risk as the dependent variable indicate that 
there were no signs of heteroscedasticity but there was some serial correlation in the LM 
version, but not in the F version, so that the Kiviet (1985) conclusion that the F version is 
more relevant in small samples is relied upon. The residual was significant at the 10% level 
and had a value of -7.09 and was more negative than the ADF critical values as confirmed 
by tables provided by Mackinnon (1990). The series was therefore stationary. Risk is 
measured in this study by the variance of profits and is a sub-set of bank profitability. Profit 
variability is defined as the difference between expected profit and actual profit. Expected 
profit is defined as the average of die prior four years’ profit.
6.3.1 Regulation and Bank Risk: Barbados
OLS regression results indicate that risk increases with the incidence of reserve 
requirements but declines with the incidence of interest rate controls. A possible inference 
is that interest rate controls may help to protect banks from increased risk. The overall 
outcome for monetary controls and bank risk therefore depends on which particular monetary 
measure predominates, but depending on the measure used by authorities, risk may either 
increase or decrease as a result of monetary measures. Risk is represented by the variable
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(RISK) and is 1(1), having a calculated test statistic of -5.9068 compared to a critical ADF 
value of -2.9084. Other stationarity test results are as in Table 6.1.
The cointegrating equation includes capital as an explanatory variable. Results are as
follows:
RISK = 1.71 -2.77LTB -4.96LM -6.3LSF + 13.11RR + .037LI -1.42LLD -.541dumin 
(-.295) (-2.61) (-4.51) (-2.01) (5.01) (.025) (-.400) (-.847)
+ 1.39dumcr-1.39LCAPB +.655sl +.948s2+1.14s3 
(2.40) (-1.58) (1.44) (2.07) (2.24)
Both in the long run and in the ECM uncertainty of profits was influenced principally 
by reserve requirements. This variable was significant and positive at the 1% level. Results 
suggest that as reserve requirements increase banks may attempt to maintaining profitability 
by assuming greater risk. This tends to give support to the view that portfolio risks increase 
with the incidence of reserve requirements. Whether this is a result of increased lending to 
the more productive high risk sectors cannot be inferred from the results. The equation 
explained approximately 50% of the variability of profits.
Results indicate that risk increases with credit controls. The coefficient of this 
variable was significant at the 5% level. The sign of the capital variable suggests that risk 
declines with increasing capital, but the coefficient, though greater than unity and therefore 
tending to confirm the views of bank supervisors, was not significant at the 5% level.
Lack of significance of the coefficient for the concentration ratio fails to support the 
Galbraith-Caves hypothesis [Galbraith, (1967)], [Caves,(1970)] that there exists a negative 
relationship between bank concentration and risk, and that there is risk avoidance behaviour 
in concentrated markets.112 (The t-value was however, greater than unity). Similarly, lack 
of significance of the interest rate spread variable did not support the findings of Mingo 
(1978) that where banks do not rely on interest payments to attract deposit funds, there tends 
to be more non-price rationing which may lead to higher bank risks.
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112 This is consistent with empirical literature on bank profitability.
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T a b le  6 .1 6
BARBADOS
Regulation and Bank Risk - Error Correction Model
DESCRIPTION
C (.079) (.028 )
LTB (-.426 ) (-.616 ) 1
D LSF (-9 .21 ) (-3 .13 )
D L M (-7 .57 ) (-.849 ) |
D L R R (7.52) (2 .63 )
D L L D (3.57) (.527 )
L C O N (.140) (.205 ) :
LI (.854) (.560 )
resid,., (-.904 ) (-5 .39 )
dumin,.! (-.410 ) (-.722 )
dumcr,., (.482) (.885)
R2 .565
R  bar squared .472
D .W . 2.15
F statistic (11 ,51) 6.03
M isspecification M SI [X 2( l )  M S2 
[F (1,47]
.546 .437
Normality N [X 2 (2)] 4 .92
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) F [1,61] .013 .012
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) F (4,47) 6.19 1.28
D " denotes the first difference.)
(R esults are based on quarterly data from  1977ql to 1992q4)
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6.3.2 Regulation and Bank Risk: Jamaica
Results of the ECM for the Jamaica case disclosed that risk was not associated with 
reserve requirements nor with any of the regulatory measures. The exchange rate was the 
principal factor explaining bank risk (see Table 6.19).
6.3.3 Regulation and Bank Risk: Trinidad and Tobago
The equation for bank risk in the case of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago was also 
cointegrated. In Trinidad and Tobago case, bank risk was measured by the variability of 
profits and was positively associated with reserve requirements. The coefficient of this 
variable was significant at the 5% level, even though Trinidad and Tobago is considered a 
mildly regulated environment. Results of the ECM are displayed in Table 6.17.
6.3.4 Conclusion
A negative sign on the credit control variable is required in order to support the views 
of Fry (1988) that credit controls discourage risk-taking. While this was so in the case of 
Trinidad and Tobago, the variable was not significant. The Fry (1988) view is consistent 
with the views of commercial banks that controls on lending did not lead to increased credit 
to the high- risk sectors, but lack of significance of the relevant variable does not permit 
either rejection or support of the hypothesis. Similarly, the views of Mingo (1978) that 
interest rate controls are associated with risk are not supported by the results.
Reserve requirements were however positively related to bank risk in Barbados, and 
in Trinidad and Tobago, supporting the Mingo (1978) view with regard to the association of 
reserve requirements and bank risk. A possible interpretation is that higher levels of reserve 
requirements force banks into taking greater risks in order to maintain profitability.
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Table 6.17
Regulation and Bank Risk 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
Error Correction M odel
DESCRIPTION JA M A ICA TRIN ID A D  &  T O B A G O
C -4.62 (-.426) -.246 (-.552 )
D R R 1.59 (.604) 7.49 (2 .32 )
DTB -4.24 (-.576) 3.39 (1 .91 )
D l -3.49 (-.344) -3 .04 (-.252 )
D M 4.53 (3 .48 )
D E R 6.48 (2.47) 2 .15 (.95 )
D BK R -5.20 ( -1-02)
DINF 6.13 (.285) 1.04 (1 .35 )
dumin .932 (.278)
dumcr 2.93 (.417) -.204 (-.373 )
residt_, -1.21 (-1 .86) -1 .02 (-2 .73 )
R2 .809 .86
R  bar squared .554 .653
D .W . 2.38 1.72
F statistic 3.17 4.06
M isspecification
M S I [X ^ l ) ]  M S(2)[F (1 ,5 ]
7.66 5.21 .945 .289
Normality N [X 2(2)] .556 .945
Heteroscedasticity 
L M  (1) F [1,62]
1.13 1.06 .963
Serial Correlation 
X 2 (4 ),F  [1,13]
2.57 1.03 .007 .005
(Results are based on annual data from  1975 -1992)
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6.4 Regulation and Liquidity
Excess liquidity was defined as commercial bank holdings of cash and government 
securities in excess of required amounts as a percentage of total assets (LIQ). A general 
reaction function was formulated for the liquidity equation. The equation was of the form 
LIQ = ao + ajLTB + a^M + a^CON + a4LRR +a5LLD + a6I + dxdumin + c^ dumcr 
+ XiSl +X2S2 + X3s3 (6.12)
6.4.1 Barbados: Regulation and Liquidity
Equations in levels were employed because of the problem of negative values, stationarity was 
established and a cointegrating equation formulated. Results of the error correction model are 
displayed in Table 6.18.
The error correction model produced an R2 of .79, and an R bar squared of .76. 
(Table 6.18). Diagnostic tests were conducted to ascertain whether the linear regression 
analysis satisfied classical assumptions of homoscedasticity and serial correlation of the 
unobservable disturbance term. Tests for serial correlation employ Durbin-Watson tests for 
non auto-correlated errors and Lagrange multiplier tests [Breusch and Pagan (1980)]. The 
normality test is a test of skewness and kurtosis based on Bera and Jarque (1980). While there 
was no heteroscedasticity, and no problems of normality or misspecification, there was serial 
correlation of the residuals using the X2 LM version, though the results of the F version were 
acceptable. This is usually more reliable for small samples. Reserve requirements as expected 
were negatively associated with bank liquidity and the coefficient was significant at the 5% 
level. Credit controls were positively associated with liquidity and were significant at the 10% 
level, giving support to the views of King (1986) that credit limits increase the liquidity of 
banks.
Tests were also conducted employing the average lending rate and the savings rate 
as separate variables as opposed to simply applying the single interest spread variable. 
Results indicate that as interest rates rose liquidity declined but the coefficients of the 
variables were not significant. The interest rate control variable was not significant at the 5%
level but was greater than unity and was negatively related to liquidity. The credit control 
variable was positive and significantly associated with liquidity and conforms to expectations 
since controls on credit will lead to unplaced funds and to excess liquidity (see below).
The result of that equation can be written;
LIQ = 52.15 -.004M2 -.266RR + .026CON 157TB 
(11.39) (-3.95) (-2.16) (1.30) (-1.31)
-50.69LD -.141SAVR -.191LR -.57dumin + .95dumcr+.505sl +.893s2 +.043s3 
(-9.37) (-.617) (-.731) (-1.11) (1.99) (1.29) (2.22) (.104)
(The notation (SAVR) refers to the minimum savings rate and the notation (LR) to the 
average lending rate.)
R2 .914 R bar squared .892 
DW 2.19
F statistic (12,47) 41.61 
Diagnostic tests were as follows:
Misspecification X2 (1) 3.850 F (1) ,(1,44) 3.07 
Normality X2 (2) 1.35 
Heteroscedasticity (1) 1.88 F (1.57) 1.88 
Serial Correlation X2(4) 3.52 F (4,41) .650
The process of testing revealed that the loan-deposit ratio and the reserve requirement 
variable appear to be collinear in that the coefficient on the latter increases in significance 
only when the loan deposit variable is excluded from the equation.
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Table 6.18
BARBADO S
Regulation and Liquidity 
Error Correction M odel
DESCRIPTION ECM
C 1.03 (.607)
TB -.020 (-.336 )
D M -.007 (-2 .06 )
SF -1.99 (-.558 )
D LD -42.97 (-8 .87 )
D R R -.415 (-3 .30 )
dumin -.113 (-.271 )
dumcr .487 (1 .75)
resid,., -.914 (-7 .44 )
R 2 .792
R  bar squared .757
D .W . 2.05
F statistic (9 ,53) 22.53
s.e. 1.01
M isspecification M SI [X 2( l )  M S2 
[F (1,52]
.044 .036
Normality N [X 2 (2)] .562
Heteroscedasticity LM  (1) F 
[1 ,61]
.446 .435
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) 
F [4 ,49]
10.22 2.37
The sym bol (D ) denotes the first difference. T-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients.
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6.4.2 Impact of Regulation on Bank Liquidity - by Bank Type
OLS regression equations partitioned according to small, large,foreign and local banks 
confirmed varying responses by each group to regulatory measures (Table 6.19, 6.20 and 
6.21). Results for large banks are not reported as they did not differ particularly from results 
for the entire system.
In the ECM formulation, regulatory changes impacted more on the liquidity of foreign 
banks. Reserve requirements were negatively associated with excess liquidity of small and 
foreign banks. The latter result is surprising given the access of foreign branch banks to the 
resources of the parent. However, it tends to confirm the views of commercial banks that they 
used foreign borrowing only as a last resort and suggests that when they do so, deficits on 
required liquidity levels have already been incurred (see Appendix 4.b).
Credit controls seemed to influence the liquidity of small banks more so than of 
foreign banks. As credit controls were imposed, small banks became less liquid. This may 
be explained by the movement of business away from large banks (who may have exceeded 
their credit limits) toward smaller banks. Surprisingly, the liquidity of local banks was not 
strongly affected by monetary regulation. This suggests that where such liquidity difficulties 
exist, that the source may not be monetary regulation as is sometimes believed.
In Chapter 4 it as observed that the response of individual banks to reserve 
requirements depends on initial liquidity conditions. The figures at Appendix 6.4 display 
liquidity ratios of banks by group. Banks which are highly loaned relative to deposit levels, 
will experience greater liquidity difficulty in adjusting to reserve requirements than banks 
with lower loans deposit ratios. Appendix 6.4 suggests that small banks are more likely to 
experience liquidity difficulties than other banks because of initial conditions. This conforms 
with results of the ECM for small banks whose levels of excess liquidity declined as reserve 
requirements increased (Table 6.19).
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T able 6 .19
Barbados
Regulation and Liquidity -  E C M  -  Small Banks
(levels)
Description Small (ECM )
C 5.37 (.861)
SMTB .014 (.091)
DSM DEP .197 (2.03)
D SM R R -.003 (-2 .68 )
D I -1.51 (-1 .78 )
SM M KS -.062 (-.455)
D SM LD 2.08 (.325)
Dumin -.576 (-.548 )
Dumcr -.392 (-2 .412)
resid,., -.907 (-7 .48)
R 2 .582
R  bar squared .501
D .W . 1.89
F (10,52) 7 .24
Ser Cor X 2 (4) F (4 ,48) 1.74 .341
M isspecification X 2( l ) 1.12 .929
Normality X 2 (2) 3.41
Heteroscedasticity X 2 (1) F  (1 ,61) 3.52 3.61
T-values are placed in brackets next to the coefficients. The prefix  "D  denotes the first
difference. R esults are based on quarterly data from  1977q l to 1992q4)
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T able  6 .2 0
Barbados
Regulation and liq u id ity  -  Foreign Banks 
Cointegrating Equation and E C M
Description Foreign Banks 
(cointegrating equation)
ECM
C .614 (.516) .014 (.191)
NLTB .051 (5 .53) .053 (2 .11 )
N LD EP .023 (3.77) .016 (1 .51 )
N LR R -.029 (-2 .96) -.039 (-2 .10 )
NL1 .256 (1.92) .187 (1 .12 )
N LM K S -2.29 (-2 .36) -3.25 (-1 .65 )
N LL D 1.06 (2.06) .294 (.417 )
dumin .069 (.732) .031 (.457 )
dumcr -.147 (-2 .14) -.059 (-.918 )
residt.j -.98 (-5 .38 )
R 2 .662 .492
R  bar squared .534 .394
D .W . 2.11 1.98
F 7.01 5.04
ser cor  X 2 (4) F (4 ,47) 6.06 1.23 3.22 647
M isspecification .977 .775 5.52  4.89
Normality 13.47 1.457
Heteroscedasticity X 2 (1) F 
(1 ,62 )
3.09 .405 .394
(t-values are placed in brackets next to the coefficients)
(R esu lts are based on quarterly data for the period 1977ql to 1992 q4)
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T ab le  6 .21
Barbados
Regulation and Liquidity Local Banks 
Error Correction M odel
Description Values
C 3.97 (1.37)
DBCTB -.227 (-.290)
DBCSF 1.071 (.755)
DBCDEP -.634 (-2 .32)
D BCR R .642 (1.01)
D I -3.80 (-1.51)
dumcr -1.00 (-.511)
residt_, .416 (-3 .40)
R 2 .535
R  bar squared .450
D .W . 2.14
F stat 6.28
Normality .305
Heteroscedasticity X 2 (1) F (1,62) 3.89 4.03
Serial Correlation X 2 (4) 
F (4 ,45 )
7.16 1.53
(t-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients)
(Results are based on quarterly data for the peiod 1977ql to 1992q4)
2 3 2
Table 6 .2 2
Jamaica 
Regulation and Liquidity 
Cointegrating Equation -  Long Run
Description Coefficient
C 34.11 (10.54)
JRR .231 (5.66)
JER -.506 (-2 .87)
JI .135 (1.28)
JLO AD .602 (4.69)
JDEP -.698 (-7 .32)
dumin -2.48 (-3.54)
dumcr -26.07 (-8 .49)
R 2 .929
R  bar squared .858
D  W 2.54
F statistic 13.16
M isspecification F  (1,11) X 2 (1) 1.82 .850
Normality N X 2 (2) 7.15
Heteroscedasticity F (1 ,17 ) LM  (1) 3.98 4.51
Serial Correlation F (1 ,11 ), X 2 (1) 2.34 1.12
(t-values are placed in brackets next to the coefficients)
(R esults are based on annual data for the period 1975-1992)
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T able  6.23
Trinidad and Tobago -  Regulation and Liquidity 
Error Correction Model
Description Liquidity
C -1.28 (-.721)
D T R R -1.08 (-1 .77)
D TB -2.20 (-1.86)
D TI 1.96 (2 .85)
D T M .005 (1.97)
D TIN F .238 (1.19)
D TBK R .669 (.793)
D TER 1.76 (.918)
dumcr 3.48 (1.85)
resid,., -1 .00  -6 .24
R2 .908
R  bar squared .790
D  W 2.19
F stat 7.72
M isspecification L M  (1) F (1 ,11) 2 .32  .948
Normality N  X 2 (2) .677
Heteroscedasticity L M  (1) F (l,1 7 ) .571 .522
Serial Correlation F  (1 ,11) X 2 (1) .647 .237
(  The prefix (D ) denotes first differences)
(t-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients)
(R esults are based on annual data for the period 1975 -1992)
6.4.3 Regulation and Liquidity - Jamaica
Reserve requirements were positively associated with bank liquidity in Jamaica. Since 
it is unlikely that banks would voluntarily hold excess cash and securities, the logical 
conclusion is that monetary controls in the form of reserve requirements were imposed when 
liquidity was already high. Credit controls and interest rate controls were negatively 
associated with liquidity. Depreciation of the exchange rate was associated with declining 
excess liquidity, possibly because liquidity was already mopped up by increases in reserve 
requirements.
6.4.4 Regulation and Liquidity- Trinidad and Tobago
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, monetary regulation had only a weak association 
with regulation of bank liquidity. Reserve requirements were negatively associated with excess 
liquidity, but at the 10% level of significance. Results support the view of King (1986) that 
credit limits lead to a build up of liquidity in commercial banks. Changes in the exchange rate 
in Trinidad and Tobago did not impact on liquidity (Table 6.23) compared with the case of 
Jamaica where this variable was quite significant (Table 6.22).
6.4.5 Conclusion: Regulation and Liquidity
Generally, banks in Trinidad and Tobago where credit controls were mild, tended to 
be more illiquid than banks in Jamaica and Barbados where credit controls were more 
binding, suggesting that credit controls may be associated with higher liquidity levels of banks 
(see also Table 3.20). This is borne out by cases of Barbados and Jamaica, and contrasts 
with that of Trinidad and Tobago.
The views of King (1986) that credit controls increase the liquidity of banks, are 
supported both in the case of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago for banks as a whole, 
though results for individual bank groups differ. How changes in reserve requirements 
translated into adjustment in excess liquidity levels was shown to depend on initial conditions. 
Banks which were more liquid had greater tolerance for reserve requirement increases. Small 
banks were more adversely affected.
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6.5 Impact of Monetary Regulation on Bank Solvency
6.5.1 Regulation and Bank Solvency - Barbados
Analysis of the role of capital has focused so far on the effects of changes in bank 
capital on bank performance as measured by bank profitability. We now alter the role of the 
capital, so that it becomes the dependent variable in a regression equation with the other 
variables on the right hand side. The objective of the OLS regression is now to test the impact 
of monetary regulation on solvency, as represented by capital.
Results of the ECM using the Engle-Granger two step with capital, reserves and borrowing 
as the dependent variable are shown in Table 6.24. The adjusted multiple correlation 
coefficient was rather low at .20. Results showed that capital was positively associated with 
reserve requirements and suggest that reserve requirements are associated with improved 
prudential standards.
OLS regressions run to test the impact of regulation on solvency as a performance 
measure show that for banks as a whole, reserve requirements were positively related to 
capital, suggesting that there may be no conflict between monetary and prudential objectives 
Table (6.24). While reserve requirements were positively association with capital in the ECM 
formulation at the 5% level, the interest rate control variable for all banks was negative and 
carried a t-value of -1.77 and was therefore significant at the 10% level. However, credit 
controls were not related to solvency.
Diagnostic tests of the ECM for all banks disclosed no sign of misspecification 
employing Ramsey’s (1969) reset test for functional form misspecifiction and the normality 
test which applied a test of skewness and kurtosis based on Bera and Jarque (1980) was also 
acceptable. However, there were signs of serial correlation, but for a X2 (4) reading this was 
not serious, and the F version was acceptable. There were signs of heteroscedasticity but 
White’s heteroscedasticity - consistent standard errors showed little change in the results (see 
Table 6.24).
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6.5.2 Testing Regulation and Bank Solvency by Bank Group
Tests using narrowly defined capital were conducted only for local banks.( They are 
required to hold stipulated levels of capital against local operations). In this regression it is 
assumed that "actual" capital and reserves are representative of "required" capital and 
reserves, since the experience is that banks tend not to hold excesses of capital over required 
amounts.
6.5.3 Local Banks
Employing capital as a dependent variable, tests were conducted for local banks.
(Local banks are required to hold stipulated levels of capital against local operations). In this
regression it is assumed that "actual" capital and reserves are representative of "required" 
capital and reserves. There was some serial correlation of the residuals so that results are 
rather tentative. In the long run model (see below) the interest rate control and reserve 
requirement variables were both significant and negatively associated with capital, but in the 
ECM monetary regulation of local banks is consistent with prudential objectives.
The results of the long run model are 
BCSOLV = 2.04 - .021BCTB - .714BCSF + 6.73 BCMKS 
(.57) (-1.12) (-.93) (3.20)
- .033BCRR -.255BCLD -.008 DEP
(-3.21) (-.55) (-.575)
(- .189 dumin) (- .107 dumcr) + .053sl + .020s2 + .036s3 
(-1.77) (-1.02) (.573) (.218) (.362)
Results suggest that in the case of local banks, in the model adjusted for short run 
dynamics, that reserve requirements are positively related to capital, but in the cointegrating 
equation the relationship of reserve requirements and solvency is negative. The signs on the 
credit control variable are negative but not significant. Overall, the relationship between 
monetary and prudential regulation remains equivocal (Table 6.25).
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Table 6,24
Barbados
Regulation and Bank Solvency - All Banks 
Engle-Granger Two Step - ECM
Description Values W hite’ s Adjusted 
S.E.
C -.029 (-.041) -.029 (-.042 )
TB - .015 (-.946) -.015  (-1 .50 )
SF .426 (.512) .427 (.479 )
D M -.016 (-957) -.007 (-1 .17 )
CON .006 (1.48) -.006 (2 .41 )
D R R .057 (1.91) ,057 (2 .69 )
D LD -3.31 (-2 .94) -3.31 (-1 .57 )
residt.j -.221 (-1 .92) -.222  (-1 .72 )
dumin -.105 (-1 .11) -.105 (-1 .15 )
dumcr .067 (.751) -.067 (-.991 )
R 2 .326
R  bar squared .197
D .W . 2.32
F statistic (10 ,52) 2 .52
Ser. Cor X 2 (4) F (4,48) 6 .02 1.27
M isspecification X 2 (1) F 1,51) 1.34 1.38
Normality X 2 (2) 14.43
Heteroscedasticity X 2 (1) F 
(1 ,61 )
12,17 12.19
(T-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients. The prefix "D "denotes the first
difference. R esu lts are based on quarterly data from  1977q l to 1992q4)
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Barbados - Regulation and Solvency - ECM
( L o c a l  b a n k s )
T able 6 .2 5
Description Local banks
D C .008 (.124)
DTB -.007 (-.443 )
DSF .053 (.166)
D M D E P .014 (2.26)
D M K S 5.45 (5.18)
D R R -.012 (-.855 )
D L D -1.26 (-4 .08 )
D I -.041 (-1 .70)
dumin -.039 (-1 .685)
dumcr -.020 (-.495 )
residt_, -.176 (-2 .03 )
R 2 .637
R  bar squared .62
D .W . 1.62
F statistic 8.45
(T-values are placed in brackets next to coefficients)
(Results are based on quarterly data from  1977ql to 1992 q4)
6.5.4 Regulation and Bank Solvency: Jamaica
The equation to establish the relationship of bank regulation and bank solvency was 
of the form
JSOLV = ao + aJRR + a^ IBKR + a3JI + a4JLOAN + a5JDEP + a6INF + a7j dumin
+ aajdumcr (6.13)
The equation was cointegrated and the residual when tested for stationarity had a calculated 
value of -4.21 compared with a critical value for ADF1 of -3.71.
In the cointegrating model, interest rate controls were inversely associated with the 
solvency of banks and the removal of controls was accompanied by improved bank solvency 
(results not shown). In the ECM formulation which took account of short run dynamics, 
monetary controls were negatively signed but not significant. The results, though not 
conclusive, are consistent with a negative impact of controls on bank solvency and give 
support to views about possible conflicts between monetary controls and prudential 
regulations.
This OLS regression accounted for 86% of the variation in bank solvency measured by R bar 
squared, but suffered from a high level of heteroscedasticity. Results are not repored and any 
conclusions must be tentative.
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Table 6.25a
Trinidad and Tobago 
Regulation and Solvency - Error Correction Model
Description Trinidad and T ’ go
C -.916 (-.810)
D R R 1.49 (2.98)
D TB -.002 (1.51)
D I -.353 (-.670)
dumcr -4.03 (-3 .37)
D M -.002  (-1 .51)
D B K R -1.01 (-1 .78)
D E R 2.51 (2.06)
DIN F .301 (2.34)
residt_, -.825 (-2 .47)
R 2 .807
R  bar squared .519
D  W 1.92
F stat 2.80
M isspecification X 2 (1) F (1,11) 6.23 3.19
Normality X 2 (2) .761
Heteroscedasticity L M (1) F (l,1 7 ) .739 .678
Serial Correlation X 2( l ) ,  F  (1 ,11) .207 .056
(R esults are based on annual data from  1975-1992)
6.5.5 OLS Regulation and Solvency: Trinidad and Tobago
Reserve requirements were positively associated with bank solvency in the Trinidad 
and Tobago case, but, credit controls were negatively associated with solvency and at the 1 % 
level of significance (Table 6.25a). The bank rate, which was quite heavily used in the post- 
1985 period carried a negative sign and was significant at the 10% level. Though regulation 
in Trinidad and Tobago was relatively mild, there was a surprising degree of negative 
association between regulation and solvency. This is consistent with the fact that of the three 
countries, Trinidad and Tobago experienced more solvency problems and banks there 
appeared more unstable. Solvency was positively associated with a depreciating exchange rate, 
suggesting that exchange rate liberalisation may in some circumstances (contrast the case of 
Chile and Argentina) be accompanied by improved solvency of banks. This compares with 
the case of Jamaica where solvency also improved with exchange rate depreciation.
6.5.6 Conclusion: Regulation and Solvency:
Results of tests of the impact of regulation on bank solvency indicate mixed results. 
Results suggest that in Trinidad and Tobago that regulation is associated with lower solvency 
for the case of credit controls but is positively associated with reserve requirement, the more 
important monetary measure. This is a comforting result since authorities tend to increase 
reserve requirements when banks are experiencing solvency problems.
Results for Barbados suggest that most monetary regulations were associated with 
prudential objectives. Interest rate controls tended to impact negatively on bank solvency, but 
the case of reserve requirements was unclear. Credit contols were negatively associated with 
solvency only for the case of Trinidad and Tobago.
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6 .6  Regulation and the Market Share of Banks
Results of regressions run with commercial banks’ market share relative to non-banks 
as die dependent variable confirm that market share was lost by commercial banks to non­
banks as the size of the banking system increased.
6.6.1 Barbados: Regulation and Market Share (MKS) - All Banks
The Engle and Granger two-step method was applied using the residual from the 
levels model to define a relationship which captured both long run and short run changes. 
Results continued to confirm that in the model adjusted for short run dynamics, the market 
share of commercial banks was influenced mostly by reserve requirements. Secondary reserve 
requirements and control of interest rate spreads were the two most significant explanatory 
regulatory variables. Results gave support to the view that reserve requirements and interest 
rate controls contributed to reduced market share of commercial banks (Table 6.26). The long 
run elasticity of reserve requirements was .08 (not reported). Surprisingly, the credit control 
variable did not impact on market share in the short run but was associated with declining 
market share in the long run. This is possibly explained by the fact that the requirement that 
prospective borrowers place minimum down-payments was made applicable to non-banks as 
well, even though limits on credit outstanding to non-priority sectors did not apply to these 
institutions until 1984.
Interest rate spreads were not significantly associated with market share, but interest 
rate controls were negative and significant at the 5% level. The result gives support to the 
view that interest rate controls may have been cost axiomatic, but also tends to support the 
view that interest rate spreads may have been insufficiently wide to prevent banks from losing 
market share to non-banks or to prevent the exit of new small banks from the industry, so that 
cost- axiomatic pricing seemed insufficient to prevent the loss of market share. Loss of 
market share to non-banks may be associated with the exit of 4 smaller banks from the 
industry in Barbados. The coincidence of the exit of small banks and the entry of non-banks 
when matched with the results obtained here could suggest some causality, but despite the 
high level of correlation this cannot be inferred from the data.
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It is suggested that the fact of regulation of interest rates may have adversely 
influenced banks’ market share more so than the actual spreads that resulted from the setting 
of rates. It gives support to the view that the fact of interest rate-setting by authorities exerts 
greater influence on decisions on market entry than the actual level at which rates are set. 
Results would tend to support the view of [Peltzman,(1986)] that in highly regulated systems 
entry into the banking industry is below the level which would have been achieved in the 
absence of regulation.
The results showed an R2 of .98 and an adjusted R2 of .97 in the long run model and 
.608 and .533 in the ECM.
The ECM disclosed that the most significant regulatory measure influencing market 
share was reserve requirements, followed by interest rate controls.
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Table 6.26
Barbados 
Regulation and Market Share 
Cointegrating Equation and ECM
Description Cointegrating
Equation
ECM
C 5.10 ( 1.74) .031 (2 .26)
TB -.001 (-3 .04) .004 (1 .05)
SF -.032  (-.202) -.008 (-.591)*
M -.083 (-1 .68) -.006 (-.115)*
R R .018 (1.27) -.035 (-2.52)*
LD -.024 (- 1.27) -.047 (-1.51)*
I -.008 (-1 .14) -.002 (-.313 )
dumin -.002  (-1 .916) -.001 (-2 .064)
dumcr .005 (2.17) -.007 (-.247 )
resid,.. -.901 (-6 .51 )
R 2 .979 .528
R  bar squared .974 .437
D .W 1.86 2.16
F statistic (10 ,52) 203.2 5.83
M isspecification X 2 (1), F (1 ,48) .790 .625 .030 .024
Normality (2) .687 1.98
Heteroscedasticity X 2 (1) F (1 ,51) 2 .62 2.64 .438 .427
Serial Correlation X 1 (4) F (4 ,48) .891 1.66 3.94 .800
w hich are first differenced. Results are based on quarterly data from  1977ql to 1992q4)
Maximum likelihood estimates for the tests relating to market share were derived on the basis 
that market share is a long run phenomenon. Cointegration LR tests based on maximal 
eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix revealed only one vector holding the system together: the 
calculated statistic was larger than the critical value at the 95% level for only one vector. 
1(1) variables are MKS, M, SF, RR, and the 1(0) variables are CON, LD, TB ,1, dumin, 
dumcr, si, s2, s3. (Money supply (M) and loans deposit ratio (LD) have seasonal variation). 
The test statistic to formally test the number of cointegrating vectors holding the system 
together is based on the trace test which is based on the hypothesis that H2 (r) :II =ab', that 
is, there are at most (r) cointegrating vectors or II is of reduced rank r < p versus the 
alternative that:
ifc-1
# ,:aX(0 = Sr,AX,_.+ nX,_,+n+$D,+e„ (6-14)
The trace test is based on the likelihood ratio test defined as
-2lnQ(tf2|tf,)= £  ln(1 -i,) (615)
i=r+1
where r is the number of cointegrating vectors, p the number of variables 
and % the estimated eigenvalues.
Results using the Johansen procedure are presented in Tables 6.27 to 6.29.
Table 6.27
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6.6.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates and Market Share
Cointegration LR tests based on Maximal eigenvalues of the Stochastic matrix.
Null Alternative Statistic 95%  Critical Value
r =  0 r =  1 44.21 27.07
r <  =  1 r — 2 23.11 20.96
r <  =  2 r =  3 8.09 14.07
r <  =  3 r =  4 1.52 3.76
Table 6.28 shows results of Cointegration LR tests based on the trace of the stochastic matrix 
and confirms the presence of one cointegrating vector.
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Table 6.28
Cointegration LR Tests Based on the Trace of the Stochastic Matrix
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value
r=l r > 1 44.20 47.21
r = 2 r > 2 23.11 29.68
r = 3 r > 3 8.09 15.41
r = 4 r > 4 1.52 3.76
The cointegrated vector and its weights are shown in Table 6.29.
Table 6.29
Cointegrated Vector and Weights
Variable Vector Weights
MKS .2155 -1.996
(-1.000) (.4303)
M .0011 .8802
(-.0053) (-.1897)
SF 4.496 -.0023
(-20.86) (.0004)
RR .0086 1.874
(-.0399) (-.4041)
The normalised eigenvectors are
v=(v1, vs); the weights are w=S0k* v
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(6.16)
where Sok are the product moment matrices.
The equation for the Johansen model can be written
MKS =  .005M - 20.86SF - .04RR (6.17)
There is a negative association of reserve requirements with market share in the long run. 
Results reveal that the adjustment of reserve requirements back to equilibrium, given by the 
average speed of adjustment back to steady state, a=b' is -.04 (see Table 6.29). The ability 
of banks to raise deposits (money is defined as broad money) influences market share 
negatively and could suggest that banks could have some difficulty in accumulating deposits.
6.6.3. Regulation and the Market Share of Banks - by Bank Group 
Barbados
Results for individual bank groups are not reported as the main hypothesis is not the 
relative share of the market by bank groups but the relative share of the market of banks 
compared with non-banks. However, Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 clearly indicate an increasing 
share of the market by small banks (SMMKSHA), and by local banks (BCMKS), while large 
banks (LAMKSHA) have lost market share of banks as a group and hence by implication lost 
share of the market of banks and non-banks combined.
As in the case of foreign banks the market share of foreign banks was negatively 
associated with each monetary regulation measure, including interest rate controls.
The results suggest that the market share of large banks and foreign banks was most 
affected by regulation and that small and local banks were not. In the case of local banks, the 
protection from competition offered by interest rate controls may have assisted their growth 
as evidence by strong positive t-values for regulatory measure, hence the declining share of 
banks relative to non-banks would have been spurred by the relative decline in market share
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Results are not reported partly because it is not the focus of the study and partly 
because of unacceptably high diagnostics for normality, attributable to the purchase and sale 
of one bank by another.
of large banks and of foreign banks.
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Figure 6.1
Market Share : Foreign Banks
NUtKTSJH
Figure 6 .1 .a
Market Share: Local Banks
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Figure 6.2
Market Share : Large Banks
Figure 6.3
Market Share: Small Banks
6.6.4 Regulation and Market Share: Jamaica
Results for Jamaica support the view that high levels of required liquid assets 
restrained market share. The fact of very few new entrants market entry may be associated 
with high liquid assets ratios (reserve requirements). Surprisingly, interest rate controls 
seemed positively associated with market share in the long run but controls on credit had no 
impact on market share in the short run. Credit controls in Jamaica applied to both banks and 
non-banks almost from the inception and explain why the credit control variable would not 
have exerted a significant influence on the market share of banks in Jamaica (Table 6.30) 
Results differ for the Barbados case where credit controls were not extended to non-banks 
until 1984. Depreciation the exchange rate was strongly associated with the loss of market 
share of banks. This tends to be confirmed by higher levels of profits which attracted non­
banks to set up new business in Jamaica and tends to be confirmed by the higher level of 
profits which non-banks are able to make in the foreign exchange market. Interest rate 
spreads were negatively associated with market share, suggesting that as spreads widened and 
the banking system in the broad sense became more profitable and new entrants came into the 
market, but chose to enter the non-bank market, so eroding the market share of banks. 
Results of the cointegrating equation and the ECM can be seen in Table 6.30.
6.6.5 Regulation and Market Share: Trinidad and Tobago
In the Trinidad and Tobago case, reserve requirements and credit controls were all 
negatively related to market share and the coefficients were all significant at the 5 % level, 
supporting the view that high liquid assets ratios encouraged the entry of non-banks (Table 
6.31. The sign on the exchange rate variable was negative but was not significant (1.47). 
These results imply that financial liberalisation of monetary controls are likely to impact 
positively on bank performance but that liberalisation of exchange rates seems likely to bring 
greater competition from non-banks.
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Table 6.30
Jamaica 
Regulation and Market Share 
Cointegrating Equation and Error Correction Model
Description Cointegrating
Equation
ECM
C 38.63 (3.83) -18.12 (-.759)
JRR .150 (.859) -4.07 (-2.01)
JI -.255 (-.752) -.374 (-2.12)
JER -2.11 (-1.72) -4.41 (-15.76)
JBKR -.231 (-1.03) .222 (.930)
JINF .298 (5.08) .371 (3.50)
JDEP -.005 (-4.15) -.033 (-3.14)
JDumcr 19.81 (1.06) 5.18 (.273)
JDumin 13.88 (4.36) 12.66 (2.62)
ResidH -.752 (-2.47)
R2 .896 .89
R bar squared .814 .76
DW 2.01 2.64
F stat 10.85 6.38
Misspecification X2 (1) F (1,9) .896 .446 4.49 1.99
Normality X2 (2) .046 1.69
Heteroscedasticity F (1,17) L(l) 4.05 .012 .011
Serial Correlation F (1,11) X2 (1) .003 .001 4.79 2.18
(t-values are placed in brackets next to the coefficients. The prefix (D) applies to figures in column 3)
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Trinidad and Tobago Regulation and Market Share: Error Correction Model
Table 6.31
DESCRIPTION Values
C .213 (.153)
DTBKR .189 (.306)
DTM .001 (.594)
DTB .005 (.005)
DTI -.468 (-.710)
DTRR -1.66 (-2.95)
DTINF -.304 (-1.87)
DTER -2.09 (-1.47)
dumcr -4.05 (-2.05)
resid,., -.177 (-.823)
R2 .820
R bar squared .496
D.W. 1.94
F statistic 2.53
Misspecification MS2 [X2 (1)] MSI 
[F (1,11]
3.70 1.31
Normality N[X2 (2) .818
Heteroscedasticity LM (1) F 
[1,17]
.878 .808
Serial Correlation X2 (4) F [1,11] .418 .114
(T- values are in brackets next to coefficients. Results are based on annual data 1975-1992).
6.6.6 Conclusion: Regulation and Market Share
The results for market share as the dependent variable are fairly unequivocal about 
the negative impact of reserve requirements and to a lesser extent credit and interest rate 
controls on bank performance. Results support the views of Farrell (1989) that in the 
Caribbean context monetary and other controls prevent any meaningful level of expansion of 
the banking system.
Low failure rates in Barbados and Jamaica may also be associated with monetary 
regulation and discriminatory pricing policies, and may have resulted in the rise of non-banks 
and the declining share of commercial banks in the combined market share of banks and non­
banks.
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6.7 Discriminant Analysis: Developing a Composite Score
6.7.1 6.7.1 A Composite Performance Index: Barbados
The analysis has so far focused on the impact of regulation on various measures of 
bank performance. Such an analysis gives valuable insights into the adjustment processes of 
commercial banks and its impact on individual performance measures, and permits authorities 
to predict how a particular measure will either worsen or improve in response to regulation. 
It is however possible to derive a composite measure of bank performance which will indicate 
how overall bank performance will be affected. This process involves the calculation of a 
composite index of performance. The process is described below.
Data are first divided into three groups or functions. Wilks’ Lambda is calculated for 
each function using the statistical programme SPSS.113 Eigenvalues for each function were 
calculated and then pooled within - group correlations between the discriminant scores and 
predictor variables produced. Canonical correlations were then calculated. These represented 
the square root of the between - group to total sums of squares. When squared they represent 
the total variability explained by differences between groups (Table 6.32).
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Table 6.32
Canonical Discriminant Functions - Barbados
Fen
Eigen
value
Pet o f 
Variance
Cum
Pet
Canonical
Corr
A fte r
Fen
W iIks' 
Lambda
Chi-
square
DF Sig
: 0 .0001 652.116 177 .0001
1* * * * * * * * 99.82 99.82 1.0000 : 1 .0001 283.214 116 .00001
2* 178.963 .15 99.96 .9972 : 2 .0224 119.642 57 .00001
3* 43.619 .04 100.00 .9887 :
Fen denotes Function 
cum= cumulative 
Pet =  percent 
corr =  correlation
113 SPSS is a Statistical Package for Social Sciences.
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The performance measures are the same as the earlier analysis: profitability (ROA), Liquidity 
(LIQ), risk (RISK), solvency (SOLV) and market share (MKS).
Table 6.33
Standardised Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients - Barbados
DF = Degrees of freedom
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3
ROA .00030 .20662 .97930
SOLV -3.29606 .00285 .00877
LIQ 3.14287 .98825 -.15551
Structure Matrix
The structure matrix represents pooled-within-groups correlations between discriminating 
variables and canonical discriminant functions. Variables are ordered by size of correlation 
within function.
Table 6.34
Structure Matrix
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3
LIQ .00030 .97844 -.20655
SOLV -.30281 .94870 -.09099
MKS .27392 -.90361 -.32931
RISK .43295 -.85294 .29162
ROA .00276 .14688 .98915
The eingenvalue for each function is the ratio of between group to within group sum of 
squares.
The entire solution is rotated with the varimax procedure to provide a simpler structure in the 
profiling of each function. The results are as follows:
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Table 6.35
Varimax Rotation Transformation
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3
% Variance 95.02 2.49 2.49
Function 1 .97566 -.15355 -.15658
Function 2 .12569 .97660 .17452
Function 3 .17971 -.15059 .97212
Table 6.36
Rotated Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients 
(Variables ordered by size of coefficient within function)
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3
LIQ 3.21852 .50597 .51340
SOLV -3.21704 .50756 -.50707
ROA .19445 .00010 1.04335
Since weights which employ all variables are desired, correlations between rotated canonical 
discriminant functions and discriminating variables are then produced using all variables and 
the appropriate weights calculated as an average across each function for the Barbados case.
Table 6.37
Correlation Between Canonical Discriminant Functions and Discriminating Variables
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Weights
ROA -.15661 -.00594 .98764 .275
SOLV -.15985 .98669 .02970 .285
LIQ .16038 .98660 -.02998 .392
MKS .21286 -.87494 -.43494 .465
RISK .26280 -.94338 .20243 .116
The performance index can therefore be written:
P* =  .275 ROA +  . 116 RISK +  .392 LIQ 
+  .285 SOLV +  .465 MKS 
On the basis of the above weights, performance indices were then calculated for commercial 
banks in Barbados (see Table 6.40). A plot of these trends (Figure 6.1) demonstrates periods 
of improved performance, but the underlying trend is one of declining overall performance 
of banks in Barbados over the past 15 years. The index combines absolute and relative 
performances.
Figure 6 .4
Index of Commercial Bank Performance -  Barbados
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6.7.2 A Composite Performance Index: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
Banks as profit maximisers or market share maximisers, or both, are likely to react 
to regulation in predictable ways which are independent of their location. Thus, having 
established weights for Barbados these are made applicable to Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago and indices of performance and bank regulation can be calculated. The rationale for 
using the same weights is based on the similarities in the responses of banks and the 
assumption that companies in the same industry have the same overall objectives with regard
to bank performance. This is the basis for universal application of the Altman (1984) Z score 
(or Zeta Score) and the basis for the general application of indices created using discriminant 
analysis. This is possible in the case of bank performance measures because companies are 
expected to use Standard Accounting Principles across countries. In the case of bank 
performance measures Z* scores are therefore comparable for banks throughout the 
Caribbean. In the case of the regulation measure, data differences in terms of what is included 
in the category credit to the non-priority sectors may lead to some lack of uniformity in the 
indices across countries but this is not expected to be significant. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 display 
bank performance indices for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Composite Index of Bank Performance -  Jamaica
J a m a  f c a
Per Iod
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Figure 6 .6
C o m p o s i t e  Index o f  Bank P e r f o r m a n c e
T r i n i d a d  a n d  T o b a g o
P e r  i o d
6.7.3 Calculating a Regulation Index: Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
An index of monetary and prudential regulation can be similarly created. Instead of 
dummy variables for interest rate controls and credit controls used in OLS regressions, 
proxies were used. Actual interest rate spreads and actual credit to the non-priority (controlled 
sectors) were used as proxies for controlled credit and controlled interest rates. (A 
preliminary run of the SPSS package for deriving discriminant scores had disclosed that the 
dummies were discarded by the system).
The same procedure used for calculation of the performance index was applied. A compressed 
form of the procedure is set out in Tables 6.38 and 6.39. Results are shown in Table 6.41.
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Table 6.38
Canonical Discriminant Functions - Regulation
Fen
E i gen 
value
Pet o f 
Variance
Cum
Pet
Canonical
Corr
A fte r
Fen
W iIks' 
Lambda
Chi-
square
DF Sig
1 * * * * * * 99.06 99.1 1.0000 0 .00001 919.8 236 .00001
2 1102.1 .64 99.7 .999 1 .00001 546.5 174 .00001
3 409.2 .24 99.9 .998 2 .00001 329.3 114 .00001
4 99.2 .06 100.0 .995 3 .00001 142.8 56 .00001
The procedure produced an index of bank regulation
Table 6.39
Correlation Between Canonical Discriminant Functions and Discriminating Variables
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Weights
RR .99338 .11058 .02620 .0164 1.0000
CAPB .0058 .91504 -.16427 .3684 1.121
I -.00013 .29947 -.21068 .93055 .2548
PERDIS .00067 -.22177 .91152 -.34634 .0869
Based on the procedure described earlier, a chart of the index of regulation for the Barbados 
case is produced below.
The results display increasing levels of regulation in the period 1977-1985, a decline in 1985- 
90 and an increase in 1991 followed by a further decline in 1992. The absolute level of 
regulation, however, remained high throughout the period.
The equation for the regulation index can be written 
R* =  1.0RR +  1.121 CAPB +.255 I +  .086 PERDIS (6.19)
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Figure 6 .7
C o m p o s i t e  R e g u l a t i o n  Index -  B a r b a d o s
M o n e t a r y  a n d  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t i o n
Pe r  1o d
Figure 6.8
C o m p o s i t e  R e g u l a t i o n  Index - J a m a i c a
M o n e t a r y  a n d  P r u d e n t i a l  R e g u l a t i o n
Per 1od
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Figure 6.9
Composite Regulation Index-TrInidad and Tobago 
Monetary and Prudential
1 9 7 3  1 9 7 5  1 9 7 7  1 9 7 9  1 9 9 1  1 9 9 3  1 9 9 5  1 9 9 7  1 9 8 9  1 9 9 1
1 0 7 1  1 9 7 6  1 9 7 0  1 9 0 0  1 9 8 2  1 9 8 4  1 9 0 6  1 0 8 8  1 9 9 0  1 9 9 2
Per I o d
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Table 6.40
Index of Bank Performance
(Normalised)
(Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
Year Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
1977 100.0 100.0 100.0
1978 105.57 99.96 91.53 j
1979 102.20 100.52 96.72
1980 100.84 103.99 91.04
1981 95.43 108.13 87.84
1982 94.60 105.18 90.27
1983 94.63 103.20 83.89
1984 94.23 97.96 80.71
1985 94.48 97.90 82.37
1986 94.30 94.58 78.84
1987 94.52 97.46 80.29
1988 92.46 108.69 76.85
1989 88.42 98.32 79.63
1990 89.27 90.17 85.46
1991 86.84 96.45 83.99
1992 91.32 98.87 82.35
Base year 1977 = 100
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Table 6.41
Index of Bank Regulation
(Normalised)
(Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
Year Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
1977 100.0 100.0 100.0
1978 109.16 93.91 96.18
1979 86.95 90.65 104.04
1980 70.93 91.39 111.33
1981 97.00 92.23 133.09
1982 110.38 125.58 147.99
1983 122.55 162.82 135.23
1984 132.05 126.54 130.34
1985 172.14 180.92 126.10
1986 155.29 141.15 112.10
1987 146.97 137.49 112.66
1988 136.53 80.27 114.09
1989 128.50 43.17 111.33
1990 144.46 91.67 94.45
1991 161.28 41.11 92.95
1992 153.84 80.55 80.66
Base year 1977 = lOo - .....................................  ............ .... ..................
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Table 6.42
Bank Performance Scores - Non Normalised
Year Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
1977 44.67 44.05 47.45
1978 47.16 44.03 43.43
1979 45.65 44.28 45.89
1980 45.05 45.81 43.19
1981 42.63 47.63 41.67
1982 42.26 46.34 42.83
1983 41.37 45.46 39.80
1984 42.09 43.15 38.29
1985 42.20 43.13 39.08
1986 42.12 41.66 37.40
1987 42.22 42.93 38.09
1988 41.30 47.88 36.46
1989 39.51 43.30 37.78
1990 39.87 39.72 40.55
1991 38.79 42.49 39.85
1992 40.79 43.55 39.07
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Table 6.43
Bank Regulation Scores - Non Normalised
Year Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
1977 14.32 25.14 24.04
1978 15.63 23.61 23.12
1979 12.45 22.78 25.01
1980 10.15 22.97 26.76
1981 13.89 23.18 31.99
1982 15.80 32.07 35.57
1983 17.54 40.93 32.50
1984 18.90 31.81 31.33
1985 24.64 46.73 30.31
1986 22.23 35.48 27.08
1987 21.05 34.56 27.42
1988 19.54 20.18 26.76
1989 18.40 10.85 22.70
1990 20.68 23.04 22.34
1991 23.09 10.33 19.39
1992 22.02 20.25 18.05
6.7.4 Analysis of Bank Performance and Bank Regulation Indices
Performance indices suggest that despite higher levels of performance in Jamaica in 
the early 1980s and again in 1988, bank performance in the Caribbean declined over the 
period measured by the calculated index of performance, but banks in Jamaica performed 
better than banks in Barbados and banks in Trinidad and Tobago performed poorly. Banks 
in all three countries appeared to recover performance levels in the period 1990- 1992, a 
period when most banking systems in the region were being liberalised in differing degrees. 
Improved performance appeared to be associated with the level of deregulation. This measure 
of bank performance differs from the bank profitability measures because of the inclusion of 
other measures usually omitted by banks, principally, solvency and market share.
The index of regulation shows increasing regulation in Barbados over the entire 
period and increasing regulation in Jamaica in the mid 1980s, but a considerable degree of 
liberalisation has taken place since 1985. This is consistent with the observation of Arthur 
Brown that the liberalisation process in Jamaica commenced at the end of 1985. For the case 
of Trinidad and Tobago, regulation increased in the period 1981 to 1985 and may have been 
associated with the tightening of prudential requirements following solvency difficulties of the 
early 1980s which principally involved non-banks, but which also affected banks.
Indices were calculated to a 1977 base year in order to standardise the results, though 
data were available for some countries for earlier periods. The indices show trends in 
regulation over the period but do not indicate the relative levels of regulation in the respective 
countries. (This can be obtained by examining the non-normalised scores (see Tables 6.42 and 
6.43)). Figures 6.1 to 6.6 were based on non-normalised scores. Non-normalized scores 
indicate that levels of bank performance among the commercial banks in Barbados, Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago, were relatively comparable, with the performance of banks in 
Jamaica on average slightly higher. The lower absolute level in the case of Barbados in the 
pre-1988 period seems attributable to the limited emphasis placed on capital criteria arising 
from the branch nature of the banking system which permits foreign branches to rely on 
global capital.
Using the cases of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, a bold interpretation of these 
results would suggest that a regulation score below 20 (non-normalised scores are the 
appropriate scores for comparison across countries) is representative of scenarios where
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regulation is relatively mild ( and by implication liberalisation is moderate). Similarly, bank 
performance scores under 40-45 represent below average performance. However, such 
benchmark scores would need to be confirmed to have global application only after a greater 
number of countries have been sampled. On the basis of the three counties studied, its global 
application can only be tentative, but the methodology is instructive and the results, widened 
to offer global application appear to be of considerable benefit to policy makers, regulators 
and supervisors, particularly where off-site analysis is being relied upon.
6.8 Granger Causality Tests
Despite the weight of evidence and the inference of causality in cointegrating 
equations, causality has not yet been unequivocally established. Granger causality tests are 
therefore conducted for the Barbados case employing the bank performance and regulation 
indices to confirm whether there is causality running from regulation to bank performance.
Table 6.44
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T- Values and Joint Restriction on Coefficients of Additional Variables
Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
R* .792 -.592 -2.657
R* -2 .779 .113 .528
R* -3 .773 .005 2.041
R* -4 .206 -1.778 2.333
Lagrange
Multiplier
(5) 2.00 (4) 11.08 (4) 7.66
Likelihood Ratio (5) 2.04 (4) 24.91 (4) 13.41
F Statistic F (5,49) 3.45 F( 4,4) 5.79 F (4,2) 1.14
In a test for unit roots the composite bank performance variable was found to be 1(1) 
and the composite regulation score variable was 1(0) at the ADF (1) level. The series was
therefore differenced on the basis that if a linear combination of 1(0) variables and 1(1) 
variables is also 1(0) then the the relationship is cointegrated. Causality was tested in a 
bivarate framework for Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. OLS was run on the 
lagged dependent variable. Up to 4 lags were included. Lags of the dependent variable were 
then added using variable addition. Joint tests of zero restrictions on the coefficients were 
applied using three diagnostic tests, the Lagrange multiplier tests, the Likelihood Ratio 
Statistic and the F Statistic. Tests in first differences indicated weak causality for Trinidad 
and Tobago applying the Lagrange multiplier and the Likelihood ratio, and stronger causality 
for the case of Jamaica based on two diagnostic tests. There was no causality running from 
regulation to performance for the case of Barbados (Table 6.44).
Economic theory would not suggest reverse causality nor would extra-statistical 
information discussed earlier. Tests for reverse causality were not therefore conducted.
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6.9 Summary of Results of Empirical Analysis
The four main hypotheses set out in the introduction to this thesis were, firstly, that 
monetary regulation impacts adversely on the performance of commercial banks, secondly that 
monetary regulation can conflict with the objectives of prudential regulation, thirdly, that 
regulators engage in cost-axiomatic pricing which mitigate some of the effects of regulation, 
and fourthly, that regulation depresses the market share of banks relative to non-banks. 
Results fully support the hypothesis on the adverse impact on bank performance and on 
declining market share.
Viewed as a composite group of measures (both monetary and prudential) regulation 
was associated with the decline in commercial bank performance. Further, causality tests 
confirm weak causality running from regulation to performance in the cases of Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago. Results indicate that, except for a few years when increases were 
recorded, composite bank performance declined over the past 15 years in Barbados. This was 
especially so in the peak years of bank regulation. In the Jamaica case, peak years of 
regulation, coincided with low periods of bank performance. A distinct pattern of declining 
bank regulation is observed in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago since 1985 and seems 
associated with the monetary liberalisation of these economies and with the freeing of the 
exchange rate. In the Barbados case, despite the partial freeing of interest rates and the 
removal of credit controls, reserve requirements remain high, and explain the continuing high 
regulation index for Barbados compared with declining indices for Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago.
Bank performance is more influenced by reserve requirements than by any other 
regulatory measure and is associated with adverse performance of several individual 
performance measures. The profitability of local banks improved however, with increasing 
reserve requirements, prompting examination of the theory of growth - maximising reserve 
requirements for the case of local banks where reserve requirements may have offered some 
form of comfort to customers. In the long ran, the banking system was negatively affected 
by credit controls in Barbados and mildly so in Trinidad and Tobago, but the profitability of 
foreign branch banks and small banks was more influenced by credit restrictions than was that 
of local banks. Regulatory resilience seemed very much determined by size and small banks 
had difficulty in adjusting to credit limits. However credit limits did not seem to affect local 
banks in the Barbados case.
Results of tests on the potential for conflict between monetary and prudential 
regulation are mixed. Reserve requirements are negatively associated with bank solvency in 
Trinidad and Tobago, suggesting a potential conflict, but the association is positive in the 
Jamaica case. In the Barbados case, reserve requirements are differently associated with 
solvency in the short run from in the long run and for the case of local banks, the correlation 
of capital and regulatory variables is not negative in all cases.
The hypothesis of cost-axiomatic pricing is supported by the results for the banking 
system in Barbados. Results suggest accommodation by regulators in their approach to the 
setting of interest rate ceilings and floors and contradict the conventional literature which 
posits that interest rate regulation impacts adversely on bank profitability - and in the case of 
Jamaica the theory of cost-axiomatic pricing is not rejected.
The fourth hypothesis that regulation contributes to the loss of market share of 
commercial banks is strongly supported by empirical analysis. Loss of market share to non­
banks is principally attributable to reserve requirements. In the Barbados case, results 
revealed that as local banks became larger, profitability declined.
Some of the other issues cited were supported by the empirical analysis and others 
were rejected. Results suggest that equity holders bear some of the cost of increases in reserve 
requirements through the relationship of dividends to bank profitability and hence to equity. 
This was indicated for all three countries. The views Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that regulated 
credit ceilings do not affect bank profitability are not supported by results for the Barbados 
case but results for the Trinidad and Tobago case are neutral. However, weak support, is 
found for this view in the case of Jamaica and this is attributable to the fact that in the 
Jamaica case there was no ceiling on lending rates so that banks could price in relation to 
their perceptions of bank risk and unrestrictedly trade-off risk against return. The view of 
Mingo (1978) that reserve requirements are associated with increased bank risk also found 
support in the case of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. However, the views of 
commercial banks that reserve requirements and interest rate controls are the most important 
factors influencing the performance of banks is supported for the case of reserve requirements 
and rejected for the case of interest rate controls.
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A model with profitability as the dependent variable confirms that regulatory 
variables are important in establishing the determinants of bank profitability in the Caribbean 
compared with models which exclude them and the resulting model could be viewed as a 
model of the determination of commercial bank performance in developing countries where 
monetary controls are still in effect.
Results tend to support the observation of Revell (1980) that banks in countries 
without foreign banks tend to have higher gross margins than countries with foreign banks. 
However, data did not support the view that large banks are more profitable than small. 
Indeed, results failed to reject the views of Rhodes and Savage (1981) and Hannan (1991) that 
there may not be the economies of scale in banking that are frequently assumed.
Liquidity was negatively associated with interest rate spreads and declined as lending 
rates were raised, suggesting relatively significant price elasticity of demand for credit but the 
relationship between interest controls and liquidity of foreign branch banks was less 
significant than that of local banks and may have been influenced by the fact that foreign 
branches can resort to head offices abroad to ease liquidity difficulties. As expected, liquidity 
increased with credit controls, the exception being the case of local banks, where controls on 
credit seemed to lead to reduced bank liquidity.
The failure of the manufacturing sector to grow could not be attributed to interest rate 
controls. The examples of Trinidad and Tobago where credit controls were imposed but were 
not accompanied by interest rate controls, and the case of Jamaica between 1985-90 when 
credit controls were in place but no interest rate controls were in effect, (and where credit to 
the manufacturing sector grew steadily), suggest that credit to the high-risk sectors will 
increase more rapidly in the presence of credit controls if interest rate controls are not 
simultaneously in effect.
Measured by the indices calculated, except for Jamaica, the performance of 
commercial banks in the Caribbean was generally less than robust and declined in at least one 
case; simultaneously, levels of bank regulation rose up to the mid 1980s (1983-1985) and 
declined thereafter, but remained high in Barbados up to the end of 1992.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Implications for the Future
Generally, the study demonstrates that bank performance is negatively affected by 
monetary regulation. In summary, primary and secondary reserve requirements impacted 
adversely on profitability in all three countries but not for all bank groups, and caused 
profitability to decline in the Barbados case. Credit controls impacted adversely on 
profitability in varying degrees; more strongly in Barbados, less so in Jamaica, and hardly 
at all in Trinidad and Tobago. Cost-axiomatic pricing appeared to be practised in some 
countries but could not offset the overall impact of regulation. Regulation affected market 
share negatively in all three countries. Other observations include the almost total absence of 
entry by banks into the industry, even in the presence of wide interest rate spreads and even 
in times of improved bank profitability. This seems associated with the fact of regulation and 
not necessarily with the profitability of the banking industry. Liberalisation was associated 
with improved bank solvency in Trinidad and Tobago, but did not result in any increase in 
the number of banks over the past 20 years. The rise of non-banks in Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago seemed associated not only with the regulation of banks but with the advantage 
created for non-banks particularly as a result of structural regulation which set boundaries for 
banks and non-banks but which were less restrictive of non-banking activity.
Though results were mixed on the question of a potential conflict between monetary 
controls and prudential criteria, the inference still remains that measures to protect the balance 
of payments via financial regulation compromise the development of commercial banks and 
that central banks in endeavouring to control money and credit, nm the risk of restraining the 
development of the banking system. Capital adequacy and other prudential criteria must be 
consistent with monetary targeting as changes in capital requirements impact the level of 
economic activity particularly where the banking sector is significant relative to other sectors. 
Timing of prudential regulations and the length of the adjustment period needed for 
compliance with capitalization criteria114 are particularly important for developing countries 
whose financial systems are not liberalised and where the banking system is used for 
achieving macroeconomic objectives. Discrete changes in regulation must therefore be based
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114 It has been suggested [Bank of England 1990)] that the agreement by Central banks who are part of the Basle Committee, to increase capital requirements came at a time when the world economy was weak and the balance sheets of many banks found the accommodation difficult.
not only on considerations of safety of financial institutions but must take the adjustment 
process into account as well as the macroeconomic context in which the adjustment is taking 
place.
The study has highlighted that despite the effectiveness of monetary controls in the 
past, with the erosion of the monopoly of commercial banks over the financial system, 
monetary regulation through commercial banks can no longer be relied upon to achieve 
balance of payments equilibrium in an increasingly liberalised environment, so that 
structuralist views will require some modification. In order for the banking system to benefit 
from greater vibrancy and for the entire financial system to become more dynamic, monetary 
controls may need to be loosened. However, given the balance of payment constraints which 
gave rise to such controls, this will require that some means for control of the balance of 
payments other than direct monetary controls over the banking system be found.
Technological advances, telecommunications, information technology, advances in 
financial theory and globalisation of the market place will help to foster deregulation. In 
addition, worldwide competition will put pressure on existing structures and dramatically 
expand the breadth of product markets. Globally the movement toward universal banking is 
inexorable, and despite the risks pointed out by Gill (1983) that weaker contractual savings 
could result, the advantage of greater financial deepening is an alternative offered by 
liberalisation for developing countries with thin financial markets and underdeveloped 
financial instruments, which needs to be grasped.115
Advocates of the conservative position who argue that effective monetary policy 
requires narrowly defined banks are gradually giving way to advocates of the functional 
position who argue for an integrated system. The drawback of this holistic approach is the 
risk of systemic failure and "infection."116 Yet limits on the permissible range of activities
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115 The 1933 Banking Act in the U.S., commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act, was designed to 
separate the activities of banking and investment, ostensibly to prevent conflicts of interests. It prohibited a) undeiwriting of secuiities by member banks b) affiliation between banks and securities houses, c) deposit-taking by securities firms and d) management interlocks between banks and securities firms.
U6The term "infection" refers to situations where problems of one institution create difficulties of loss of confidence in other institutions which are otherwise quite sound.
of different types of institutions undermine efficiency and to a lesser extent stability. The 
option is for regulation to be as close to neutral as possible between different financial 
intermediaries and markets. Such functional regulation would permit the free affiliation of 
various parts of the financial sector and would allow institutions to enter whatever market 
they choose. This would effectively avoid asset or product restrictions, which though 
constraining, are at the same time a central feature of current regulation.
Essentially, the study demonstrates that where banking activities are restricted, the 
scope for profit maximising behaviour is reduced and the banks’ opportunity set is curtailed. 
Monetary regulation tends to inhibit competition and liberalisation increases it. In the process 
of determining the effects of regulation on bank performance, the study has identified a model 
of determination of commercial bank performance appropriate to developing countries where 
controls are still in place. However, the changing market will, however, alter the prescription 
for appropriate profit maximising behaviour and new theories of the banking firm appropriate 
to the new scenario are likely to evolve. Effective monetary policy as a control tool in the 
new structure of the financial system will probably require different transmission mechanisms. 
Also, monetary and prudential controls must allow for global maximisation of economic 
welfare and require a general equilibrium approach in both the setting of monetary policy and 
in the setting of structural and prudential regulations, since these are interdependent areas of 
control.
In the Caribbean, the experiences of the 1980s have forced policy makers to accept 
the deficiencies of the structuralist approach of which monetary control was a part. Indeed 
it is ironic that those Caribbean countries which were most wedded to the structuralist 
approaches have abandoned these views and now adhere to more monetarist IFI prescriptions. 
Countries which were more moderate in the application of these theories have managed to 
accept the monetarist approach of the international financial institutions while retaining some 
of the features in their economic structure which reflect the structuralist point of view. 
Examples in the Caribbean are Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. In Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago, for example, selective credit controls formed part of IMF programmes, and in 
the case of Trinidad and Tobago were used more during the programme period than before.
The observation of the structuralists that elasticities are lower and weaker in 
developing countries than in industrialised countries still apply in the Caribbean context, so
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that even if it might be appropriate to reject the extreme structuralist approach, there are still 
some elements of the structuralist views which remain relevant to the Caribbean and in some 
ways have not yet been completely removed from the policy prescriptions of some Caribbean 
countries. Also, recent research points to the view that liberalisation will not necessarily lead 
to higher economic growth as propounded by the liberalisation theorists led by McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) and can rather lead to financial instability as has been experienced 
in the southern cone of Latin America.
In the Caribbean, the example of Jamaica demonstrates that when markets are fully 
liberalised the exchange rate can come under further pressure and inflation rates soar as 
countries try to seek this new competitiveness while giving full rein to market forces. The 
complete freeing up of markets in the Jamaican economy which was announced at the start 
of 1991 has been accompanied by further devaluation of the dollar and by growing rates of 
inflation. It is worth considering whether devaluation should be sudden or whether the shift 
to full dependence on market forces should be a gradual process, particularly in small 
economies where sudden policy shifts can cause high levels of economic instability.
There remains the underlying monetarist assumption that free markets work more 
efficiently than imperfect markets and that state intervention should be abandoned and free 
markets put in their place. The study has certainly shown that bank performance declines with 
increases in regulation implying that development of the banking system requires monetary 
liberalisation. Most Caribbean countries in structural adjustment programmes are beginning 
to embrace these prescriptions. However, despite the need for greater liberalisation, greater 
attention may need to be paid to some of the concerns of the structuralist - for example their 
views about institutional restraints and observations about some of the negative effects of 
market forces on developing economies.
Where capital markets are underdeveloped and the economies of scale do not exist, 
liberalisation does not ensure the same results as in large economies. The view which prevails 
in the banking and capital market, that markets must be of a certain minimum size to work 
efficiently and that markets without depth cannot function as effectively must be transferred 
to policy approaches of economic management. Despite the acceptance of this view in 
financial circles there is only the occasional concession to the special situation of small 
countries and International Financial Institutions are still generally reluctant to make
I ll
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It is suggested that small Caribbean countries do not neatly fit into either the 
structuralist, the dependency or the monetarist mode, but that aspects of all three are relevant, 
so that a more pragmatic approach to policy prescriptions which takes into account market 
rigidities and special circumstances of the Caribbean is desirable. There is no doubt that 
liberalisation approaches to development in the Caribbean must be embraced by Caribbean 
countries if they are not to be left out of the global search for competitiveness. Globalisation 
will make it more difficult for credit controls and interest rate controls to work, and the scope 
for reserve requirements will be reduced. In this scenario the sequencing of the liberalisation 
process and the way in which structuralists’ concerns are accommodated will become 
important. The study points to the need for further research on how monetary objectives of 
macroeconomic stabilisation can be achieved in a liberalised environment where banks are no 
longer the vehicle for giving effect to monetary controls, for in the final analysis the failure 
to achieve macroeconomic stability will undermine the process of financial development.
Finally, the study shows that global regulation scores and by implication 
(liberalisation scores) can be derived which can indicate to policy makers what are acceptable 
levels of regulation/liberalisation, relative to the past and to other countries. Similarly, the 
study develops bank performance scores for the Caribean and lays the foundation for 
development of performance scores with global application. Inspection of the calculated scores 
would suggest that there is some level of regulation which is consistent with some level of 
bank performance and that if similar studies are conducted of other countries it is possible to 
arrive at a benchmark measure of bank performance below which the concern of bank 
supervisors worlwide (and of banks themselves) is triggered, and similarly, benchmark 
measures of regulation above which the attention of policy makers is triggered. To derive 
such benchmarks with application beyond the Caribbean, would however require a sample 
which includes several other countries so as to give such benchmarks global application and 
therefore suggests an area for further research. Such indicators have the potential for 
facilitating improved monitoring of both the process of liberalisation and the stability of the 
banking system.
concessions to the constraints of size.
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Appendices to Chapter 2
Interest rates and Economic growth
Appendix 2 .1
19*73 I I 19*77 I 19*79 | 19'81 | 1s"83 | ig 'aS  | 19'97 | 19'89 | r ia b l
1 9 7 4  1 9 7 6  1 9 7 8  19B 0 1 9 8 2  1 9 8 4  1 98 6  1 9 8 8  1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2per fod
o real growth + actual lending rate
Appendix 2.2 
Lending rates and economic growth -Jamaica
1 9 7 2  1 9 7 4  1 9 7 6  1 9 7 8  19BD 1 3 8 2  1 9 8 4  1 9 8 6  1 9 8 8  1 9 9 0  1 9 9 2
1 9 7 3  1 9 7 5  1 9 7 7  1 9 7 9  1 9 9 1  1 9 9 3  1 9 9 5  1 9 9 7  1 9 0 9  1 9 9 1
p e r  Iod
l e n d i n g  r a t e s  - ^ - g r o w t h  r a t e
Barbados
* All rates are expressed in nominal terms.
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Appendix 2.3 
L e n d i n g  r a t e s  a n d  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h -
T r f n l d a d  a n d  T o b a g o
1 9 7 3  1 9 7 5  1 9 7 7  1 9 7 9  1 9 9 1  1 9 9 3  1 9 9 5  1 9 8 7  1 9 9 9  1 9 9 1
1 9 7 4  1 0 7 6  1 9 7 0  19BD 1 9 0 2  1 9 9 4  1 9 0 6  1 9 0 0  1 9 9 0  1 9 9 2
P e r l o d
*All rates are expressed in nominal terms.
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Appendix 2.4
Solution via the Method of Lagrange Multipliers 
The problem is to maximise
n  ® p  (a f A ) A  +  r A '  - g ( K )  K  - h ( D ) D
Subject to the soundness constraint 
t -  aA + alAl + cC + kK +cD
and the balance sheet constraint 
Af +A + C -  K ~ D  = Q
The Lagrangean expression is formed from (2A.1) (2A.2) and (2A.3) 
via C = (l-v)D.
L -  pA + rAf + gK -  hD + A1 (x -  aA -  a'Af -  kK + cvD) +
K-vD)
The first order conditions are 
-|| = PaA + p -X xa + X2 = 0
= r - X 1 a/ + X2 — 0 
bA' 1  2
2 . Al  
, 2.A2
2.  A3
eliminating C
X2 (A' + A-  
2 . 4
2 .A5
2.A6
2 . hi
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o  D
= ~hDD~h +X± c v - X 2 v =  0
2.A8
=  P a A  -  X 1 A  =  0
2 . A 9
=  x  -  a A  -  a ' A ' - k K  +  c v DSA = 0
2 . A 1 0
The solution to the Lagrangean multipliers are
fr = Pa
=  A 1 -  A  -  K  -  v D  =  06A2
A .  A l l
fr = -r + Pa a'
Then eliminating A' by rewriting (2.A10) as
x  -  a A  + a 7A  -  ( a 1 +  k )  K -  ( a ' - c ) v D  =  0 2 . A 1 2
We are left with four equations (2.A5), (2.A7), (2.A8) and (2.A12) in four unknowns (A 
a,D, K).
To solve for changes is in the endogenous variable with respect to a change in soundness, 
total derivatives of equation (2.A5) (2.A7) (2.A8) and (2.A12) are taken, yielding
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4 P -  %  * 2Pjl f  ♦ (a'-)paa f  = 0
- 2 % - f  - <a' + * ) p M  f  = 0
-  I H , „  f  - 2 h D - f  -  ( a - e )  v p aa f  =  0
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Appendices to Chapter 3
BARBADOS
Appendix 3.1
Monetary and Prudential Regulatory Changes 1972-1992
E f f e c t i v e Cash R e se rv e S e co n d a ry C r e d it  c o n t r o l s I n t e r e s t D is c o u n t
d a t e s R equi rem ents r e s e r v e + t ig h t e r s p r e a d s  (a v r a t e
re q u ire m e n ts - e a s i e r le n d in g -  m in
M = m od ified s a v in g s )
1973
qi
q2
q3
q4 D ec3 +2% +1%
1974
qi
Jan 31 +1%
Feb 28 +1%
q2
q3
S e p t  5 +2% +1%
q4
O ct 31 +1%
Nov 30 +1%
1975
qi
Mar 1 -1%
Mar 24 +2%
Q2
June 1 -1%
J u ly  31 +1%
Aug1 +2%q3
0 c t1 -1%
q4
Source: Central Bank of Barbados
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Appendix 3.1 Cont'd
Barbados
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requirements
secondary 
reserve 
requi rements
c re d it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r 
-easier 
M=modified
in te re s t 
spreads(av. 
lend ing- min 
savings)
d is-coun t
ra te
1976
ql
q2
May 1
q3
q4
Dec 1 
Dec 31
+3%
-0.5%
-1.0%
1977
q i
q2
q3
Aug3
AugIS
q4
Sept 27
+2%
+
+
1978
q l
q2
q3
Aug 1
-2%
( in c r )
Q4
Nov 1 -
1979
qi
feb14
q2
q3
q4
-
1980
q i
q2
A p r i l 15
- (M)
+1%
(deer)
June 1 
q3
Sept 22
+ (M)
q4
Source: Central Bank o f Barbados
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Appendix 3.1 cont'd
Barbados
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requi rements
secondary 
reserve 
requi rements
c re d it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r -eas ie r 
M=modified
in te re s t 
spreads (av. 
lending - min 
savings)
discount
ra te
1981
q i
Jan 1
q2
q3
q4
Oct 1
Oct 26
Oct27
Nov4 +5%
+
+0.5%
(deer)
-1%
( in c r )
-.05%
( in c r )
+3%
+8%
+4%
1982
qi
Mar 3 
q2 
q3 
q4
Oct 1
+2%
-2%
1983
q1
q2
A p r i l 1 
A p r i l 30 
June 30
q3
q4
- (M)
-1%
( in c r )
+1%
(deer)
+0.5%
(deer)
-4%
1984
q i
Mar 9
q2
Apr 19
May 20 
June 19 
q3
Jul 1
+ (M)
-0.5%
( in c r )
Source: Central Bank o f Barbados
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Appendix 3.1 Cont'd
Barbados
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requirements
secondary 
reserve 
requi rements
c re d it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r 
-easie r 
M= M odified
in te re s t 
spreads(av 
lending - min 
savings)
Discount
ra te
1985
q i
Feb 1 
q2
Apr 1 
May 15 - (M)
+1%
(deer)
-3%
May 20
q3
q4
1986
q i
Apr 1
+0.5%
(deer)
Apr 3 -2%
q2
q3
Spt 17
+3% -1%
( in c r )
-3%
q4
1987
q i
q2
Jun 5
q3
q4
(con tro ls
removed)
1988
q1
q2
q3
q4
Source: Central Bank of Barbados
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Barbados
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requi rements
secondary 
reserve 
requi rements
c re d it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r -eas ie r 
M=Modified
i n te re s t 
spreads (av 
lending- min 
savings)
discount
ra te
1989
qlq2q3
Sept 20 
q4
Oct 16 
Dec4
+ con tro ls  
re ins ta ted
+3.5%
+2%
1990
qiqH
Jun 1q3
q4
-<M> +0.5%
(deer)
1991
qlq2q3
Aug 1 
Aug 15
q4
Oct 16 
Nov 1 
Dec 31
+2%
+1% -
(.9% ) 
( in c r )  
Determined 
by banks 
a f te r  Aug 1
(-1.1%) 
( in c r )  
by bks
+2.5%
+2%
1992
q l
q2q3
Ju ly  1 
Aug 1 
Sept 15 
Sept 28 
q4
-2%
- (con tro ls  
removed May 1 
*93)
(-1.4%) 
( in c r )  
by banks 
(-0.4%) 
( in c r )  
by banks
-3%
-3%
Source: Central Bank o f Barbados
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Appendix 3.2
JAMAICA
Monetary and Prudential Regulation 1973-92*
E ffe c tiv e
dates
Cash Reserve 
Requi rements
L iqu id  assets 
ra t io
(inc ludes cash)
C red it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r 
-easie r 
M=modified
Minimum 
In te re s t ra te  
on savings 
deposits S
Discount 
ra te  (Bank 
ra te )
1973
qi
q2
q3
q4 +2.5%
dec
+1/2% to  4% 
(Feb)
+1% 
(Jan1)
1974
qi
q2q3 i 
q4
+1.5%
May
+(M)
Nov
+2% to  6% 
(Feb)
+2% 
Jan 24
1975
ql
q2
q3
q4
+1% 
Dec 12
-1%
Feb19
1976qi
q2
q3
q4
1977
qiq2q3
q4
+2% 
Mar 21
1978
ql
q2
q3
Aug 1 
Q4
1979
ql
q2
q3
q4
40%
vo lun ta ry
-(M)
Feb15
1980qi
q2
q3
q4
+ (c re d it  
ce ilin g s  
established fo r  
personal and 
d is tr ib u t io n )
+3%
May 8
*  S e lec tive  c re d it  con tro ls  were f i r s t  introduced in  November 1969, con tro l o f the prime ra te  in  
May 1969 and co n tro l o f both the savings and prime lending rates in  Ju ly  1972.
The Bank o f Jamaica commenced payment on cash reserve (c le a rin g  account balances) in  October 1984.
Source: Central Bank of Jamaica
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Jamaica
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requirements
liq u id  assets 
ra t io
c re d it  con tro ls  
+ tig h te r  -eas ie r 
M=modified
in te re s t 
spreads(prime- 
min savings)
discount
ra te
1981
q i
q2
q3
q4
82
q1
q2
q3
q4
1983
q i
q2
q3
q4
+6%
vo lun ta ry  
ra t io  o f 40% 
term inated
1984
ql
q2
q3
Apri I
q4
+2%
Jan 24 
+2%
Mar 12 
+1% May 11 
+2% Sept 30 
+2% oct 22
+4%
Feb 9 
(Voluntary 
liq u id  assets 
ra t io
reintroduced 
a t 44%
pe rm itting  up 
to  50% ) 
form alized 
01.11.84
c re d it c e ilin g s  
on p r iva te  sector 
12%
(Jan 24)
to  11% (Feb)
+1% to  16% 
(Sept) 
+1% to13% 
(Nov)
+1% to  13% 
Jan 25
+1% to  
14% Aug 
8 +2% 
to  16%
Oct 16
Source: Central Bank o f Jamaica
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Jamaica
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requirements
L iqu id  assets 
ra t io  
(excludes 
cash)
c re d it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r 
-easie r 
M= Modified
Minimum 
savings 
deposit ra te
Discount
ra te
1985 +4% from 44% + global +2% to  15%
qi +1% to  15% to 48% c e ilin g s  Aug 3 (Feb)qz Apr 4
+2 to  17% + tigh ten ing  o f +3% to  18% +1 to  17%
q3 June 6 * c e r t i f ic a te s global c re d it (Apr) Feb
+2% to  19% of deposits June 11 +4 to  21%
q4 June 21 introduced +3% to  20% A p r il 1
+1 to  20% Nov 18 C redit c e ilin g (May)
Ju ly  8 removed, except
consumer c re d it
Oct 10
1986
ql Feb 1 -4% to  16%
48% to  44% (May)
q2 May 1 + August
q3 44% to 38% consumer c re d it -1% to  15%
tightened, (Aug)
q4 con tro ls  on
personal and
d is tr ib u t io n
re ins ta ted .
1987 March 26
q1 +3% to  35%
q2q3
q4
1988 March 30 - -5% to  30% Jan
q1 In te re s t on 27 -2% to  13%
q2 payment of -5% to  25% (Sept)
q3 cash reserve Feb 24
q4 increased from -5% to  20%
15%to 30% Mar 20
Source: Central Bank of Jamiaca
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Jamaica
E ffe c tiv e  1 
dates
Cash Reserve 
Requirements
L iqu id  Assets 
Ratio 
(excludes 
cash)
C red it Controls 
+ tig h te r  -easie r 
M=Modified
Minimum 
Savi ngs 
Deposit ra te
discount 
ra te  Bank 
ra te )
1989
qi
q2q3
q4
20% to  19% 
Ju ly  1 
Termination 
of in te re s t 
charged on 
cash po rtion  
o f cash 
reserves.
+ C red it c e ilin g s  
reimposed Dec 
31
+5% to  18% 
(Nov)
1990
q l
q2q3q4
+.5% to 
19.5%
+.5% to  20% 
May 1
+5% to  25% 
A p r il 1 
+2.5% to 
27.5% May 1 
+5% to 32.5% 
Nov 1
Savings ra te  
deregulated 
(Oct)
1991
qi
q2q3
q4
-1% from 20% 
to  19%
Oct 1
+1% to 33.5% 
Jan 10 
-13.5% to  20% 
A p r il 1 
Schedules 
provided fo r  
liq u id  assets 
ra t io .
c re d it  c e ilin g s  
removed.
Jan. 1
1992
q l
q2
q3
q4
+2% to  21% 
May 1.
+2% to  23% 
June 1
+2% to  25% 
Ju ly 1
l iq u id  assets 
ra t io
increased to  
50%
Ju ly  1
Source: Central Bank o f Jamaica
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Trinidad and Tobago 
Monetary and Prudential Regulation - 1972-1992
Appendix 3.3
E ffe c tiv e
dates
Cash Reserve 
Requi rements
L iqu id  assets 
ra t io
(inc ludes cash)
C red it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r 
-eas ie r 
M=modified
Minimum 
Savings 
Deposit Rate 
(no t
ap p licab le )
Discount 
ra te  (Bank 
ra te )
1973
qi
q2
q3
q4
+2% to  7% 
Ju ly  2
+1% to 
6% Ju ly
1974
q1
q2q3
+2% to 9% 
Nov 27
q4
1975
qi
Q2
q3
q4
Source: Central Bank o f T rin idad  and Tobago
294
Appendix 3.3 Cont'd
Trinidad and Tobago
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requirements
liq u id  assets 
ra t io  (includes 
cash)
c re d it con tro ls  
+ tig h te r 
-easie r 
M=modified
Minimum 
Savings 
Deposit Rate 
(not
a p p licab le )
discount
ra te
1976
qi
q2
q3
q4
minimum down 
payments and 
maximum 
repayment 
periods fo r  
consumer c re d it 
revised.
1977
qi
q2
q3
q4
1978
qi
q2
q3
Aug 1 
Q4
1979
ql
q2
q3
q4
se le c tive  c re d it 
c o n tro l, non­
business loans 
re s tr ic te d  to  
25% of 
incremental 
c re d it .  Nov
1980
qi
q2
q3
q4
9% marginal 
reserve 
requirement of 
15%. Feb 2
Source: Central Bank o f t r i n i  dad and Tobago
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Trinidad and Tobago
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requi rements
liq u id  assets 
ra t io
c re d it  con tro ls  
+ tig h te r  -eas ie r 
M=modified
Minimum 
Savi ngs 
Deposit Rate 
(not
ap p licab le )
d i scount 
ra te
1981
qi
q2
q3
...... . . . . .
82
qi
q2
q3
q4
1983
qlq2
q3
q4
+1.5% to  
7.5%
Nov 9 
Bank Rate
1984
qiq2
q3
q4
+2% to  17% 
Nov 7
+1% to  13% 
Feb 9 
+1% to  14% 
Aug 8 
+2% to  16% 
Oct 16 
Bank Rate 
7.5%
Source: Central Bank o f T rin idad  and Tobago
Appendix 3.3 contfd
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Trinidad and Tobago
E ffe c tiv e cash reserve L iqu id  assets c re d it  con tro ls Minimum Discount
dates requi rements ra t io + tig h te r Savings ra te
(excludes 
cash) |
-eas ie r 
M= M odified
Deposit Rate 
(no t
ap p licab le )
1985
ql
q2
q3
q4
1986 -2% to  15% - se lec tive
q1 ju ly  2 c re d it  con tro l
q2 formula changed
q3 from an
q4 incremental
basis on
consumer
loans.Not to
exceed 30% of
average
loans.Sept 30
Minimum
downpayment
removed and
maximum
repayment
periods
extended.
1987 cash and secondary 11%
ql secondary Dec 16
q2 reserve s p l i t .
q3 cash
q4 requirement 9% 
Dec 16
1988 +2% to  9.5%
qi
q2
q3 78.50
q4 9.5
Source: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago
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Trinidad and Tobago
E ffe c tiv e
dates
cash reserve 
requi rements
liq u id  assets
ra tio (exc ludes
cash)
c re d it 
con tro ls  
+ tig h te r - 
easier 
M=Modified
in te re s t i
spreads(not
ap p licab le )
discount 
ra te  Bank 
ra te )
1989
q1
q2
q3
q4
S ta tu to ry
cash
requirement 
increased by 
3% to
12%.Ju ly  26
- to  9% Jan 25
- 2% to  7% May 3 
-2% to  5% Ju ly  26
1990
q1
q2
q3
q4
1991
qi
q2
q3
q4
+4%to
16%
August 22
(Jan 1991) 
new
instalment
c re d it
gu ide lines
+1% to  10 
%(Oct)
+1% to  11.5% 
(Dec)
1992
ql
q2
q3
q4
+1.5% to  13% 
(Jan)
Source: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago
A Note on Deposit Insurance
If capital criteria are intended to protect the insurance fund and hence the system, the 
need for deposit insurance may be reduced if capital adequacy and other regulatory controls 
are adequate. One solution is to implement risk-based capital criteria, but the disadvantage 
is that banks are likely to avoid risky investments and could leave the financing of high risk 
projects in the Caribbean unsatisfied, thus resulting in costs in terms of social efficiency.
It is sometimes argued that the better option might be to increase capital requirements 
instead of requiring deposit insurance. This view ignores the pooling effect of resources, since 
in the deposit insurance case contributions of several institutions provide support to the failing 
bank, while in the latter, that institution relies only on its own capital, a more costly 
alternative. The result of either capital adequacy criteria or deposit insurance, or both, is to 
reduce the profitability of banks in the short term.
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Appendix 3.5
Foreign Exchange Reserves Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
BarbadosBDS$milliom JamaicaJ$million Trinidad & Tobago TT$million
1972 n.a. n.a. 97.4
1973 35.7 -107.1 78.1
1974 46.4 -89.1 776.7
1975 82.2 144.6 1722.9
1976 53.5 71.6 2397.7
1977 74.3 -155.5 3192.5
1978 126.1 -229.6 4058.7
1979 143.8 -518.6 4996.0
1980 167.2 -709.5 6491.3
1981 125.5 -957.2 7677.2
1982 184.6 -1382.5 7034.8
1983 227.2 -1362.5 4950.9
1984 238.5 -2361.5 3579.9
1985 321.7 -3911.4 1528.4
1986 296.3 -6271.9 314.6
1987 289.6 -6509.8 284.9
1988 328.8 -4931.4 -23.8
1989 255.9 -3278.8 534.3
1990 165.1 -3274.6 796.8
1991 70.0 -4813.8 n.a.
Source: Monthly Digests of Statistics, Central Banks of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Total Assets of Commercial Banks Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago $ Million
Appendix 3.6
BARBADOSBDS$ JAMAICAJ$ T’DAD & TOBAGO TT$
1972 331.6 632.3 759.0
1973 355.3 767.0 912.4
1974 390.9 907.2 1178.6
1975 450.9 1010.9 1555.8
1976 486.6 1066.1 1857.8
1977 538.2 1183.9 2406.4
1978 646.4 1538.6 3112.6
1979 795.4 1643.8 3942.2
1980 883.8 2100.4 4694.7
1981 1011.0 2634.2 5752.6
1982 1109.6 3150.4 8553.0
1983 1211.3 4319.6 9607.6
1984 1310.9 5426.0 10059.8
1985 1416.2 6623.3 10165.1
1986 1511.3 8240.2 9913.2
1987 1781.3 9600.0 10744.4
1988 1844.7 12812.0 10765.6
1989 1923.1 15320.0 11107.3
1990 2186.4 17327.0 12187.2
1991 2160.1 27691.0 13254.2
1992 2266.2 47865.0 13100.5
Source: Monthly Digests of Statistics, Central Banks of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Share of Banks in Total Assets of Banks and Non-banks $ Million
Appendix 3.7
YEAR BARBADOS
(%)
JAMAICA
(%)
T’DAD & TOBAGO
(%)
1972 • • . .
1973 • . . .
1974 . .
1975 M 87.2
1976 82.3 85.3
1977 94.4 84.7 84.7
1978 92.7 85.7 82.1
1979 91.2 86.6 83.7
1980 90.5 90.7 80.9
1981 88.8 93.6 78.0
1982 87.9 93.3 80.2
1983 87.4 89.8 78.2
1984 86.7 89.5 77.9
1985 87.5 88.6 76.7
1986 86.1 81.4 80.7
1987 86.0 84.3 82.3
1988 83.6 81.9 81.2
1989 82.7 80.1 81.8
1990 83.2 78.9 81.3
1991 82.1 81.8 81.5
1992 82.7 81.2 78.8
Source: Monthly Digests of Statistics, Central Banks of Barbados, Jamaica and Trindad and Tobago.
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Appendix 3.8
Comparative Bank Rates 
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
(%)
BARBADOS JAMAICA T’DAD & TOBAGO
1972 - 6.0 5.0
1973 - 7.0 6.0
1974 10.5 9.0 6.0
1975 7.5 8.0 6.0
1976 6.0 9.0 6.0
1977 6.0 9.0 6.0
1978 6.0 9.0 6.0
1979 6.0 9.0 6.0
1980 7.0 11.0 6.0
1981 22.0 11.0 6.0
1982 20.0 11.0 6.0
1983 16.0 11.0 7.5
1984 16.0 16.0 7.5
1985 13.0 21.0 7.5
1986 8.0 21.0 5.97
1987 8.0 20.6 7.5
1988 8.0 17.35 9.5
1989 13.5 25.10 9.5
1990 13.5 30.73 9.5
1991 18.0 46.94 11.5
1992 12.0 25.49 13.0
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Appendix 3.9
Required Cash Reserves as a % of Total Assets
Period Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago
1974 3.03 1.3 7.03
1975 4.74 2.12 7.17
1976 4.81 2.12 7.88
1977 6.31 2.87 7.80
1978 6.41 2.68 7.30
1979 7.47 3.06 7.75
1980 6.72 2.83 9.08
1981 6.50 2.49 11.20
1982 6.21 2.19 11.86
1983 6.19 1.74 12.41
1984 6.20 1.51 12.58
1985 6.13 1.31 12.37
1986 6.19 1.13 10.93
1987 5.83 1.08 6.25
1988 6.25 .90 6.37
1989 6.21 .77 8.60
1990 6.09 .76 8.26
1991 6.19 n.a 10.45
1992 6.37 n.a. 9.96
Source: Monthly Digests of Statistics, Central bank of Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago.
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(a) Reserve Requirements
1. What are the steps which your bank would take in order to meet increases in reserve 
requirements?
2.How long would it ordinarily take your bank to satisfy a 1% increase in reserve 
requirements?
3. What is the impact on your loan commitment profile of an increase in reserve 
requirements?
4. What areas of your bank’s lending would you first restrict in order to assist in satisfying 
reserve requirements?
5. Do you intensify your marketing for deposits when cash reserve requirements are 
increased?
6. Does the adjustment required to the announcement of increases in reserve requirements 
often entail an increase in interest rates offered on deposits?
7. a) Does your bank ordinarily keep sufficient cash or liquid assets on hand and in your
portfolio in anticipation of a cash reserve requirement increase?
b) If the answer to 7a) above is yes, what size excess cash and liquid assets would your bank
normally aim to keep in excess of your working capital needs?
8. Does the adjustment response of your bank differ when there is an increase in secondary 
reserves; e.g. treasury bills or debentures? Please state how.
9. Other than the fact that secondary reserves are interest bearing assets, is it otherwise easier 
to satisfy that requirement?
Appendices To Chapter 4
Appendix 4.1
QUESTIONNAIRE
10. Does your bank as a matter of policy keep a sufficient stock of securities to satisfy an
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increase in 
secondary reserves?
a) as much as 1 % of deposits?
b) 2% of deposits?
c) 3% of deposits?
d) Other (please specify)
11. Does your bank borrow from its head office (in the case of branches) in order to satisfy 
primary or secondary reserve increases?
Yes No____
12. Would the rate of interest obtaining abroad influence your decision at 11 above?
Yes  No____
13. In the case of branches would borrowing from head office, if undertaken, be undertaken 
before:
a) launching a deposit drive?
b) cutting back on private sector lending?
(please tick)
14. If your bank had to restrain its lending in order to satisfy reserve requirements. What 
sector would likely be the most affected? Rank in order of 1 to 4
—  personal lending
— distribution
—  manufacturing
—  services
—  other (please specify)
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1. Do you think they are ways for banks to circumvent credit controls? (please tick)
1) only slightly
2) partly so
3) almost fully
4) not at all
2. Do the limits on credit to selected sectors lead to increases in credit to other sectors in the 
private sector? Yes______ No______
If "yes" please specify and rank the sectors which benefit.
3. Do credit controls affect the profitability of your bank?
Y es  No______
If "yes", please specify.
4. Are there more applications from the protected sectors when controls are in place?
Yes  No________
5. Are the potential returns from the controlled sectors greater than the potential returns from 
the eligible sectors?
6. If "yes", are the eligible sectors likely to bear a higher rate of interest?
Yes_   No
7. Is there a pent up demand for credit from the controlled sectors?
Yes  No____
8. If and when global credit limits are in place,to what sectors would credit first be cut? 
Please rank.
1.
( b) Credit Controls
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3.
4.
9. In the case of branches). Does your head office give your branch quantitative guidelines 
for lending to specific sectors?
Yes  No______
If "yes", which sectors are given priority?
1.
2.
3.
10. Is the size of your bank a constraint in meeting official guidelines relating to credit or 
reserve and securities requirements?
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1. What are the major difficulties for banks when ceilings are placed on:
a) the average lending rate?
b) the prime lending rate?
2. What areas of banking activity are first affected when the ceiling on the average lending 
rate (or prime rate if applicable) is lowered? Please state.
3. Do banks immediately attempt to lower deposit rates when lending rates are lowered?
Yes  No_____
4. What scope is there for cutting other costs when lending rates are lowered?
5. Would increased bank charges tend to be the first or last recourse before lowering deposit 
rates where possible?
a) first____
b) last____
c) Other (please specify)
6. Is it a disadvantage to banks in having a minimum savings rate (where applicable)? Please 
tick.
a) slight advantage
b) great advantage
c) advantage
Please give reasons for your response.
7. To what extent do you think that a higher minimum savings rate raises the level of savings 
deposits when these rates are similar for all banks?
a) helps a little
b) helps a lot
c) Other (please specify.
8. Is the competition for deposits greater when:
a) interest rates are high
b) when banks are illiquid
(c) Interest Rates
9. Has liquidity of your bank ever been a serious problem?
Yes  No___
Please comment on the circumstances.
10. Do interest rate controls influence the liquidity of your bank?
Yes No
Please state how.
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(In the case of local banks). Do you find the minimum capital requirements:
a) adequate
b) too low
c) too high
2. Do you think prudential regulations which require banks to capitalise in line with the 
riskiness of their portfolios are:
a) reasonable
b) too strict
c) unreasonable
3. Are prudential regulations likely to affect the profitability of banks?
Yes  No___
4. Does the limit on lending to a single customer adversely affect your bank?
Yes  No__
If "yes" please state how.
5. Does the restriction on the holding of equity by banks in commercial operations affect the 
profitability of banks?
Yes  No___
If "yes" please state how.
6. a) Do capital adequacy provisions affect the liquidity of your bank?
Favourably _______ Unfavourably___
Please state how.
b) Do capital adequacy provisions affect the solvency of banks?
Favourably  Unfavourably___
Please state how.
c) Do capital adequacy provisions affect the profitability of banks?
Favourably  Unfavourably___
Please state how.
(d) Prudential regulation
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Appendix 4.2
Responses to the Questionnaire sent to Commercial Banks 
in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
The questionnaire received an 83% response from commercial banks in Barbados, a 50% 
response from banks in Trinidad and Tobago and a 25% response from banks in Jamaica. 
Most banks felt that profitability was adversely affected by increases in primary and 
secondary reserve requirements. They viewed the savings rate as restricting pricing flexibility 
and considered ceilings on lending, whether average lending or prime lending, as 
disadvantageous to high risk borrowers but felt that the impact of interest rate controls on 
profitability depended on spreads rather than on the absolute level at which rates were set. 
All banks responding observed that credit controls adversely affected profitability and felt that 
scope for circumvention was slight. Most banks viewed prudential controls as adequate and 
many thought concentration guidelines adversely affected profitability. Most felt that initial 
capital requirements were adequate but were non-committal about the use of risk-based capital 
guidelines.
The results of the questionnaire are summarized below.
Abbreviations: Bds= Barbados
Jca= Jamaica
T&T= Trinidad and Tobago 
Responses marked ( a) refer to reserve requirements
(b) to credit controls.
(c) to interest rate controls.
(d) to prudential regulations.
(4.a)Reserve Requirements
4.a.i.
Commercial banks’ reaction to increases in reserve requirements (both primary and 
secondary) ____________
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Appendix 4.a cont’d
Responses to questionnaire
Response % of times mentioned
Country Bds Jca T&T
Increase deposits 100% 100% 33%
Restrict lending generally 83% 50% 100%
Reduce Credit Lines 33% - -
Offer higher interest rates 50% 50% 33%
Cancel loan commitments 17% - -
Sell excess treasury bills 17% 33% -
4.a.2
Length of time taken to satisfy a 1 % increase in Reserve Requirements /liquid assets ratio
Length of time taken Percent of responses
Country Bds Jca T&T
Virtually no time
17% 100% 33%
Up to 2 weeks
17%
-
33%
Up to 2 
months 33%
-
Over 2 months 33% - -
Various times - - 33%
4.a.3.
Most banks indicated that the impact of increased primary and secondary reserve requirements 
on loan commitments would depend on liquidity at the time. Generally, however the response 
would be as follows.
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Banks’ response to loan commitments following an increase in reserve requirements
Response % of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Lower commitments 20% 100% 33%
Honour on a first come first served basis 20% - -
Restrict drawdown 40% - -
Indicate inability to meet commitments 20% - -
No effect 100% 33%
Most banks indicated that they would not use any one approach but the response 
represented the most generally used approach by them.
4.a.4
The following table summarizes those areas of lending first restricted in order to 
meet increases in official reserve requirements.
Sectors which suffer credit cutbacks following credit controls
Sectors of credit cut-backs % of responses
Personal lending 40%
Commercial lending 20%
Excess overdraft 20%
Across the board 20%
4.a.5
Banks indicated that they intensified marketing of deposits when reserve requirement 
were increased, especially banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
4.a.6.
Banks confirmed that increases in reserve requirements very often required increased interest 
rates.
4.a.7. a) and b)
The evidence is that most banks tend to hold reserves and securities in excess of the 
stipulations, but almost all banks indicated that this was not done in anticipation of, or as a 
contingency against, increases in reserve requirements. Banks in Jamaica or Trinidad and 
Tobago which responded to the questionnaire indicated that they did not deliberately hold 
excess reserves in anticipation of increased cash reserve requirements. In Barbados a very
small percentage indicated that they held excesses with official requirements in mind.
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The responses to this question are summarized below.
Holding of excess reserves as a contingency against future increases
Holding of excess reserves Percent Quantity
Country Barbados only Barbados only
As a contingency against 
increased requirements
17% $5.0 million 
approximately
Excess not held as a contingency 
against increases
83% n.a.
4.a.8
Most banks observed that action taken to satisfy reserve requirements was little different from 
action taken to satisfy secondary reserve requirements except where they were in a position 
to sell treasury bills in satisfaction of cash reserve requirements. In such cases it was easier 
to satisfy cash reserve requirements. The cost was of course lower in the case of secondary 
reserve requirements, but the difference in adjustment was largely one of degree.
Difference in banks’ responses to cash reserve requirement increases compared with increases 
in secondary reserve requirements
Response to increased cash reserve 
requirements vs secondary reserve 
increases
Percent of responses
Country Bds Jca T&T
The same 83% 50% 66%
Different 17% 50% 33%
Easier 83% - 33%
More difficult easier 50% -
4.a.9
Other than the fact that secondary reserves were interest bearing, banks felt that it 
was not otherwise easier to satisfy secondary reserve requirements in circumstances where 
they held no excess securities.
4.a. 10
Most banks had no policy on holding of excess reserves but seemed to allow demand 
and supply conditions to dictate their holding of excess primary and secondary reserves. 
Banks in Jamaica had a policy not to hold excess reserves.
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Is there a policy on excess reserves?
Indications % of responses
Country Bds Jca T&T
Policy 0% - -
No Policy
83%
- 100%
Policy to hold excess 0% - -
Policy not to hold excess 0% 100% -
Policy to hold excess if 
possible
17% - -
4.a. 11 and a. 12
Banks in Barbados indicated that they borrowed abroad to satisfy primary or secondary 
reserve requirements. In such cases the interest rate obtaining abroad was not a major 
consideration; this either indicates that interest rates abroad were generally lower than local 
rates or that banks placed a high priority on compliance. Commercial banks in Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago, where most banks are locally owned and controlled, did not borrow 
abroad to satisfy reserve requirements.
Borrowing abroad to satisfy reserve requirements
Borrowing abroad % of responses Influenced by Interest Rate
Country Barbados only
Yes 25% no
No 75% ••
4.a.13
Those banks in Barbados which indicated that they would borrow abroad also indicated that 
they would first launch a deposit drive or cut back on private sector lending. It was 
interesting that this response was only obtained when the question was specifically asked but 
was not mentioned voluntarily among the earlier responses to increased reserve requirements, 
indicating perhaps that it is usually a last resort.
4.a.14
In identifying which sectors were more likely to be affected by cutbacks in lending 
as banks sought to satisfy reserve requirements, the sector most frequently mentioned was 
services in Barbados, and personal lending in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Sectors likely to suffer cutbacks in lending (Ranked by frequency mentioned)
Sector Rank
Country Bds Jca T&T
Services 1 4 3
Distribution 2 3 2
Manufacturing 3 2 4
Personal lending 4 1 1
(b) Credit Controls
Most commercial banks thought circumvention of credit controls was possible but that the 
possibilities were few.
4.b.l
Can credit controls be circumvented?
Likelihood of possible 
circumvention
% of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Only slightly 40% - -
Partly so 40% 66% 50%
Almost fully 0% 33% -
Not at all 20% - 50%
4.b.2
Banks were unanimous in the view that credit controls on the consuming sectors 
did not lead to increases in credit to the productive or officially preferred sectors.
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Do credit controls lead to increases in credit to the productive sectors?
Credit controls: leads to increase in credit 
to productive sectors?
% of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Yes 0% 0% 0%
No 100% 100% 100%
4.b.3
Most banks thought that credit controls affected profitability adversely.
Effect of credit controls on profitability
Effect of credit control on profitability % of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Adverse 100% 66% 100%
Positive 0% 33%
None 0% - _
4.b.4
Most banks observed that there was no increase in applications from the productive sectors 
when credit controls were in place.
4.b.5 & 6
Most banks in Barbados felt that returns from lending to the controlled sectors were 
greater than returns from the protected sectors suggesting that interest rates charged were 
higher, but not all banks in Jamaica were of that view, nor were one-third of the respondents 
from Trinidad and Tobago.
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Relative returns from credit to the protected sectors
Response Returns from credit to the protected sectors
Country Bds Jca T&T
Greater 25% - 33%
Lesser 75% 50% 66%
The same 0% - -
Not
necessarily
greater
25% 50% -
4. b.7.
Commercial banks in Barbados observed that there was no pent up demand for 
credit from the controlled sector. This differed from responses from commercial banks in 
Jamaica who observed that there was considerable pent up demand from the controlled sectors 
when controls were in place.
4.b.8
In response to the question concerning which sectors were affected by global credit 
limits, the personal sector was mentioned more frequently by respondents. The following is 
a summary of those responses.
Sectors affected by global credit limits
(ranked by the frequency and order in which mentioned)
Sector No of times sector 
mentioned
Country Bds Jca T&T
Personal 1 1 1
Distribution 2 1 1
Services 3 1 *4
Manufacturing 4 .,
Construction 4 2 2
Agriculture 5 3 .,
Tourism , , ., !
! Across the board 
(least profitable)
4 1 2
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Only a few banks in Barbados indicated the existence of head office guidelines for 
sectoral lending. There were no such guidelines in Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago where 
most banks were locally owned.
4.b.9
Head office guidelines on sectoral credit
Are there head office guidelines on 
sectoral credit?
% of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Yes 20% 0% 0%
No 80% 100% 100%
4.b,10
Only a minority of banks in Barbados felt that size was important in influencing 
banks’ ability to meet official requirements. Commercial banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago thought it was irrelevant. It is observed that most banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago tend to be larger than in Barbados.
Importance of size in meeting official requirements
Size as important in meeting requirements % of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Yes 20% 0% 0%
No 80% 100% 100%
4. (c) Interest Rates
Banks were unanimous in their views about the adverse effects of interest rate controls, but 
differed in identifying the major areas affected. Responses were very similar concerning the 
action which they would take to counteract adverse effects of interest rate controls. Remedies 
mentioned tended to be common across banks and across countries.
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4.c. 1.
Major difficulties arising from average or prime lending rate ceilings 
(weighted by frequency mentioned)
Areas affected % weighted percent
Country Bds Jca T&T
Costly monitoring 20% - -
Constraints on spreads 30% 50% 25%
Inability to price in relation to risk 50% - -
Restricts lending - 25% 50%
Competition from non-banks - 25% 25%
4.C.2.
The responses from banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago placed a great deal of 
emphasis on competition from non-banks, suggesting that this was an important consideration 
in pricing. This compared with Barbados where this concern was not mentioned.
Areas of banking activity first affected when prime or average lending rates are lowered
Areas first affected Weighted percent
Country Bds Jca T&T
Control of spreads 40% 50% 50%
Adverse impact on profitability 20% - -
Difficulty in raising deposit levels 20% - -
Other 20% 50% 50%
4.C.3.
All banks indicated that they attempted to lower deposit rates as soon as lending 
rates were cut, some immediately, others after monitoring deposit rate commitments. Banks 
in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were inclined to cut rates irrespective of deposit 
commitments.
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Cut in deposit rates in response to reduction in lending rates.
Cut in deposit rates % of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Immediate cut 83% 100% 100%
Cut after checking deposit 
commitments
17% ••
4.c.4 and 5.
Most banks found that there was little scope for cutting other costs and indicated 
that increasing bank charges would be one of the last considerations.
Scope in cost cutting/increasing bank charges
Scope for cost cutting/ increasing 
bank charges
% of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Little scope for cutting costs 100% 100% 100%
Increased charges least preferred
100% 100% 100%
4 .C .6
Most banks thought that a minimum rate on savings deposits was a major 
disadvantage, and that it did little to raise the level of deposits as savings deposits were 
interest inelastic.
Disadvantage of minimum savings rate
Advantage/ disadvantage % of Respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Slight disadvantage 20% 50% 33%
Great disadvantage 80% 50% 66%
Advantage 0% 50%
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Banks were asked to give their reasons for these conclusions. The following were the 
main reasons given.
A stipulated minimum savings rate:
1. reduces the interest margin available when lending rates are falling.
2. does not allow for market forces to determine interest rates.
3. facilitates a higher interest rate regime for loans.
4. ia a disadvantage if lending rates are controlled.
5. controls the margin between deposit and lending rates.
6. could make banks eliminate offering small savings accounts because of the
inherent costs of servicing such accounts.
4.C.7.
Most respondents felt that increases in the minimum savings rate had only a minimal effect 
on deposit growth. The responses are summarized below.
Effect of increased minimum savings rate on deposit growth
Effect on volume of savings of a minimum 
savings rate
% of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Helps a little 40% 33% 50%
Helps a lot 0% - -
Does not help 0% 66% 50%
4. c.8
Most respondents felt that competition for deposits was influenced more by changes 
in liquidity than by changes in interest rates. Commercial banks in Jamaica were undecided 
on the relative importance of liquidity or interest rate levels for competition.
323
Competition for deposit: relative influence of interest rates or liquidity
Relative impact on competition % of res] 1I
Country Bds Jca T&T
Interest rates 0% - 0%
Liquidity 100% - 100%
4 .C .9
The sources of illiquidity were identified as follows:
1. Increases in reserve requirements.
2. Withdrawal of funds by a major customer.
3. High loan demand.
4. A combination of the above.
4 .C .1 0
Although banks noted that the minimum savings rate had little impact on deposit growth the 
majority felt that interest rate controls impacted on liquidity in the banking system.
Do interest rate controls impact on liquidity of the system?
Impact of interest controls on liquidity % of respondents
Country BDS Jca T&T
Yes 33%
No 67%
( 4.d) Prudential Requirements
There was a high level of non-response on many of the capital requirement questions by 
commercial banks in Barbados. Responses from banks in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
were much more explicit. This was attributed to the fact that most banks in Barbados are 
branches of foreign banks and are not directly affected by capital requirements as their global 
capital is used as a reference point. Banks were more forthcoming on other prudential 
guidelines. Generally, they saw capital requirements as restricting profitability, particularly
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risk weighted capital requirements, but thought they were necessary. They were very critical 
of the imposition of concentration ratios which limited lending to a single customer.
4.d.l and 4.d 2
Adequacy of capital requirements
Minimum capital requirements Adequacy of capital requirements, % of 
respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Adequate 60% 100% 100%
High - - -
Low - - -
No response 40% - -
Risk-based capital requirements
Reasonable 40% 100% -
Too- strict 20% - -
Not sure 0% - -
The wide range of responses probably reflects the uncertainty about risk-based capital since 
the methodology is not transparent to banks but depends on the assessment of auditors and 
bank supervisors.
Are prudential requirements likely to affect the profitability of hanks?
Effect of prudential regulations on banks
Affect on profitability % of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Yes 40% _ -
No 40% 100% 100%
No response 20% - -
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Most banks in Barbados who responded to the question of concentration guidelines 
commented that while it might affect short term profitability it was in the long term interest 
of banks. Responses from Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica indicated greater concern about 
the impact of concentration guidelines on profitability. The lower level of concern in 
Barbados reflected the greater burden of customer concentration ratios on locally incorporated 
banks.
4.d.4.
Do Customer Concentration ratios on lending affect banks adversely?
Concentration Ratios % of respondents
Country Bds Jca T&T
Affect adversely 0% 100% 66%
Do not affect adversely
80%
- -
No Response 20% - 33%
4.d.5.and 4.d.6.
All banks responding felt that capital adequacy provisions impacted favourably on 
liquidity and solvency but mostly adversely on profitability.
Effect of capital adequacy provisions on liquidity, solvency and profitability
Response Liquidity (% of 
responses)
solvency (% of 
responses)
profitability (% of 
responses)
Country B J T B J T B J T
Favourable 100 50 - 100 - 0 20 - 66
Unfavour­
able
0 50 - - - 0 80 - 33
Not signif­
icant
0% - 100 - 100 100 - 100 -
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Results: Excluding and Including Regulatory Variables
(Preliminary OLS Results)
Appendices to Chapter 6
Appendix 6.1
DESCRIPTION ROA Excluding 
Regulatory variables
ROA - Including 
Regulatory Variables
C 1.14 (1.71) .504 (1.17)
TB .016 (1.91) .026 (3.64)
SF -.82 (-1.36) -1.15 (-2.50)
M -.002 (-.314 .147 (2.00)
CON .007 (.113) .007 (3.03)
RR -.024 (-2.14)
LD -.639 (-1.27) -.226 (-.57)
I .114 (1.67) .202 (1.91)
Inf .007 (.659
dumin «• .211 (5.40)
dumcr -.083 (2.00)
R2 .405 .700
R  bar squared .292 .630
D .W . 1.09 1.86
F statistic 3.61 9.92 9.92
s.e. .146 .105 .105
Misspecification MSI [F 
(1,50] MS2 [X2 (1)]
8.76 9.22 .039 .049
Normality N[X2 (2) .397 .108
Heteroscedasticity F [1.62] 
LM (1)
1.18 1.19 3.20 3.14 1
Serial Correlation F [4,47] 
X 2 (4)
8.31 25.86 .485 2.54
ROA denotes Return on Assets
ROPA denotes Return on Operating Profits
BTSETA denotes the ratio of Net Profit and Staff Expenses to Total Assets
OLS Results Appendix 6.2
Capital as an Explanatory Variable
The results of that regression are set out below:
Barbados
Results of Regression Using the Narrow Definition of Capital as an Explanatory Variable
R2 .785
R bar squared .726 
RSS .367
DW 2.00
F stat 13.24
s.e. .088
The equation is expressed as :
ROA =  .642 + .012 TB -1.22 SF+.003 M +.006 CON 
(1.71) (1.88) (-3.00) (4.84) (4.95)
-.050RR -.071LD + .1671- .041CAP +.206dumin-.065dumcr
(-5.11) (-.181) (1.99) (-1.13) (4.89) (-2.24)
-.052s 1 - . 159s2 -.034s3 
(1.54) (-4.67) (-.99)
Results showed that the coefficient for capital, though having a t-value greater than
unity, was not significant, indicating that capital defined to include paid-up capital and
reserves may have no impact on bank profitability. Lags used in that regression equation are 
the same as those included in the earlier equation. The explanatory power of the equation 
improved only marginally as measured by the multiple correlation coefficient but the F- 
statistic slipped slightly indicating that the results as a whole were less robust when lags were 
added. Diagnostic tests for this equation indicate no sign of serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity.
Results of Diagnostic Tests:
Misspecification Normality Heteroscedasticity 
F .608(1,46) 1.422 (1,59)
328
329
X2 .796 (1) .243 (2) 1.436(1)
Serial Correlation
F .295(4,43) X2 1.63(4)
Appendix 6.3
Regression Results with Loan Loss Provisions (and Staff Expenses) Included in Return on 
Assets (btfxla) - Barbados
btfxla =  .67 + .005TB + .207M +  .86SF-.04RR +.007CON 
(1.9) (.096) (2.72) (1.90) (-4.02) (4.30)
-.37LD + .091 + .lldumin -.09 dumcr -.04sl -.05s2 -.003s3 
(-.876) (1.02) (2.47) (-2.83) (-1.22) (-1.57) (-1.00)
R2 =  .636
R bar squared =  .541 
DW = 1.66
F stat (12,46) 6.70 
Max log likelihood 68.99
Diagnostic Tests
ser. cor. LM (4) 5.46 F (4,42) (1.07)
Functional form LM (1) (.036) F (1.45) (.028)
Normality LM (2) (.537)
Hetero LM (1) (1.15) F (1.14)
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Appendix 6 .4
L i q u i d i t y :  lo a n  d e p o s i t  r a t i o :  l o c a l  banks
L i q u i d i t y :  lo a n  d e p o s i t  r a t i o :  la r g e  banks
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